Secret Sharing in a Multidisciplinary Model

Slides:



Advertisements
Similar presentations
Auction Theory Class 5 – single-parameter implementation and risk aversion 1.
Advertisements

Collaboration Mechanisms in SOA based MANETs. Introduction Collaboration implies the cooperation between the nodes to support the proper functioning of.
Cryptography and Game Theory: Designing Protocols for Exchanging Information Gillat Kol and Moni Naor.
Secure Multiparty Computations on Bitcoin
Computer-aided mechanism design Ye Fang, Swarat Chaudhuri, Moshe Vardi 1.
Do software agents know what they talk about? Agents and Ontology dr. Patrick De Causmaecker, Nottingham, March
SRIRAM KRISHNAMACHARI MEHRDAD NOJOUMIAN KEMAL AKKAYA SOUTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY CARBONDALE FLORIDA ATLANTIC UNIVERSITY FLORIDA INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY.
A Prior-Free Revenue Maximizing Auction for Secondary Spectrum Access Ajay Gopinathan and Zongpeng Li IEEE INFOCOM 2011, Shanghai, China.
Computational Security. Overview Goal: Obtain computational security against an active adversary. Hope: under a reasonable cryptographic assumption, obtain.
Achieving Byzantine Agreement and Broadcast against Rational Adversaries Adam Groce Aishwarya Thiruvengadam Ateeq Sharfuddin CMSC 858F: Algorithmic Game.
Eran Omri, Bar-Ilan University Joint work with Amos Beimel and Ilan Orlov, BGU Ilan Orlov…!??!!
Detecting Phantom Nodes in Wireless Sensor Networks Joengmin Hwang Tian He Yongdae Kim Department of Computer Science, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis.
Mehrdad Nojoumian David R. Cheriton School of Computer Science University of Waterloo, Canada CrySP Lab Supervisor: Professor Douglas R. Stinson PhD Thesis.
Improving the Round Complexity of VSS in Point-to-Point Networks Jonathan Katz (University of Maryland) Chiu-Yuen Koo (Google Labs) Ranjit Kumaresan (University.
Mehrdad Nojoumian Department of Computer & Electrical Engineering and Computer Science Florida Atlantic University 4 th AAAI Workshop on Incentives and.
Secure Multi-party Computations (MPC) A useful tool to cryptographic applications Vassilis Zikas.

A Payment-based Incentive and Service Differentiation Mechanism for P2P Streaming Broadcast Guang Tan and Stephen A. Jarvis Department of Computer Science,
How to Share a Secret Amos Beimel. Secret Sharing [Shamir79,Blakley79,ItoSaitoNishizeki87] ? bad.
DANSS Colloquium By Prof. Danny Dolev Presented by Rica Gonen
TrustDavis: A Non-Exploitable Online Reputation System Dimitri DeFigueiredo and Earl T. Barr Dept. of Computer Science, University of California at Davis.
A Mechanism Design Approach for the Stabilization of Networked dynamical systems L. Galbusera, N. Gatti, C. Romani Dipartimento di Elettronica e Informazione.
How to play ANY mental game
Efficient and Robust Private Set Intersection and multiparty multivariate polynomials Dana Dachman-Soled 1, Tal Malkin 1, Mariana Raykova 1, Moti Yung.
Price Discrimination in E-market Emese Habodász Július Pál.
Secure Computation (Lecture 5) Arpita Patra. Recap >> Scope of MPC > models of computation > network models > modelling distrust (centralized/decentralized.
On the Cost of Reconstructing a Secret, or VSS with Optimal Reconstruction Phase Ronald Cramer, Ivan Damgard, Serge Fehr.
Rational Cryptography Some Recent Results Jonathan Katz University of Maryland.
Auctions serve the dual purpose of eliciting preferences and allocating resources between competing uses. A less fundamental but more practical reason.
The Pennsylvania State University CSE597B: Special Topics in Network and Systems Security The Miscellaneous Instructor: Sencun Zhu.
PROACTIVE SECRET SHARING Or: How to Cope With Perpetual Leakage Herzberg et al. Presented by: Avinash Ravi Kevin Skapinetz.
Utility Dependence in Correct and Fair Rational Secret Sharing Gilad Asharov Yehuda Lindell Bar-Ilan University, Israel.
Second Price Auctions A Case Study of Secure Distributed Computing Bart De Decker Gregory Neven Frank Piessens Erik Van Hoeymissen.
Round-Efficient Multi-Party Computation in Point-to-Point Networks Jonathan Katz Chiu-Yuen Koo University of Maryland.
Computing Shapley values, manipulating value division schemes, and checking core membership in multi-issue domains Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm Computer.
Contents of the Talk Preliminary Materials Motivation and Contribution
Approximation algorithms for combinatorial allocation problems
Managerial Economics Game Theory
Generalized Agent-mediated procurement auctions
Adaptively Secure Multi-Party Computation from LWE (via Equivocal FHE)
Comp/Math 553: Algorithmic Game Theory Lecture 08
Lecture 13.
Auctions and Competitive Bidding
To Whom the Revenue Goes: A Network Economic Analysis of the Price War in the Wireless Telecommunication Industry Vaggelis G. Douros, Petri Mähönen   Institute.
Rational Choice Sociology
Comp/Math 553: Algorithmic Game Theory Lecture 09
Caching Games between Content Providers and Internet Service Providers
Bidding on an Antique.
Internet Economics כלכלת האינטרנט
On Communication Protocols that Compute Almost Privately
Game Theory in Wireless and Communication Networks: Theory, Models, and Applications Lecture 6 Auction Theory Zhu Han, Dusit Niyato, Walid Saad, Tamer.
On the Power of Hybrid Networks in Multi-Party Computation
Distributed Consensus
Competitive Auctions and Digital Goods
For ASIACRYPT 2018 Constructing Ideal Secret Sharing Schemes based on Chinese Remainder Theorem Fuyou Miao University of Science and Technology of China.
Secret Sharing: Linear vs. Nonlinear Schemes (A Survey)
A Novel Secret Sharing Scheme from Audio Perspective
Fast Secure Computation for Small Population over the Internet
Some New Issues on Secret Sharing Schemes
Cryptology Design Fundamentals
Rie Mashima & Nobuyuki Takahashi (Hokkaido University)
Example: multi-party coin toss
Helen: Maliciously Secure Coopetitive Learning for Linear Models
A Trust Evaluation Framework in Distributed Networks: Vulnerability Analysis and Defense Against Attacks IEEE Infocom
Cryptographic Protocols Secret Sharing, Threshold Security
Information, Incentives, and Mechanism Design
Auction Theory תכנון מכרזים ומכירות פומביות
Blockchain Mining Games
Announcement Sign up google sheet for in class lectures
Class 2 – Revenue equivalence
Presentation transcript:

