Michael Lacewing enquiries@alevelphilosophy.co.uk Ethical naturalism Michael Lacewing enquiries@alevelphilosophy.co.uk

Cognitivism vs. non-cognitivism What are we doing when we make moral judgments? Cognitivism: moral judgments, e.g. ‘Murder is wrong’ Aim to describe how the world is Can be true or false Express beliefs that the claim is true Non-cognitivism: moral judgments Do not aim to describe the world Cannot be true or false Express attitudes towards the world

Three quick arguments If there were no facts about moral right and wrong, it wouldn’t be possible to make mistakes. Morality feels like a demand from ‘outside’ us, independent of what we want or feel. How is moral progress possible, unless some views about morality are better than others?

Types of realism Moral realism: good and bad are properties of situations and people, right and wrong are properties of actions Moral judgements are true or false depending on whether they ascribe the moral properties something actually has What is the nature of these properties?

Ethical naturalism Naturalism: moral properties are actually natural (psychological) properties Reductionism: things in one domain are identical with things in another Utilitarianism as naturalism Goodness is happiness Rightness is maximizing happiness Cf. non-reductive reading: maximizing happiness and rightness are correlated

Objection How can we prove the identity claim? Which natural property, if any, is identical with goodness isn’t obvious We can’t use empirical reasoning Science can show whether, e.g. someone is happy, but can’t show whether this is good We can’t deduce it: conceptual analysis of ‘happiness’ doesn’t establish that it is good Philosophical argument will be necessary

Was Mill a naturalist? Moore argues that Mill defines good as ‘desired’ Mill argues that happiness is desired, and then infers that happiness is good But this only works if what is desired is good Likewise, Mill says that to think of something as desirable (good) and as pleasant is the same thing – so pleasant, desired, good are all the same

Was Mill a naturalist? But Mill could be taking what is desired as evidence as what is good Not the same property, but evidence that a different property is possessed

Was Aristotle a naturalist? Aristotle argues that eudaimonia – the good for people – what we achieve if we perform our ‘function’ well There are psychological facts about what traits enable us to do this Reply: but what eudaimonia is can’t be identified with any set of natural facts The person with practical wisdom understands the reasons for feeling and acting a certain way Whether something is a reason isn’t a natural fact