Drone D-Fence EMP Based Drone Defense System Team: Aero Outcasts Kevin Johnson, Jamey Mulloy, Pete Opper ES678 Agile Systems and Enterprises

System: Drone D-Fence System Strategic Values/Objectives Rapid Deployment Scalable Reconfigurable Multi-platform compatibility (interfaces with existing radar systems) Descriptive Statement The Drone EMP D-Fence System is a system that defends assets against drone and drone swarm attacks. A modular array of EMP transmission pods disable drone functionality by overwhelming its electrical systems with high amplitude electromagnetic pulses.

CURVE High-Level System/Process Environment Capriciousness: unknowable situations Future Drone Technologies and Evolving Enemy Tactics (reactive) Robust features developed by design team (proactive) Uncertainty: randomness with unknowable probabilities When and where attack occurs (reactive) Modular Architecture allows future component upgrades (proactive) Risk: randomness with knowable probabilities Probability of attack (reactive) Variation: knowable variables and variance range Quantity and size of attackers (reactive) Quantity and size of attackers (proactive) Evolution: gradual (relatively) successive developments Integration of more advanced technology (reactive) Improved developmental processes (Proactive)

System: Drone Defense Reality Factors Human (Including Customer) Behavior – Human error, whimsy, expediency, arrogance... Judgement of system operators Fatigued system operators Organizational Behavior – Survival rules rule, nobody's in absolute control... Operator may be multi-tasking multiple systems Technology Pace – Accelerating technology and security-vulnerability introductions, sparse testing... New drone technology may counter EMP defense Specific attack to disable system could be developed System Complexity – Incomprehensible, highly networked, unintended consequences, emergence... Large scales of multiple assets at single site Globalization – Partners with different ethics, values, infrastructures, cultural assumptions... Logistical Complications Partially-Agile Enterprise Faddish Practices – Outsourcing, web services, transparency, COTS policies/affects... Offsite system support High use of COTS Agile Customers/Competitors/Adversaries – Distributed, collaborative, self organizing, proactive, impatient, innovative... System technology is easily copied Other?

Response Situation Analysis for System: Drone D-Fence with [t,c,p,s] metric-priorities for each issue, t = time of change, c = cost of change, p = predictability of change, s = scope of change Change Domain Change/Response Issue Proactive Reactive Creation (and Elimination) What must the system be creating or eliminating in the course of its operational activity? Creates model of threat environment [t,p] Creates security for assets and personnel (piece of mind) [t, p] Improvement What performance characteristics will the system be expected to improve during operational life cycle? Defend against potentially more capable drones [c,p,s] Reaction time [t] Coverage range (defense perimeter) [c] Migration What major events coming down the road will require a change in the system infrastructure? Government Regulations (affecting use of EMP based Defense Devices) [t,p] Disruptive technologies employed by attackers [c,p] Modification (Add/Sub Capability) What modifications in resources-employed might need made as the system is used? Mounting Configurations (Compatible with different types of assets) [c,s] Correction What can go wrong that will need an automatic systemic detection and response? [Wrong – needs to be about correcting something that was broke and didn’t work with agility] Add capabilities to address counter-tactics developed by attackers [t,p,s] Add capabilities to address improved drone technologies (higher velocities, hardening) [t,p,s] Firmware updates (for software bugs) [s] Variation What process variables will range across what values and need accommodation? Weather conditions (could affect detection and targeting systems) [t,p] Surrounding Terrain [s] Expansion (and Contraction of Capacity) What are “quantity-based” elastic-capacity range needs on resources/output/activity/other? – Wrong – needs to be about deploying modules or parts of system and addressing it in operational system design Shortages of components such as CPUs, displays [t,c] Pricing impacts due to low volume sales [c] Reconfigu-ration What types of resource relationship configurations will need changed during operation? Interface to existing radar systems [s] Firmware updates (to counter new attacker tactics and drone types) [s] Component upgrades (to counter new attacker tactics and drone types) [c]

System: Drone D-Fence (Think … Drag-and-Drop / Plug-and-Play) Encapsulated Modules Turrets Defense Tactics Modules (software) Scalable Reusable Evolving Infrastructure Standards Sockets: Standard Turret Interface Signals: Common Data Bus Security: Turrets perform a standard set of functions Safety: Lockout/tagout system Service: Provide security for land and sea based assets of various size and configurations sockets (physical interconnect) signals (data/stuff flow between modules) security (trust interconnect) safety (of user, system, and environment) service (system assembly ConOps and evolutionary agility sustainment)

Sample Graphics for your modification into your system needs System: Drone D-Fence Sample Graphics for your modification into your system needs Resources Integrity Management Installers Operators Turrets Controller Radar fff Situational awareness Resource mix evolution Resource readiness Activity assembly Infrastructure evolution Who? Who? Who? Who? Active Infrastructure Passive Small Ship Airfield Fwd Operating Base Sockets Signals Security Safety Service Standard Turret Interface Common Data Bus Turrets perform a standard set of functions Lockout/tagout system Provide security for land and sea based assets of various size and configurations Rules/Standards