Presentation for POL 328 Dr. Kevin Lasher

USSR After Stalin

Post-Stalinism How do you have Stalinism without Stalin? How do you reform Stalinism without destroying CPSU/USSR How does new leadership “explain” their role in Stalin’s crimes? What will the USSR become after the monstrous Stalin is gone?

Post-Stalinism Collective leadership – no more attacks on the party Reform USSR while maintaining CPSU control

Khrushchev Era Totalitarian System Conservative Authoritarian and Bureaucratic System

Nikita Khrushchev (1953-64) Reform Stalinist system Secret Speech (1956) De-Stalinization Modest economic reforms The Thaw – relaxation of censorship Slight lessening of cold war Removed from power in 1964

Nikita Khrushchev (1953-64) Technical education, party education Central Committee and Head of Moscow Party, 1934-38 Head of Ukrainian Party, 1938-49 Politburo in 1939 Returns as Head of Moscow Party, 1949-53 Hands were “less bloody than others” (still plenty bloody)

Nikita Khrushchev (1953-64) William Taubman calls him “Stalin’s pet” Played buffoon around Stalin, competent but no threat Friendship/acquaintance with Stalin’s wife (that may have saved him)

Nikita Khrushchev (1953-64) Far more human and humane than Stalin Emotional outbursts, laughter, temper, bluster, crude sense of humor “Earthy” personality appealed to Soviet people (for a while) Whirlwind of ideas and activity Too active for new party elite

Khrushchev Era: Issues Leadership Struggle De-Stalinization Domestic Policy Foreign Policy Ouster

Leadership Struggle Beria Malenkov Molotov

Leadership Struggle Beria returns to head MVD (Interior Ministry) Malenkov as Premier (head of governmentt) Molotov as Foreign Minister (always #2) Khrushchev as 1st Secretary (General Secretary) All members of Politburo/Presidium

Leadership Struggle Beria is arrested in June 1953 in move led by Khrushchev, executed with other aides in December 1953 Last “political execution” Top party members will no longer kill each other; losers will live

Leadership Struggle Struggle between Malenkov and Khrushchev Factors – personality, policy, approach to common people Somewhat of a replay of post-Lenin 1920s struggle Khrushchev not as cunning as Stalin, but sufficient to win power

Leadership Struggle Malenkov removed as premier in 1955, remains on Politburo Khrushchev emerging as #1 in collective leadership Opponents try to remove Khrushchev in 1957 Khrushchev defeats “anti-party group” Losers removed from Politburo, but remain in party until 1961, Malenkov and Molotov die in 1980s

Leadership Struggle Khrushchev becomes premier in 1958 Top leader among collective leadership No personal dictator like Stalin

De-Stalinization Process of removing the worst aspects of Stalinism from Soviet society

De-Stalinization: GULAGS Release of political prisoners begins in 1953 GULAGS finally “closed” in 1960; however, labor camps for small number of political prisoners and many criminals remain Some GULAG literature published

De-Stalinization: Secret Speech February 25, 1956 at 20th Party Congress of CPSU Khrushchev discusses with other top party leaders

De-Stalinization: Secret Speech Attacks Stalin’s crimes, especially actions against the party and failures during WW2 Does NOT criticize collectivization, famine, attacks on citizens

De-Stalinization: Secret Speech Secret Speech does not remain “secret” within USSR or the world for long Khrushchev promises to return to Lenin’s vision Contributes to unrest in Poland and Hungary

De-Stalinization: Secret Speech “When we analyze the practice of Stalin in regard to the direction of the party and of the country, when we pause to consider everything which Stalin perpetrated, we must be convinced that Lenin's fears were justified. The negative characteristics of Stalin, which, in Lenin's time, were on1v incipient, transformed themselves during the last years into a grave abuse o f power by Stalin, which caused untold harm to our party. . . .”

De-Stalinization: Secret Speech “Stalin, on the other hand, used extreme methods and mass repressions at a time when the revolution was already victorious, when the Soviet state was strengthened, when the exploiting classes were already liquidated, and Socialist relations were rooted solidly in all phases of national economy, when our party was politically consolidated and had strengthened itself both numerically and ideologically. It is clear that here Stalin showed in a whole series of cases his intolerance, his brutality, and his abuse of power. Instead of proving his political correctness and mobilizing the masses, he often chose the path of repression and physical annihilation, not only against actual enemies, but also against individuals who had not committed any crimes against the party and the Soviet Government.”

