NERC Published Lessons Learned

Slides:



Advertisements
Similar presentations
Revised Event Analysis Process Event Analysis Subcommittee (EAS) Process Update Team (EUT) Hassan Hamdar – FRCC Reliability Engineer, EAS Vice-Chair FRCC.
Advertisements

NERC Lessons Learned Summary December NERC lessons learned published in December 2014 Three NERC lessons learned (LL) were published in December.
Group 3 John Gregory John Marsh Gerri Houston Samantha McNeily.
SIM5102 Software Evaluation
September 2014 Lesson Learned Summary. September 2014 LLs 2 Three NERC lessons learned (LL) were published in September 2014 LL Redundant Network.
NERC Lessons Learned Summary March NERC lessons learned published in March 2015 Two NERC lessons learned (LL) were published in March2015 LL
Segment Two: Business Requirements Drive the Technical Updates January 26-27, 2012 Idaho ICD-10 Site Visit Training segments to assist the State of Idaho.
NERC Lessons Learned Summary
ITIL Process Management An Overview of Service Management Processes Presented by Jerree Catlin, Sue Silkey & Thelma Simons.
EC4019PA Intrusion & Access Control Technology (IACT) Chapter 4- CAMS Prepared by Sandy Tay.
© Copyright 2013 TONE SOFTWARE CORPORATION. Confidential and Proprietary. All rights reserved. ® Operator Training – Release Alarms Suppression and.
03/22/07 TPTF meeting ICCP Quality Codes Bill Blevins/Frank Kendall.
ERCOT Retail Market IT Update Aaron Smallwood Director, IT Operations Retail Market Subcommittee April 7 th, 2015.
ITIL Process Management An Overview of Service Management Processes Thanks to Jerree Catlin, Sue Silkey & Thelma Simons University of Kansas.
NERC Lessons Learned Summary April NERC lessons learned published in April 2015 Two NERC lessons learned (LL) were published in April 2015 LL
Event Management & ITIL V3
IT Technical Support 1. Introduction Technical support personnel offer support for individual and organizations in a variety of ways. This module focuses.
EAS Lessons Learned Summary Lessons Learned Published in August 2014.
Project Real-time Monitoring and Analysis Capabilities Mark Olson, Senior Standards Developer Texas RE NSRS October 5, 2015.
NERC Lessons Learned Summary February NERC lessons learned published in February 2015 Two NERC lessons learned (LL) were published in February 2015.
EAS Lessons Learned Summary Lessons Learned Published in June 2014.
Loss of EMS Events 2015 System Operator Seminar. Training Objectives 2 System Operators will be able to identify the ERO Event Analysis Process Category.
NERC Lessons Learned Summary LLs Published in September 2015.
Requirements Engineering Requirements Management Lecture-25.
Loss of EMS Events 2015 System Operator Seminar. Training Objectives 2 System Operators will be able to identify the ERO Event Analysis Process Category.
NERC Lessons Learned Summary LLs Published in December 2015.
ICS Area Managers Training 2010 ITIL V3 Overview April 1, 2010.
NERC Published Lessons Learned Summary
Introduction to CAST Technical Support
Chapter 19: Network Management
NERC Published Lessons Learned
NERC Published Lessons Learned Summary
NERC Published Lessons Learned
NERC Lessons Learned Summary
Introduction Edited by Enas Naffar using the following textbooks: - A concise introduction to Software Engineering - Software Engineering for students-
Phase Angle Limitations
Incident Management Incident Management.
NERC Published Lessons Learned
EAS Lessons Learned Summary
NERC Published Lessons Learned
NERC Published Lessons Learned Summary
Chapter 18 Maintaining Information Systems
DCR ARB Presentation Team 5: Tour Conductor.
NERC Published Lessons Learned Summary
Enterprise Algorithm Change Process
CORRECTIVE MAINTENANCE (REPAIRS) MANAGEMENT
ISO New England System R&D Needs
Processing Integrity and Availability Controls
IT Service Operation - purpose, function and processes
ERO Portal Overview & CFR Tool Training
Introduction to Operating System (OS)
Top-Down Network Design Chapter Nine Developing Network Management Strategies Copyright 2010 Cisco Press & Priscilla Oppenheimer.
SUPPORT OPTIONS Note to Presenter: This is a high-level presentation of EMC’s CSS Support Options. Backup slides are also available which include additional.
Unfortunately, any small business could face the risk of a data breach or cyber attack. Regardless of how big or small your business is, if your data,
Introduction Edited by Enas Naffar using the following textbooks: - A concise introduction to Software Engineering - Software Engineering for students-
E-NOTIFY and CAER OnLine Training
EMResource, HAvBED Poll, ED & Census Poll, Hospital Diversion
Introduction to CAST Technical Support
“TOP-010-1: Data Quality, Analysis Quality, and Alarm Process Monitor”
Impacts and Actions Resulting from the August 14, 2003 Blackout
PLC / SCADA / HMI Controllers: Name : Muhammad Zunair Comsats University Date: 28-October-2018.
The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services
Coordinate Operations Standard
WISP Follow on Reporting.
Project Name - Testing Iteration 1 UAT Kick-off
CFR Enhancement Session
Top-Down Network Design Chapter Nine Developing Network Management Strategies Copyright 2010 Cisco Press & Priscilla Oppenheimer.
Demo for Partners and Customers
International Standards and Contemporary Technologies,
Presentation transcript:

