Instructor: Ruta Mehta TA: Omkar Thakoor

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Presentation transcript:

Instructor: Ruta Mehta TA: Omkar Thakoor Algorithmic Game Theory Instructor: Ruta Mehta TA: Omkar Thakoor

Q: Multiple self-interested agents interacting in the same environment Deciding what to do. Q: What to expect? How good is it? Can it be controlled?

Chicken (Traffic Light) S S C S C S

Algorithmic Game Theory AGT, in addition, focuses on designing efficient algorithms to compute solutions necessary to make accurate prediction.

Research-oriented Course What to expect Research-oriented Course Exposure to key concepts and proof techniques from AGT Explore research problems and introduce novel questions What is expected from you Energetic participation in class Research/Survey Project (in groups of two).

Instructor: Ruta Mehta (Me) TA: Omkar Thakoor Office hours: Ruta: Fri 1-2pm Omkar: Mon 3-4pm

Grading: 4 to 5 homeworks, one every two weeks – 25% Final exam – 30% Research/Survey Project – 40% Work – 20% Presentation – 10% Report – 10% Class participation – 5%

References T. Roughgarden, Twenty Lectures on Algorithmic Game Theory, 2016. N. Nisan, T. Roughgarden, E. Tardos, and V. Vazirani (editors), Algorithmic Game Theory, 2007. (Book available online for free.) M. Osborne and A. Rubinstein, A Course in Game Theory, 1994. R. Myerson, Game Theory: Analysis of conflict, 1991. Recent papers, and lecture notes from other similar course

Useful links Webpage: https://courses.engr.illinois.edu/cs598rm/ Piazza Page: piazza.com/illinois/spring2017/cs598rm

3 Broad Goals

Goal #1 Understand outcomes arising from interaction of smart and self-interested agents. Games and Equilibria

Prisoner’s Dilemma Two thieves caught for burglary. Two options: {confess, not confess} N C N -1 -1 -6 0 C 0 -6 -5 -5

Prisoner’s Dilemma Two thieves caught for burglary. Two options: {confess, not confess} N C N -1 -1 -6 0 C 0 -6 -5 -5 Only stable state

Rock-Paper-Scissors R P S R 0 0 -1 1 1 -1 P 0 0 1 -1 -1 1 S -1 1 1 -1 0 0 -1 1 1 -1 P 0 0 1 -1 -1 1 S -1 1 1 -1 0 0 No pure stable state! Both playing (1/3,1/3,1/3) is the only stable state. Why?

Normal form games and Nash equilibrium existence Computation: minmax theorem, Lemke-Howson algorithm Complexity: PPAD-complete Other equilibrium notions – markets, security games Incomplete information, Bayesian Nash Collusion, Core, Nash bargaining

Goal #2 Analyze quality of the outcome arising from strategic interaction, i.e. OPT vs NE. Price of Anarchy

Braess’ Paradox 60 commuters s t Commute time: 1.5 hours 30 30 1 hour 𝑥 minutes 1 hour 1 hour 𝑥 minutes 30 Commute time: 1.5 hours

Braess’ Paradox 60 commuters s t Commute time: 1.5 hours ~1 hour 30 30 𝑥 minutes 1 hour s t 0 hours ~1 hour 1 hour 𝑥 minutes 30 Commute time: 1.5 hours

Braess’ Paradox 60 commuters s t Commute time: 2 hours 60 1 hour 𝑥 minutes 1 hour 60 s t 0 hours 1 hour 𝑥 minutes Commute time: 2 hours

Price of Anarchy (PoA): 𝒘𝒐𝒓𝒔𝒕 𝑵𝑬 𝑶𝑷𝑻 = 𝟐 𝟏.𝟓 = 𝟒 𝟑 Braess’ Paradox 60 commuters 𝑥 minutes 1 hour 60 s t 0 hours 1 hour 𝑥 minutes Price of Anarchy (PoA): 𝒘𝒐𝒓𝒔𝒕 𝑵𝑬 𝑶𝑷𝑻 = 𝟐 𝟏.𝟓 = 𝟒 𝟑 Can not be worse!

Congestion (potential) games PoA in linear congestion games Network routing games Congestion (potential) games PoA in linear congestion games Smoothness framework

Goal #3 Designing rules to ensure “good” outcome under strategic interaction among selfish agents. Mechanism Design

At the core of large industries Search auction – primary revenue for google! Spectrum auction – distribution of public good. enables variety of mobile/cable services. Kidney exchange – critical decision making

At the core of large industries Online markets – eBay, Uber/Lyft, TaskRabbit Voting, review, coupon systems. So on …

MD without money MD with money Arrow’s theorem (voting), stable matching, fair division MD with money First price auction, second price auction, VCG Generalized second price auction for search (Google) Optimal auctions: Myerson auction and extensions

Fun Fact! Olympic 2012 Scandal Check out Women’s doubles badminton tournament Video of the fist controversial match

You and your friend choose a number … Food for Thought You and your friend choose a number … 2 3 97 98 99 100

You and your friend choose a number … What are Nash equilibria? Food for Thought You and your friend choose a number … 2 3 96 97 98 99 100 -2 +2 What will you choose? What if +/- 50? What are Nash equilibria?