De-Stalinization: Secret Speech “Now when the cases of some of these so-called spies and saboteurs were examined it was found that all their cases were fabricated. Confessions of guilt of many -- arrested and charged with enemy activity were gained with the help of cruel and inhuman tortures. . . .”

De-Stalinization: Secret Speech “Did we have time and the capabilities for such preparations? Yes; we had the time and capabilities. Our industry was already so developed that it was capable of supplying fully the Soviet Army with everything that it needed. . . Had our industry been mobilized properly and in time to supply the army with the necessary materiel, our wartime losses would have been decidedly smaller. Such mobilization had not been, however, started in time. And already in the first days of the war it became evident that our Army was badly armed, that we did not have enough artillery, tanks, and planes to throw the enemy back. . . .” “Very grievous consequences, especially in reference to the beginning of the war, followed Stalin's annihilation of many military commanders and political workers during 1937-41 because of his suspiciousness and through slanderous accusations.”

De-Stalinization: Secret Speech “We must state that after the war the situation became even more complicated. Stalin became even more capricious, irritable, and brutal; in particular his suspicion grew. His persecution mania reached unbelievable dimensions. Many workers were becoming enemies before his very eyes. After the war Stalin separated himself from the collective even more. Everything was decided by him alone without any consideration for anyone or anything.”

De-Stalinization: Secret Speech WHY? Guilt Attack opponents Appeal to intelligentsia GULAG returnees True and necessary Repentance?

De-Stalinization: The Thaw Relaxation (not elimination) of censorship in art, movies and literature Major reduction in political repression Some more freedom in cultural realm Some openness to outside world

De-Stalinization: The Thaw Inconsistent and contradictory policy Two steps forward, on step back (or vice versa) Precursor of Gorbachev’s glasnost

De-Stalinization: 1961 Second wave Stalin’s body removed from mausoleum Stalingrad to Volgograd Khrushchev implies Stalin had Kirov killed

De-Stalinization: 1962 Khrushchev approves publication of “One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich” Short novel about life in a GULAG (labor camp) More attention to Stalinist terror

Domestic Policy End to Stalinist terror Major reduction in political repression New “understanding” between CPSU and Soviet citizens Citizens accept authoritarian political system and CPSU will make average lives better year to year

Domestic Policy Construction of Krushchyovka, with individual apartments for millions of Soviet families Greater emphasis on provision of consumer goods

Khrushchev Bury the West in the economic and ideological competition

Domestic Policy: Economic Reform Communism will be built “in the main” by 1980 “The current generation of Soviet people will live under communism” (1961)

Domestic Policy: Economic Reform Real concern that Soviet economy was catching up to American economy (it was not)

Khrushchev

Khrushchev

Domestic Policy: Economic Reform Despite real success and false boasts, central planning system was beginning to encounter serious problems Not the industrial world of 1930s

Domestic Policy: Economic Reform Khrushchev launches a series of economic reforms to strengthen and modernize the command economy

Domestic Policy: Economic Reform Virgin Lands policy in northern Kazakhstan Significant increase in food production but failing by early 1960s Soviet food imports by 1963-64 Agriculture continues to underperform Political and administrative reforms instead of any kind of market-style reforms

Domestic Policy: Economic Reform Khrushchev will replace central planning agency (Gosplan) with 105 sovnarkhozy (regional economic councils) Move from central planning to regional planning Reduced to 47 regional councils by 1963 Return to full central planning following 1964

Domestic Policy: Economic Reform Khrushchev splits party into agricultural and industrial sections in regions in 1962 Bizarre plan unpopular with party elite

Domestic Policy: Economic Reform Soviet-style central planning was not suited to modern industrial economy of 1960s and beyond Beginning of the end of period of “extensive growth” (more land, more workers, cheap resources) Khrushchev’s economic reforms not very successful and many were unpopular with rebuilt party elite

Domestic Policy: Economic Reform Despite problems, Soviet economy was performing fairly well in this era Fulfilling the “new social contract” Life for average Soviet citizen was much improved

To Be Continued