Basic Flying Skills and Aircraft certification Airbus Captain Xavier Lesceu Basic Flying Skills and Aircraft certification DGAC Paris 8 December 2016

The PAST

NOW

Fly by Wire and protections Panel logic Dark cockpit Fly by Wire and protections Vertical display Ghost bird Auto Pilot robustness FMS RNAV, FLS RNP Side-stick ECAM

Back to the Basics

What to AVOID

Undesired Aircraft State What must BE AVOIDED Undesired Aircraft State An undesired aircraft state is characterized by unintentional divergences from parameters normally experienced during operations.  An aircraft upset may involve pitch and/or bank angle divergences as well as inappropriate airspeeds for the conditions.

Prevent LOC - I Flight envelope protections Improved alerting Aircraft design Flight envelope protections Improved alerting Automation improvements Flight Crew training Stall training Upset prevention and recovery Crew resource management Flight crew proficiency Simulator fidelity

Maintain a high level of proficiency Back to Basics Maintain a high level of proficiency Knowledge Practice Apply Key Legend

Is Flying SAFE ?

Is flying safe Flying is safe as it is based on the combination of 4 pre-requisites Safe design according to certification requirements Aircraft maintained according to approved procedures Aircraft operated by skilled pilots Aircraft flown within a safe ATM en route and airfield environment è These 4 pre-requisites are intrinsically linked together.

A key question: What is safe ? Is it “safe” to fly with failures, with degraded flight controls, without AP, FD, ATHR?

About safety Everyday life risks Without any risks ? Birth: 2.9 x 10-3 Delivery: 10-3 to 10-4 Anesthesia + surgery: around 10-4 Fighter pilot: 10-5 per hour Traveling by car: around 10-6 per hour Heart attack ? Collapse of the building ? Without any risks ?

Relation between severity and probability of acceptable risks.

Dealing with risks in aircraft design “Catastrophic” events are acceptable if their probability is lower than one for one billion flight hours (10-9). (This is equivalent to one event each 1157 centuries of flight.) Example: combination of 2 failures probable at 10-5 “Hazardous” events must be less probable than 10-7 “Major” events must be less probable than 10-5 “Minor” events may be more probable than 10-5

Dealing with risks in aircraft design Aircraft are designed against § 25-1309 of the certification regulations. This regulation requires that the severity of any event must be in accordance with its probability of occurrence.

Required relations between probability and severity: ACJ 25-1309

Required relations between probability and severity: ACJ 25-1309

Required relations between probability and severity: ACJ 25-1309

EXAMPLES

Examples CATASTROPHIC Multiple deaths, usually with loss of aircraft Rationale The AP orders are erroneous, the AP cannot be disengaged, the crew has no mean to fly the aircraft which is out of control.

Examples HAZARDOUS Large reduction in safety margins; crew extended because of workload or environmental conditions; serious injury or death of small number of occupants Rationale The crew must immediately detect the failure and take over manually within a short delay.

Examples MAJOR Significant reduction in safety margins; difficult for the crew to cope with adverse conditions; passengers injuries Rationale The detection by the crew of the untimely AP engagement may not be immediate, and lead to an awkward landing.

DGAC Examples MINOR Normal Nuisance Operating limitations: emergency procedures Rationale Any pilot is assumed to be able to ensure easily basic manual flying without automation. Possible operational effects can be expected, e.g. RVSM limitations.

Expected flying skills when dealing with risks in aircraft design The severity of an event is assessed taking into account Effects on aircraft & occupants, Assumption of crew capability to face this event This assumption of crew capability to face the event considers expected flying skills

The challenges Remember: Flying is safe because it is based on the combination of 4 pre-requisites which are intrinsically linked together Safe design according to certification requirements Aircraft maintained according to approved procedures Aircraft operated by skilled pilots Aircraft flown within a safe ATM en route and airfield environment Not fulfilling these 4 pre-requisites may lead to change an acceptable risk into an unacceptable risk

Example of assumptions about the pilot’s skills Example of a failure with a probability of 6.4 10-6 classified as MAJOR

Reminder: Pilot take-over time - certification requirements Certification Rules take as an assumption the following pilot reaction time to take over 3 seconds in Cruise 1 second in Approach

Example of assumptions about the pilot’s skills Example of a failure with a probability of 6.4 10-6 classified as MAJOR THIS CLASSIFICATION IS BASED ON TWO ASSUMED PILOT’S SKILLS: 1) THE PILOTS MONITOR THE RAW DATA AND DETECT A WRONG FLIGHT GUIDANCE 2) THE PILOTS CAN FLY A MANUAL CAT 1 ILS ON THE RAW DATA WITHOUT AP & FD

What if the pilot’s skills would not be as they should be? Example of a failure with probability of 6.4 10-6 classified as MAJOR MAJOR HAZARDOUS Should the skills Not be as expected CATASTROPHIC MAJOR

Required relations between probability and severity: ACJ 25-1309 The probability of the failure (of 6.4 10-6) would become INCONSISTENT WITH ITS SEVERITY !

What if the pilot’s skills would not be as they should be ? SAFETY WOULD BE AT STAKE !

EVALUATE

Evaluation Aerodynamics Performance Undesired aircraft state Theoretical knowledge Aerodynamics Performance Undesired aircraft state Skills Manual flying skills Treat and error management Decision making Crew communication

TRAIN

Theoretical knowledge Ground Theoretical knowledge High altitude aerodynamics Definitions of aircraft upset Undesired aircraft state Causes of aircraft upset Environmental effects Flight instruments failures Pilot induced airplane upset ………

USE of VIDEO

SKILLS

Training area Stall Stall warning VFE MMO VMO MD VD

Skills in simulator Simulator Fly in the whole flight envelope Start in the middle and work towards the edges Raw data flight AP/ FD / ATHR / FPV OFF flights Day / Night Adverse weather conditions

Skills in simulator Simulator Stall and Upset training refer to OTT Incorporate OEM into scenario if needed Don’t change simulator models without OEM cooperation Do not experiment

FLY

Manual flight in daily operations Aircraft Manual flight in daily operations Establish policy Weather conditions Level of automation AP – ATHR - FD FDA Review manual flight operations Feedback to training

Think and RETHINK Training

Prevention is a key Recovery skill need to be maintained Do not set artificial requirements Simulators at the highest fidelity Share experience and scenarios It is an industry problem that we must solve together Contact your OEM and do not experiment

An “engaged” pilot uses his superior judgment to avoid situations which require the use of his superior skill. Frank Borman

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