National Security & Politics History, Geopolitics and International Affairs

War Powers Resolution

War Powers Resolution

War Powers Resolution

War Powers Resolution

Passed November 7, 1973, over a presidential veto. War Powers Resolution Passed November 7, 1973, over a presidential veto.

PBS NewsHour – February 11, 2015 ( 1:06 – 3:22 )

PBS NewsHour – February 11, 2015 ( 24:10 – 31:25 )

Lessons Learned from Vietnam War Weinberger Doctrine Caspar W. Weinberger "The Uses of Military Power" National Press Club, Washington, D.C. Nov. 28, 1984 • Secretary of Defense under President Reagan • Drafted by his military assistant, Brig Gen Colin Powell

Weinberger Doctrine • The United States should not commit forces to combat overseas unless the particular engagement or occasion is deemed vital to our national interest or that of our allies . . . .

National Interest National Interest: the collection of issues that support our vision and goals

National Interest National Interest:  The security of the United States, its citizens, and U.S. allies and partners;  A strong, innovative and growing U.S. economy in an open international economic system that promotes opportunity and prosperity;  Respect for universal values at home and around the world; and  An international order advanced by U.S. leadership that promotes peace, security, and opportunity through stronger cooperation to meet global challenges. National Security Strategy of the US, 2010

Vital National Interest Vital National Interests: those issues of such importance over which the nation is willing to go to war

Weinberger Doctrine • The United States should not commit forces to combat overseas unless the particular engagement or occasion is deemed vital to our national interest or that of our allies . . . . • If we decide it is necessary to put combat troops into a given situation, we should do so wholeheartedly and with the clear intention of winning . . .

Weinberger Doctrine • The United States should not commit forces to combat overseas unless the particular engagement or occasion is deemed vital to our national interest or that of our allies . . . . • If we decide it is necessary to put combat troops into a given situation, we should do so wholeheartedly and with the clear intention of winning . . . . • If we do decide to commit forces to combat overseas, we should have clearly defined political and military objectives . . . .

Weinberger Doctrine • The relationship between our objectives • The United States should not commit forces to combat overseas unless the particular engagement or occasion is deemed vital to our national interest or that of our allies . . . . • If we decide it is necessary to put combat troops into a given situation, we should do so wholeheartedly and with the clear intention of winning . . . . • If we do decide to commit forces to combat overseas, we should have clearly defined political and military objectives . . . . • The relationship between our objectives and the forces we have committed -- their size, composition, and disposition -- must be continually reassessed and adjusted if necessary . . . .

Weinberger Doctrine • The United States should not commit forces to combat overseas unless the particular engagement or occasion is deemed vital to our national interest or that of our allies . . . . • If we decide it is necessary to put combat troops into a given situation, we should do so wholeheartedly and with the clear intention of winning . . . . • If we do decide to commit forces to combat overseas, we should have clearly defined political and military objectives . . . . • The relationship between our objectives and the forces we have committed -- their size, composition, and disposition -- must be continually reassessed and adjusted if necessary . . . . • Before the United States commits combat forces abroad, there must be some reasonable assurance we will have the support of the American people and their elected representatives in Congress . . . .

Weinberger Doctrine • The United States should not commit forces to combat overseas unless the particular engagement or occasion is deemed vital to our national interest or that of our allies . . . . • If we decide it is necessary to put combat troops into a given situation, we should do so wholeheartedly and with the clear intention of winning . . . . • If we do decide to commit forces to combat overseas, we should have clearly defined political and military objectives . . . . • The relationship between our objectives and the forces we have committed -- their size, composition, and disposition -- must be continually reassessed and adjusted if necessary . . . . • Before the United States commits combat forces abroad, there must be some reasonable assurance we will have the support of the American people and their elected representatives in Congress . . . . • The commitment of US forces to combat should be a last resort.

Weinberger Doctrine • The United States should not commit forces to combat overseas unless the particular engagement or occasion is deemed vital to our national interest or that of our allies . . . . • If we decide it is necessary to put combat troops into a given situation, we should do so wholeheartedly and with the clear intention of winning . . . . • If we do decide to commit forces to combat overseas, we should have clearly defined political and military objectives . . . . • The relationship between our objectives and the forces we have committed -- their size, composition, and disposition -- must be continually reassessed and adjusted if necessary . . . . • Before the United States commits combat forces abroad, there must be some reasonable assurance we will have the support of the American people and their elected representatives in Congress . . . . • The commitment of US forces to combat should be a last resort.

Thesis The Gulf War (Operation Desert Storm) was the only war in U. S. history where we successfully implemented the lessons of the previous war from the beginning. 20

Weinberger Doctrine Caspar W. Weinberger 1917 - 2006