From Rational Secret Sharing to Social and Socio-Rational Secret Sharing

Secret Sharing in a Multidisciplinary Model

Trust and Reputation Systems Trust versus Reputation: Trust is a personal quantity, created between “2” players, whereas Reputation is a social quantity in a network of “n” players. Trust Function: Let ij (p) be the trust value assigned by player Pj to Pi in period “p”. Let i be the trust function representing the reputation of Pi. Example: If all players have an equal view, trust = reputation. A1 A2 A3 A4 0.4 0.5 0.6 j=1 n 4 (p) = 1/(4-1)  4j (p) = 1/3 (0.4 + 0.5 + 0.6) = 0.5

Review of a Well-Known Solution Previous Solution: trust value T(p+1) is given by the following equations and it depends on the previous trust rating where:   0 and   0 [CIA’00]. T(p) Cooperation Defection > 0 T(p) +  (1-T(p)) (T(p) + ) / (1- min{ |T(p)| , || }) < 0 (T(p) +  ) / (1 - min{ |T(p)| , || }) T(p) +  (1+T(p)) = 0   T(p) < 0 T(p) = 0 T(p) > 0 T(p) < 0 T(p) = 0 T(p) > 0

Our Trust Model Our Function is not just a function of a single round, but of the history: Reward more (or same) the better a participant is, Penalize more (or same) the worse a participant is. Discourage Reward TGood Pi  (,+1] Opportunities Give/Take T New Pi: [,] Penalize Encourage TBad Pi  [-1,) Defection Cooperation Trust Value Bad Pi (C) Newcomer Pi (C) Good Pi (C) Bad Pi (D) Newcomer Pi (D) Good Pi (D)  

Intuition and Motivation There exist some common principles for trust modeling A lies to B for the 1st time: defection A lies to B for the 2nd time: same defection + past history A cheat on B: costly defection  Impact of the brain’s history

Shamir Secret Sharing Sharing: a secret is divided into n shares in order to be distributed among n players. Reconstruction: an authorize subset of players then cooperate to reveal the secret, e.g., t players where t < n is the threshold. Example: t = 2 points are sufficient to define a line: ( 1, 2 ), ( 2, 3 ), ( 3, 4 ), ( 4, 5 )  y = x+1 t = 3 points are sufficient to define a parabola. t = 4 points are sufficient to define a cubic curve. In general, it takes t points to define a polynomial of degree t-1. Secret = 1

Application of Secret Sharing Secure Multiparty Computation: compute  with private inputs. Sealed-Bid Auctions: preserve the privacy of different parameters. Secrecy of the selling price and winner’s identity are optional. To have a fair auction, confidentiality of the losing bids is important: They can be used in future auctions and negotiations by different parties, e.g., auctioneers to maximize their revenues or competitors to win the auction. P2 : x2 P1: x1 Pn : xn sharing … (x1, …, xn) reconstruction computation  …  Sealed-Bid 1st-Price Auctions: the bidder who proposes the highest bid β wins & pays $β.

