Sujoy Sikdar, Lirong Xia, Sibel Adalı

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Presentation transcript:

Computing Optimal Decisions for Probabilistic Conditional Preference Networks Sujoy Sikdar, Lirong Xia, Sibel Adalı Department of Computer Science, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute Alternatives characterized by multiple issues. Agents have combinatorial preferences on the issues. Goal: Make an optimum group decision on every issue. Examples: Multi-issue referenda, Omnibus legislative bills. Configuring a meal from a dinner menu. Multi-Issue Voting First approach to address cyclic preferential dependencies. New class of voting rules for profiles of CP-nets Global loss ( 𝐿 𝐺 ): total number of outcomes that dominate 𝑑 . A unified framework to reason about optimal outcomes for acyclic and cyclic CP-nets and their probabilistic extension, PCP-nets, with full generality. Motivation Main dish preference w/ pr. 0.7 0.3 CP-net induced w/ pr. 0.7×0.6×0.7 Main dishes > , > { , } X { , } Main dishes X Wines Choices faced in a restaurant. Main dish Wine preference w/ pr. 0.6 0.4 0.3 0.7 Wines > , > Some natural notions of the loss of a decision 𝑑 w.r.t a given CP-net 𝐶 in terms of the number of other outcomes that dominate it. 0-1 loss ( 𝐿 0−1 ): the loss is 1 if 𝑑 is dominated in 𝐶, and 0 otherwise. This corresponds to the most probable optimal outcome [Cornelio et al. 2013]. Neighborhood loss ( 𝐿 𝑁 ): # neighboring alternatives (that differ by the value of only one attribute) that dominate 𝑑 . Corresponds to local Condorcet winner [Conitzer et al., 2011]. Global loss ( 𝐿 𝐺 ): total number of outcomes that dominate 𝑑 . Loss Minimization Framework An example of a PCP-net over meal configurations and induced CP-net. Computing the Optimal Decision: Complexity Optimization Objective: Find the outcome that minimizes the loss in expectation. 𝐿-OPTDECISION: 𝒅 ∗ =𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑖 𝑛 𝒅 𝐿 𝑄, 𝑑 A compact preferences language with conditional preferential dependencies using ceteris paribus statements “I prefer red wine to white wine with my meal, ceteris paribus, given that meat is served.” CP-nets 𝐋𝐨𝐬𝐬 𝐟𝐧. Acyclic Cyclic 𝐿 0−1 P [Boutilier et al., ‘04] NP-complete 𝐿 𝑁 𝐿 𝐺 P 𝐋𝐨𝐬𝐬 𝐟𝐧. Acyclic Cyclic 𝐿 0−1 NP-complete, P for trees [Cornelio et al., ‘13] NP-complete [Cornelio et al., ‘13] 𝐿 𝑁 NP-hard, P for trees NP-hard 𝐿 𝐺 coNP-hard Computing the Loss of a Decision: Complexity Main dishes Main dish preference (a) CP-nets 𝐋𝐨𝐬𝐬 𝐟𝐧. Acyclic Cyclic 𝐿 0−1 P 𝐿 𝑁 𝐿 𝐺 coNP-hard (b) PCP-nets , > Complexity of 𝐿-OPTDECISION: 𝒅 ∗ =𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑖 𝑛 𝒅 𝐿 𝑄, 𝑑 . Main dish Wine preference Wines Contributions > Complexity of 𝐿-LOSS: 𝐿 𝑄, 𝑑 . , Loss minimization framework for CP-nets and PCP-nets. Clear definition of optimality criteria for acyclic and cyclic (P)CP-nets with full generality. Natural loss functions that correspond to well studied notions of optimality. Complexity results for (i) computing loss, and, (ii) finding the optimal decision. Tractable cases for particular loss functions under this framework. Future work: Axiomatic characterization of voting rules characterized by a loss function. Identifying further reasonable loss functions and tractable cases under each. > Uncertain preferences of a single agent. Incorporate agents’ changing preferences. Aggregate representative CP-net preferences of multiple agents. PCP-nets induce a probability distribution over CP-nets with the same dependency structure. PCP-nets An example of CP-net preferences over a restaurant menu. Dominance relationships imposed by a CP-net.