U.S. Nuclear Strategy toward China Charles Glaser (Elliott School, George Washington University) April 21, 2017

Basic purposes of US nuclear strategy Deter nuclear attacks against the US homeland Deter attacks against US allies—that is, extend deterrence Reassure US allies about the effectiveness of its deterrent, thereby helping preserve the alliance Reduce the damage/costs the US would suffer in a nuclear war, either by: Averting escalation to all-out nuclear war Reducing the adversary’s ability to damage the United States

Basic strategy questions about US nuclear policy toward China Should the United States pursue a “damage-limitation” capability? Should the US threaten first use of nuclear weapons to deter conventional attacks against its allies? The questions are related: a damage-limitation capability might enhance extended deterrence I will spend most of my talk on the first question and sketch an analysis of the second question

Roadmap of analysis damage-limitation question Glaser and Steve Fetter, “Should the United States Reject MAD? Damage Limitation and U.S. Nuclear Strategy Toward China,” International Security (Summer 2016) Is damage limitation feasible? What counts as damage limitation? Vulnerability of Chinese forces: fixed silos, mobile missiles, SSBNs, C2 Ballistic missile defense How large would the benefits be? Reducing costs of all out war Deterrence—homeland and extended Reassuring allies How large would the costs be? Accidental and unauthorized attacks; tactical windows Political costs of military competition

Background Why the question of US-China nuclear strategy is becoming more important Why damage limitation is the key question Policy is less straight forward than during Cold War The Soviet Union deployed over 10,000 warheads on thousands of long-range missiles China now deploys about 20 silo-based ICBMs and 25 mobile ICBMs; it may soon deploy up to 60 SLBMs Given current projections, China is likely to have around 100 warheads on mobile missiles by 2030 Technological advances have increased the ability to find forces compared to hide them

What counts as damage limitation? Cold War levels: McNamara: 20-25% of Soviet population and 50% of industry  200 EMT; “corrected”  40 EMT How should we define damage limitation? Level at which the costs of additional damage are insignificant Level at which a modern state cannot recover Need for comprehensive technical analysis

Survivability of ICBMs All fixed silos are highly vulnerable Mobile missiles: survivability depends on: How China operates its forces during a crisis Whether China can launch from unprepared positions US ability to locate missiles: US space-based surveillance, and possibly other surveillance Chinese countermeasures

Survivability of SSBNs and C2 China is deploying a second-generation ballistic missile submarine: BUT, it will be vulnerable to US ASW China’s nuclear command and control is vulnerable; “solutions” are available: Ensuring the survivability of links between political leaders and launch commanders – mobility, diversity, redundancy Predelegation Launch on warning

Effectiveness of US Ballistic Missile Defense Current US BMD systems is not oriented against China China will be able to defeat an expanded version of the current US system: Extreme difficulty of midcourse discrimination Attacks against BMD radars

Benefits of a Damage-Limitation capability Reducing costs of all out war: US ability is relatively small and declining Homeland Deterrence: generally quite easy—retaliatory threats are highly credible Extended Deterrence: Benefits are small because deterrence is already highly effective US-Japan alliance conventional forces can defend Japan against conventional attack The possibility of nuclear war will cast a deterrent shadow over major crises, even if the United States can not limit damage Limited nuclear options can add credibility to US nuclear threats Taiwan is the exception Reassuring allies: benefits are small, because US commitments can be highly credible w/o D-L

Cost of a damage-limitation capability Escalatory pressures and risks Accidental Chinese launch via pressure to launch quickly Unauthorized Chinese launch via predelegation of launch authority Incentives for US to attack early, before Chinese forces become survivable Political costs: China will view US efforts to maintain a significant damage-limitation capability as reflecting malign motives Nuclear competition will strain the US-China relations, increasing the probability of dangerous crises

Conclusions re damage limitation Prospects for significant damage limitation over the medium to long term appear to be poor Does depend, however, on where the D-L threshold is set Benefits of feasible damage-limitation capabilities are small: US already possess effective deterrent capabilities Costs are significant: A damage-limitation posture generates an array of escalatory pressures and strains political relations Bottom-line: US should forego efforts to preserve its damage-limitation capability However, other analysts disagree along all of these dimensions

No First Use? The US has extended deterrence commitments to Japan and South Korea A policy dedicated to deterring conventional attacks requires a policy of first use: This was NATO strategy for deterring the Soviet Union/Warsaw Pact during the Cold War The marginal deterrent value of FU threats depends on: Whether conventional forces are sufficiently effective to deter Chinese conventional attack Whether nuclear weapons, essentially independent of US doctrine, contribute to deterrence of conventional war when the US lacks a D-L capability Reassurance: do US allies believe FU is necessary? Risks of FU: early use, unauthorized use