The Long War Reporting on The Long War Afghanistan Pakistan The Predator War Iraq Threats to the West Beyond Afghanistan and Iraq

Reporting on The Long War Origin of term About The Long War Journal Embedding Sebastian Junger: “Journalistic convention hold that you can't write objectively about people you are close to, but you can't write objectively about people who are shooting at you either. Pure objectivity—difficult enough while covering a city council meeting— isn't remotely possible in a war;bonding with the men around you is the least of your problems. Objectivity and honesty are not the same thing, though and it is entirely possible to write with honesty about the very personal and distorting experiences of war. Not about good vs bad news, but accurate Conflicts in reporting (Mosul)

Afghanistan US/NATO was not prepared for insurgency US focus was on CT operations No Afghan partner Taliban established Shadow Governments Insurgency spread The “surge” & time Al Qaeda's presence Afghanistan is a sideshow to Pakistan

Pakistan Tribal areas bases for al Qaeda, Afghan & Pakistani Taliban Pakistan's peace deals 2009: Taliban advance to within 60 miles of Islamabad Good vs Bad Taliban Strategic Depth US trying to pressure Pakistan to move again North Waziristan, problem is far bigger Display map of tribal areas, Taliban control, note operations in N & S Waziristan, 2004-2008, Bajaur and Mohmand 2008-2009, Khyber & Peshawar 2008-2010, S Waziristan 2009-2010, No op in N Waziristan. - Strategic depth, hedging against US leaving region, influence in Afghanistan, India - Note how a Corps commander in 2008 called Taliban "patriots" after 2008 Mumbai, and Taliban pledged to fight India - ISI/military complicity - NATO dependent on Pakistan for supplies, "influence"

Predators, a Tactic, Not a Strategy Three targets: Leaders, External ops, and Afghan groups Pros: Thins leaders, forces inexperienced to take command Plan for survival, not operations Cons: Increases OPSEC Puts allies at risk Civilian backlash No substitute for holding ground Al Qaeda still plotting despite Predator strikes - Aimed at AQ leaders, allied groups, and external ops - Succeeds in thinning the leadership, forcing early promotion - Also succeeds in forcing AQ to adjust energy on survival, not ops - But, as explained, AQ has a deep bench - Air power cannot substitute holding groups - As long as Pakistan clings to strategic depth (and worse, support of use of terrorism as foreign policy tool) the problem will not go away

Iraq The surge worked Iraqis have rejected al Qaeda, Mahdi Army Security forces are good enough to keep lid on internal threat Iran continues to attempt to extend influence Failure to form government hasn't fractured Iraq Still a long way to go, cannot judge succes for a decade or more - Aimed at AQ leaders, allied groups, and external ops - Succeeds in thinning the leadership, forcing early promotion - Also succeeds in forcing AQ to adjust energy on survival, not ops - But, as explained, AQ has a deep bench - Air power cannot substitute holding groups - As long as Pakistan clings to strategic depth (and worse, support of use of terrorism as foreign policy tool) the problem will not go away

The Threat to the West Al Qaeda's External Operations Network based in FATA Plots against West, India traced to FATA London Tubes 2006 Transatlantic airline plot Times Square Europe plot Al Qaeda affiliates are used as “bench”

Beyond Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq Al Qaeda affiliates seek to hit the US Yemen Somalia North Africa Southeast Asia Caucasus