XACML The New Standard for Access Control Policy

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Presentation transcript:

XACML The New Standard for Access Control Policy Hal Lockhart BEA Systems hlockhar@bea.com 02/17/06 – Session Code: STA-403

Topics Overview of Policy and Authorization History of XACML at OASIS XACML Overview XACML Concepts Policy Evaluation DataTypes and Functions Combining Algorithms XACML Profiles Work in progress XACML Uptake

Information Security Definition Technologies and procedures intended to implement organizational policy in spite of human efforts to the contrary. Suggested by Authorization Applies to all security services Protection against accidents is incidental Suggests four areas of attention

Information Security Areas Policy determination Expression: code, permissions, ACLs, Language Evaluation: semantics, architecture, performance Policy enforcement Maintain integrity of Trusted Computing Base (TCB) Enforce variable policy

Infrastructural Service Consistent enforcement of security policies Minimize user inconvenience Ensure seamless implementation Coherent, interdependent services Not just list of products Avoid reimplementation Simplify management and administration

Authorization Theory Authentication Authority Attribute Policy Decision Point Enforcement Credentials Assertion System Entity Authorization Collector Application Request

Types of Authorization Info - 1 Attribute Assertion Properties of a system entity (typically a person) Relatively abstract – business context Same attribute used in multiple resource decisions Examples: X.509 Attribute Certificate, SAML Attribute Statement, XrML PossessProperty Authorization Policy Specifies all the conditions required for access Specifies the detailed resources and actions (rights) Can apply to multiple subjects, resources, times… Examples: XACML Policy, XrML License, X.509 Policy Certificate

Types of Authorization Info - 2 AuthZ Decision Expresses the result of a policy decision Specifies a particular access that is allowed Intended for immediate use Example: SAML AuthZ Decision Statement, IETF COPS

Implications of this Model Benefits Improved scalability Separation of concerns Enables federation Distinctions not absolute Attributes can seem like rights A policy may apply to one principal, resource Systems with a single construct tend to evolve to treating principal or resource as abstraction

OASIS XACML History First Meeting – 21 May 2001 Requirements from: Healthcare, DRM, Registry, Financial, Online Web, XML Docs, Fed Gov, Workflow, Java, Policy Analysis, WebDAV XACML 1.0 - OASIS Standard – 6 February 2003 XACML 1.1 – Committee Specification – 7 August 2003 XACML 2.0 – OASIS Standard – 1 February 2005

XACML TC Charter Define a core XML schema for representing authorization and entitlement policies Target - any object - referenced using XML Fine grained control, characteristics - access requestor, protocol, classes of activities, and content introspection Consistent with and building upon SAML

XACML Objectives Ability to locate policies in distributed environment Ability to federate administration of policies about the same resource Base decisions on wide range of inputs Multiple subjects, resource properties Decision expressions of unlimited complexity Ability to do policy-based delegation Usable in many different environments Types of Resources, Subjects, Actions Policy location and combination

Policy Examples “Anyone view their own 401K information, but nobody else’s” “The print formatting service can access printers and temporary storage on behalf of any user with the print attribute” “The primary physician can have any of her patients’ medical records sent to a specialist in the same practice.” “Anyone can use web servers with the ‘spare’ property between 12:00 AM and 4:00 AM” “Salespeople can create orders, but if the total cost is greater that $1M, a supervisor must approve”

General Characteristics Defined using XML Schema Strongly typed language Extensible in multiple dimensions Borrows from many other specifications Features requiring XPath are optional Obligation feature optional Language is very “wordy” Many long URLs Expect it to be generated by programs Complex enough that there is more than one way to do most things

Novel XACML Features Large Scale Environment Request centric Subjects, Resources, Attributes, etc. not necessarily exist or be known at Policy Creation time Multiple Administrators - potentially conflicting policy results Combining algorithms Request centric Use any information available at access request time Zero, one or more Subjects No invented concepts (privilege, role, etc.) Dynamically bound to request Not limited to Resource binding Only tell what policies apply in context of Request Two stage evaluation

