Hamilton and Madison: The Federalist Papers Philosophy 219 Hamilton and Madison: The Federalist Papers

The Challenge of Revolution In our review of the variety of expressions of the fundamental concepts and concerns of social and political philosophy, one notable concern revealed in the readings was about the relationship between the community and it’s members. For some, it is a natural, though degradable, relationship. For others, it is a problematic, always contestable, relationship. For all, it is a relationship that needs to be negotiated. These negotiations were on full display in the early days of our country, as the former colonists, recently freed from monarchical control, sought to balance ideals of individual freedom and public good against each other in the formation of a new political union.

The Options These negotiations came to a head in the discussions over whether to ratify the proposed constitution, as a replacement to the then operative Articles of Confederation. Opponents of ratification, emphasizing individual liberties, argued for direct democracy and decentralization. Alexander Hamilton and James Madison saw in the Constitution’s advocacy of representative democracy and a strong central executive a necessary antidote to the excesses of individual interests.

The Federalist Papers The Papers were a series of 85 articles written to persuade New York citizens to vote in favor of ratification. Though published under a common pseudonym, they were actually authored by three different people: Alexander Hamilton, James Madison and John Jay. Hamilton organized the effort and wrote the bulk of the articles himself.

Alexander Hamilton Hamilton was a prominent early leader of the United States. He served as an aide de camp of General George Washington during the revolutionary war. He was a delegate to the constitutional congress from New York. He was the first secretary of the treasury, under President Washington.

James Madison One of the principal authors of the Constitution, Madison was the 4th president of the United States. A somewhat more ambiguous supporter of federalism than Hamilton, Madison authored the bill of rights to placate opponents and eventually broke with Hamilton over the formation of a national bank (though as president, he later supported the idea).

Number 10 Written by Madison, this is the most famous of the Papers. It’s theme is the question of how to protect the interests of society against “factions”, “a number of citizens…who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community” (556c1-2). Madison argues that a strong national government provides better protection against the distortion of society by these “passions” than local or state government.

Starting Point Number 10 is a continuation of a discussion started in Number 9 (written by Hamilton). Madison begins by reiterating the point of that earlier Paper: that the proper role of government is to constrain private interests for the public good. The question he begins by addressing concerns why this is necessary. Initially, factions arise naturally, due to diversity of opinion about basic goods. However, “the most common and durable source of factions has been the various and unequal distribution of property. Those who hold and those who are without property have ever formed distinct interests in society” (557c1).

What can be done? Madison recognizes that that there are two ways government can limit the damage caused by factions: either remove their causes or control their effects. The only way to do the first would be to severely restrict individual liberties, particularly that of owning property, but that would in effect render the whole point of the revolution and its political reforms moot. Thus, the only real option is to design a form of government which can control the effects of factions.

A Democracy or a (Large) Republic? Madison’s claim is that this is not possible in a pure democracy but is possible in a republic. A pure democracy is a system in which every citizen votes directly for laws. A republic is a society in which citizens vote for representatives who then vote for laws. Representative government is better able to control factions because it is less susceptible to individual self-interest. A large republic is preferable to a small republic because the probability of electing competent representatives is greater, it is less likely that candidates could fool the voters, and given the difficulty of producing majorities, a large republic is more likely to produce laws that really reflect the common good.

Number 15 The 15th Paper is the first in a series to directly criticize the Articles of Confederation. It’s specific focus is the necessity of authority. Hamilton argues that the failure of the Articles to articulate the national government’s authority to issue sanctions over the states invites anarchy and disunion, “Government implies the power of making laws. It is essential to the idea of a law that it be attended with a sanction; or, in other words, a penalty or punishment for disobedience” (562c1).

Number 39 Composed by Madison, this Paper articulates the proposed constitutional government as a hybrid between a national and federal system. He begins by redefining the term "republic," stating three principles that must be present for a true republic to exist: the power to govern must be derived from the consent of the people; representatives elected from the people are the administrators of the government; the terms of service of the Representatives must be limited by time or good behavior. Madison goes on to describe several aspects of the proposed government in order to demonstrate that the new government will be republican in some aspects and federal in others, with a balance being the goal.

Number 51 Also written by Madison, this Paper is an attempt to address concerns people had about a strong central executive. Clearly this executive could not be a monarch. In order to ensure that such could not emerge, Madison articulates a system of checks and balances with a clear separation of powers. The goal, is to produce a system in which “Ambition must be made to counteract ambition” (cf. 574c1). At the end, an new argument about factions appears: the only way to counteract the effects of factions is to have numerous factions.

Number 70 Composed by Hamilton, this Paper is a response to an objection to the central executive which argued for a plural executive (somewhat like the Roman model of paired Consuls). Hamilton argues that a plural executive, “tends to conceal faults, and destroy responsibility” (591c1), and states that a singular executive would better be suited to wield power efficiently and effectively. A strong and energetic executive branch requires unity, duration in office, adequate resources, and sufficient powers.

Number 78 Authored by Hamilton, this Paper addresses concerns that anti-federalists had regarding the judicial system proposed in the constitution, particularly the possibility of “activist judges.” He argues that the judiciary is the weakest of the three branches, Hamilton says that the Judiciary branch of the proposed government would be the weakest of the three, having neither "FORCE nor WILL" (595c2) but only the capacity to judge, there is no reason to think that the judiciary would be able to overpower the political branches. The judiciary depends on the political branches to uphold its judgments.

The Balancing Act So does a federal system of government, as outlined in The Federalist Papers strike a balance between the individual interests and liberties and social goods? Do you think the balance is an effective one? Does the balance do enough to insulate our republic from the corrosive effects of factionalization?