ASAS Thematic Network ASAS Operational Improvements -Dream or Reality:- The Impact on the Controller Anthony Smoker - IFATCA ASAS-TN First Workshop Rome April 2003 ASAS-TN Rome 29th-IV-2003

ATCEUC The contents of this presentation also represent the views of the ATCEUC, whose representative is unable to attend this seminar. ASAS-TN Rome 29th-IV-2003

Dream or Reality? For many controllers, ASAS has the potential to be a “bad dream” – why? What will be the effect of ASAS on controllers? – technical concerns and practical considerations ASAS-TN Rome 29th-IV-2003

Controllers and ASAS History: “ASAS” style concepts have been around for many years – IEE 1961 etc Generally there is a poor record of implementation of advanced technical systems into ATC - leads to concern and a legacy The needs of the controller are often secondary to implementation – compromise and understanding of the controller task – “Cinderella effect” Human in the system used as fallback for poor system design or technical shortcomings Differing interpretations of procedures ASAS-TN Rome 29th-IV-2003

The IFATCA View “It is arguable that the concepts have a potential to improve the safety and productivity of the ATM system” IFATCA welcomes the change from “assurance” to “assistance” Several areas of concern: many that involve the “impact” on the controller ASAS-TN Rome 29th-IV-2003

IFATCA – Procedural and technical Concerns Visual Separation: ICAO rule changes Responsibility for separation – there remain uncertainties in certain situations Workload impact of “new tasks” - negative or positive effects, task scheduling etc Airspace organisation and: design – rigid discrimination to achieve full ASAS benefits? ASSAP – identification of traffic Intent information ASAS-TN Rome 29th-IV-2003

IFATCA Concerns – Practical considerations - 1 How many aircraft can be transferred for ASAS ops at anyone time, and retain system resilience to perturbation? Will flight-deck workload limit the extent of tactical instructions or the controllers tactical freedom? Complexity of multiple clearances to achieve system goals System failure More  ASAS-TN Rome 29th-IV-2003

IFATCA Concerns – Practical considerations - 2 Military traffic Transfer of traffic from sector to sector operating on “ASAS” type clearances Practical application – common pilot understanding ASAS-TN Rome 29th-IV-2003

Wider Issues Don’t forget that controllers have other tasks than separation to fulfil There are lots of other ”tools” e.g. MTCD, AMAN, DMAN, all competing for controller workload resources! What are the limitations of ASAS – in a control sense? ASAS concepts must be embedded into a holistic concept of operations ASAS-TN Rome 29th-IV-2003

Conclusions ASAS is here, but then it has been a long time in coming! There is a long way to go. There is much that we simply do not know about ASAS in operation THE IFATCA vision, might perhaps be that ASAS should be just another tool in the controller “box of tools” – please ask us ASAS-TN Rome 29th-IV-2003

Conclusions – cont’d Please try to appreciate that controllers are system users as well, not just system providers, and that we have our own set of user requirements to make ASAS work. Moreover, many controllers simply do not understand why there is a need for ASAS, and there is a need to ensure that they are engaged fully in it’s development ASAS-TN Rome 29th-IV-2003