XACML Concepts Policy & PolicySet – combining of applicable policies using CombiningAlgorithm Target – Rapidly index to find applicable Policies or Rules Conditions – Complex boolean expression with many operands, arithmetic & string functions Effect – “Permit” or “Deny” Obligations – Other required actions Request and Response Contexts – Input and Output Bag – unordered list which may contain duplicates

XACML Concepts Target Target Target Condition Effect Obligations Rules Obligations Policies Obligations PolicySet

Request and Response Context

Rules Smallest unit of administration, cannot be evaluated alone Elements Description – documentation Target – select applicable policies Condition – boolean decision function Effect – either “Permit” or “Deny” Results If condition is true, return Effect value If not, return NotApplicable If error or missing data return Indeterminate Plus status code

Target Designed to efficiently find the policies that apply to a request Enables dynamic binding Makes it feasible to have very complex Conditions Attributes of Subjects, Resources, Actions and Environments Matches against value, using match function Regular expression RFC822 (email) name X.500 name User defined Attributes specified by Id or XPath expression Normally use Subject or Resource, not both

Condition Boolean function to decide if Effect applies Inputs come from Request Context Values can be primitive, complex or bags Can be specified by id or XPath expression Fourteen primitive types Rich array of typed functions defined Functions for dealing with bags Order of evaluation unspecified Allowed to quit when result is known Side effects not permitted

Datatypes From XML Schema String, boolean Integer, double Time, date dateTime anyURI hexBinary base64Binary From Xquery dayTimeDuration yearMonthDuration Unique to XACML rfc822Name x500Name

Functions Equality predicates Arithmetic functions String conversion functions Numeric type conversion functions Logical functions Arithmetic comparison functions Date and time arithmetic functions Non-numeric comparison functions Bag functions Set functions Higher-order bag functions Special match functions XPath-based functions Extension functions and primitive types

Policies and Policy Sets Smallest element PDP can evaluate Contains: Description, Defaults, Target, Rules, Obligations, Rule Combining Algorithm Policy Set Allows Policies and Policy Sets to be combined Use not required Contains: Description, Defaults, Target, Policies, Policy Sets, Policy References, Policy Set References, Obligations, Policy Combining Algorithm Combining Algorithms: Deny-overrides, Permit-overrides, First-applicable, Only-one-applicable

Request and Response Context Request Context Attributes of: Subjects – requester, intermediary, recipient, etc. Resource – name, can be hierarchical Resource Content – specific to resource type, e.g. XML document Action – e.g. Read Environment – other, e.g. time of request Response Context Resource ID Decision Status (error values) Obligations

XACML Profiles Digital Signature Hierarchical Resources Privacy RBAC Integrity protection of Policies Hierarchical Resources Using XACML to protect files, directory entries, web pages Privacy Determine “purpose” of access RBAC Support ANSI RBAC Profile with XACML SAML Integration XACML-based decision request Fetch applicable policies Attribute alignment

XACML Version 3.0 Administrative policies Policy delegation “HR-Admins can create policies concerning the Payroll servers” Policy delegation “Jack can approve expenses while Mary is on vacation” Language generalization Dynamic Policies Enhanced Obligation processing Policy queries Revocation Exception handling changes

XACML Uptake Three open source implementations available See OASIS website Product Statements Astrogrid, BEA Systems, CapeClear, CA, Entrust, IBM, Jericho, Layer 7, Parthenon Computing, PSS Systems, Starbourne, Sun Microsystems, Xtradyne Standards references OASIS ebXML reference implementation Open GIS Consortium XRI Data Interchange – interest UDDI – interest Global Grid Forum – joint work PRISM (Publication Metatadata) – interest ASTM – Healthcare Informatics PMI

Questions?