Constant Time Updates in Hierarchical Heavy Hitters

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Presentation transcript:

Constant Time Updates in Hierarchical Heavy Hitters Ran Ben Basat, Technion Gil Einziger, Nokia Bell Labs Joint work with Erez Waisbard (Nokia Bell Labs) Roy Friedman (Technion) and Marcello Luzieli (UFGRS)

Distributed Denial of Service

Hierarchical Heavy Hitters (HHH) identify traffic clusters. They are at the core of numerous DDoS mitigation systems… DDoS attack (Aug. 2014) DREAM: dynamic resource allocation for software-defined Counting. ACM SIGCOMM 2014 LADS: Large-scale Automated DDoS Detection System. USENIX ATC 2006 Automatically Inferring Patterns of Resource Consumption in Network Traffic. ACM SIGCOMM 2003

DDoS Mitigation Can we block only the attacking devices? 181.7.20.1 181.7.20.2 … 181.7.21.1 181.7.21.2 Can we block only the attacking devices?

Hierarchical Heavy Hitters Hierarchical Heavy Hitters identifies frequent: Flows (heavy hitters) Source networks. Source-Destination pairs. 181.7.∗.∗ 181.7.20.∗ 220.7.16.∗ 220.7.16.9 181.7.20.13

State of the art “Count each prefix independently.” 181.7.20.6 Level0 Counting Level0 Counting Level1 Counting Level1 Counting Compute all prefixes 181.7.20.6 181.7.20.6 181.7.20.* Level2 Counting Level2 Counting 181.7.*.* 181.*.*.* Level3 Counting Level3 Counting *.*.*.* Level4 Counting Level4 Counting Mitzenmacher et al., Hierarchical Heavy Hitters with the Space Saving Algorithm, ALENEX 2012

Randomized HHH (Our work) “Select a prefix at random and count it” Level0 Counting Level1 Counting Level1 Counting Compute a random prefix 181.7.20.6 Level2 Counting 181.7.20.* Level3 Counting Level4 Counting

Compute a random prefix Additional Speedup Level0 Counting Level1 Counting Level1 Counting With probability 90% Compute a random prefix Level2 Counting 181.7.20.* 188.67.7.1 181.7.20.2 92.67.7.81 188.3.12.3 181.7.20.3 181.7.20.6 92.67.7.81 181.7.20.3 181.7.20.2 181.7.20.6 188.67.7.1 188.3.12.3 Level3 Counting Level4 Counting Ignore packet

We did the math Accuracy and convergence guarantees . After enough packets there are: No false negatives. No counting errors. Only a few false positives.

How much traffic is needed for convergence? “Accuracy improves with the number of packets” 128M packets 128M packets Counting Errors False Negatives 32M packets 32M packets One prefix packet One prefix per 10 packets

Comparison with other HHH algorithms “Accuracy improves with the number of packets” One prefix per packet One prefix per 10 packets Mitzenmacher et al. Cormode et al., Finding hierarchical heavy hitters in streaming data, TKDD 2008

Comparison with other HHH algorithms Up to X62 speedup! One update per packet One update per 10 packets Mitzenmacher et al. Cormode et al., Finding hierarchical heavy hitters in streaming data, TKDD 2008

Open vSwitch Implementation Server A: Traffic Generator We send min-sized packets with headers from Internet traces. Server B: DPDK enabled Open vSwitch Performs HHH Counting in data plane Server A: Traffic generator Serve B: Open vSwitch Traffic Generator Open vSwitch

Comparing Implementation Overhead Highlights: Only -4% overheads for HHH in the OVS data plane! +250% throughput improvement compared to previous work. One prefix per packet One prefix per 10 packets OVS Mitzenmacher et al.

Takeaways Real time hierarchical heavy hitters measurement in networking devices. Provable accuracy guarantees. Open source code: https://github.com/ranbenbasat/RHHH How to detect the maximal-prefix networks?

Any Questions