NERC Published Lessons Learned December 2016 Rev1

NERC Lessons Learned - December 2016 Two NERC Lessons Learned (LL) were published in the December 2016 LL20161201 Loss of ICCP – Local Control Center Notifications LL20161202 SCADA System Software Design Flaw Prevented Processing of Alarms and Events

Loss of ICCP - Details Entity A’s control center experienced multiple ICCP communication failures with external entities Due to the ICCP failures, Entity B’s State Estimator tool failed to solve because it was not receiving ICCP data from Entity A, resulting in a loss of their state estimator monitoring capabilities Entity B was the only entity in the area that experienced a failure of its state estimator during Entity A’s loss of ICCP data

Loss of ICCP – Corrective Actions Entity A returned the firewall to its pre-event state to stabilize the ICCP link Entity B restored the last good values from Entity A to their State Estimator model

Loss of ICCP - Lessons With the increasing reliance on real-time data and accurate state estimator solutions, entities are becoming more dependent on data from other TOPs TOPs and RCs should be encouraged to notify all BAs and TOPS in the area, (not just those adjacent BAs and TOPs) of a loss of ICCP This allows for other’s EMS support teams to make appropriate adjustments to their systems if needed

SCADA System Software Design Flaw - Details SO entered a comment on a SCADA alarm to provide additional information The comment was 179 characters in length (max allowable for this field) Character limit was by design based on the length of the field within the database A defect in the SCADA system only allowed the first 90 characters of the comment to be processed, but allowed 179 characters to be typed

SCADA System Software Design Flaw - Details The state of the alarm changed back to “normal” but the SO could not clear or delete it The database was designed for a 179 character message but it could only handle the first 90 characters due to a coding error; therefore, it hung while trying to evaluate the remaining part of the alarm note Rebooting the alarm process did not resolve the issue as it crashed every time attempting to process the alarm note

SCADA System Software Design Flaw – Details This filled the alarm processor queue, preventing additional alarms from being displayed, thus impacting the SO’s ability to monitor and control transmission facilities Eventually, the support staff, with assistance from the software vendor, were able to identify and truncate the System Operator’s note to less than 90 characters and successfully clear the database table After initial investigation, it was discovered that the vendor had a patch available to resolve this issue

SCADA System Software Design Flaw – Corrective Actions A software patch provided by the vendor was applied to the SCADA system, preventing future notes from inhibiting the system’s ability to process state changes

SCADA System Software Design Flaw - Lessons Software users should consider stress testing all user- enterable fields In this event a non-essential function became a single point of failure Be proactive about reviewing vendor patches, regardless of how insignificant they may appear Engaging vendor support early may help identify and resolve problems faster

SCADA System Software Design Flaw A centralized monitoring of the system’s components and processes may help diagnose these issues sooner SOs should be trained on the importance of situational awareness as it relates to EMS health Early detection of EMS health issues and notification to EMS support personnel leads to quicker resolution

Lessons Learned Survey Link NERC’s goal with publishing lessons learned is to provide industry with technical and understandable information that assists them with maintaining the reliability of the bulk power system NERC requests that industry provide input on lessons learned by taking the short survey. A link is provided in the PDF version of each Lesson Learned

Hassan Hamdar hhamdar@frcc.com