Rational Secret Sharing Problem: the players deny to reveal their shares in the secret recovery phase, therefore, the secret is not reconstructed at all. Example: f (x) = 3 + 2 x + x2  t=3 shares are enough for recovery. Model: players are selfish rather than being honest or malicious. If all players act selfishly, secret recovery fails. Solution: Pi Pj Pk 6 11 18 selfish 6 11 only Pk learns the secret “3” fake secret recovery rounds … unknown real recovery round

STOC’04 Paper Problem: 3-out-of-3 rational secret sharing. Solution: a multi-round recovery approach. In each round, dealer initiates a fresh secret sharing of the same secret. During an iteration, each Pi flips a biased coin ci with Pr[ci = 1] = . Players then compute c* =  ci by MPC without revealing ci-s. If c* = ci = 1, player Pi broadcast his share. There are 3 possibilities: If all shares are revealed, the secret is recovered and the protocol ends. If c* = 1 and 0 or 2 shares are revealed, players terminate the protocol. In any other cases, the dealer and players proceed to the next round. c1 c2 c3 ci reveal - 1 s3 s2 s1 s1,s2,s3 0 , 2 1 P1 P2 P3 s1 s2 s3 all players are selfish 3

Socio-Rational Secret Sharing Motivation: we would like to consider a repeated secret sharing game where players enter into a long-term interaction for executing an unknown number of independent secret sharing schemes. Contribution: a public trust network is constructed to incentivize players to be cooperative, i.e., they can then gain extra utilities. In other words, players avoid selfish behaviors due to the social reinforcement of the trust network.

Application in Repeated Games Sealed-Bid Auctions: consider a repeated secret sharing game. Bidders select “n” out of “N” auctioneers based on their reputation. Each bidder then acts as an independent dealer and shares his bid. Auctioneers simulate a secure MPC protocol to define the outcome. In the last round of the MPC, they need to recover the selling price. Only auctioneers who learn (report) the selling price are rewarded. At the end of each game, the reputation of each auctioneer is updated.

Our Construction in Nutshell Utility Estimation Function: is used by a rational foresighted player. Estimation of the future gain/loss due to the trust adjustment (virtual). Learning the secret at the current time (real). The number of other players learning the secret at the moment (real). Prominent Properties: our solution Has a single reconstruction round. Provides a stable solution concept. Is immune to rushing attack. Prevents the players to abort. decision making $ despite all the existing protocols

Utility Assumption Rational vs Socio-Rational Secret Sharing: : whether Pi has learned the secret or not, and let . The first preference illustrates that whether Pi learns the secret or not, he prefers to stay reputable. The second assumption means Pi prefers the outcome in which he learns the secret. The third one means Pi prefers the outcome in which the fewest number of other players learn the secret. Socio-Rational Rational

assume Pi has contributed in two consecutive periods p and p-1 Utility Computation Sample Function: which satisfies our utility assumptions. assume Pi has contributed in two consecutive periods p and p-1 i  [1 , 3] [-3 , -1] or [1 , 3]  = $100 ui ’

Protocol: Socio-Rational SS Sharing Phase: Non-reputable Newcomer Reputable %10 %30 %60

Protocol: Socio-Rational SS Reconstruction Phase: Action Profile Reputation Profile Three Actions consider the current and a few games further only consider the current game

Comparison (2,2)-Socio-Rational Secret Sharing: despite rational secret sharing, Cooperation is always the best strategy even if the other party defects. Utility Comparison: where (2,2)- Secret Sharing with Selfish Players (2,2)- Socio-Rational Secret Sharing

Intuition and Motivation Reputation is a key point for having a successful social collaboration Rational players should have a long-term vision as reputable persons or companies gain more profit all the time

Thank You Very Much More Resources: Nojoumian M. and Stinson D. R., Socio-Rational Secret Sharing as a New Direction in Rational Cryptography, 3rd Conference on Decision and Game Theory for Security (GameSec), Springer LNCS 7638, pp. 18-37, Budapest, Hungary, 2012. Nojoumian M., Novel Secret Sharing and Commitment Schemes for Cryptographic Applications, PhD Thesis, David R. Cheriton School of Computer Science, U of Waterloo, Canada, 2012. Nojoumian M. and Stinson D. R., Social Secret Sharing in Cloud Computing Using a New Trust Function, 10th IEEE Annual Conference on Privacy, Security and Trust (PST), pp. 161-167, Paris, France, 2012. Nojoumian M., Stinson D. R., and Grainger M., Unconditionally Secure Social Secret Sharing Scheme, IET Information Security (IFS), vol. 4, issue 4, pp. 202-211, 2010. Nojoumian M. and Stinson D. R., Brief Announcement: Secret Sharing Based on the Social Behaviors of Players, 29th ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing (PODC), pp. 239-240, Zurich, Switzerland, 2010. Nojoumian M. and Lethbridge T. C., A New Approach for the Trust Calculation in Social Networks, 3rd International Conference on E-Business (ICE-B), pp. 257-264, Setubal, Portugal, 2006.