The Future of US-Russia Nuclear Arms Control

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Presentation transcript:

The Future of US-Russia Nuclear Arms Control Steven Pifer Director, Brookings Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Initiative April 21, 2017

First Steps SALT I (1972) SALT II (1979) ABM Treaty Interim Offensive Agreement SALT II (1979)

Breakthrough Years INF Treaty (1987) START I (1991) PNIs (1991-92)

Recent Arms Control ABM Treaty Withdrawal (2002) SORT (2002) New START (2010)

US and Russian Warhead Numbers

INF Treaty Bans ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with range of 500-5500 kms ~2700 missiles eliminated SS-20, GLCM, PII

US Charges Russian INF Treaty Violation Russia tested, deployed ground-launched cruise missile of intermediate range Variant of Iskander K? (SSC-8?)

Russian Charges US INF Treaty Violations Russia charges three US violations: Targets for missile defense tests Armed UAVs Aegis Ashore

Leverage on Russia? INF missile Additional conventional capabilities in Europe Multilateral diplomatic push

Notional SSC-8 Coverage

Resolving SSC-8 Issue SVC works out procedures for exhibition and briefing on SSC-8 characteristics If US side satisfied, issue resolved If further questions, return to SVC If SSC-8 range exceeds 500 kms, need to eliminate it and launcher

Resolving MD Tests Issue SVC develops language to differentiate allowed target missiles from banned INF ballistic missiles Numerical limit on target missiles? Locational limits

Resolving Armed UAVs Issue SVC develops language to differentiate allowed armed UAVs from prohibited ground-launched intermediate-range cruise missiles

Resolving Aegis Ashore Issue SVC works out: Functionally-related observable differences Observable differences Procedures for visits to show Aegis Ashore contains only SM-3s

New START Limits 1550 deployed strategic warheads 700 deployed ICBMs, SLBMs and bombers 800 ICBM/SLBM launchers plus bombers

New START Time Period Limits take effect in Feb 2018 Sides appear on track to meet Treaty in force until Feb 2021 Can be extended by up to 5 years

New START Levels, March 2017 New START Limit US Russia Deployed strategic delivery vehicles (700) 673 523 Deployed warheads (1550) 1411 1765 Deployed and non-deployed launchers and bombers (800) 820 816

Russia Strategic Modernization Borey-class SSBN Bulava SLBM SS-27, Sarmat ICBMs Reopen Tu-160 production Appears sized to New START limits

US Strategic Modernization Columbia-class SSBN Ground-based strategic deterrent (ICBM) B-21 bomber Long-range standoff option (ALCM) Sized to New START limits

Planned US Triad, 2018 Minuteman ICBMs 400 454 Trident SLBMs 240 280 Deployed Dep/Non-Dep SDVs Launchers Minuteman ICBMs 400 454 Trident SLBMs 240 280 B-2/B-52H Bombers 60 66 700 800

Trump Administration View Nuclear posture review Likely maintain strategic triad LRSO in question? New START => 2021; extend? Need 700 missiles and bombers? Unlikely to move to lower number unless costs get out of hand

Nuclear Stockpile Size US Russia Deployed strategic* ~1740 ~1950 Non-dep strategic ~2240 ~500 Nonstrategic ~500 ~1850 Total stockpile ~4480 ~4300 [4018] * Estimated actual number, not New START accountable number Numbers drawn from Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, “US Nuclear Forces, 2017” and “Russian Nuclear Forces, 2017”

“Big” Treaty USG very interested in 2011 Possible limits 2200 total nuclear warheads limit 1000 deployed strategic warhead sublimit 500-550 SDVs limit Of interest to Moscow? Aggregate warhead limit => trade-off

Issues Linked by Russians Three main issues Missile defense Precision-guided conventional arms Third-country nuclear forces Real concerns or pretext to block further reductions?

Phased Adaptive Approach (1) SM-3 IA on board ships (2011) (2) SM-3 IB in Romania (2015) 24 SM-3 IB interceptors (3) SM-3 IIA in Poland (2018) 24 SM-3 IIA interceptors

MD Transparency Agreement For key missile defense elements, sides provide annual declaration on: Current numbers Projected numbers for 10 years => time to act if threat emerging

Precision-Guided Conventional Weapons Conventional Prompt Global Strike If ballistic missile warheads, New START captures If hypersonic glide vehicles, niche Conventionally-armed cruise missiles Strategic threat?

World Nuclear Stockpiles

Third-Country Nuclear Forces Russia says next nuclear reduction negotiation must be multilateral Obama administration believed at least one more bilateral agreement possible Possible solution: third country unilateral political commitments

Stockpile Stewardship Program Ensure reliability of arsenal without nuclear explosive testing

CTBT Monitoring

Risks of AC Regime Collapse Lose caps, transparency Back to worst-case assumptions Open path to nuclear arms race? Affordability? Allies’, Democrats’ views? Play to Russia comparative advantage? Effect on NPT? Third-country reaction, especially China?