Key Elements to a Successful Anti-Cartel Program

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Presentation transcript:

Key Elements to a Successful Anti-Cartel Program Ann O’Brien Senior Counsel Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of Justice NDRC International Conference on Anti-monopoly Agreements Concerning Pricing June 1, 2011 Beijing, China

Key Elements of an Effective Anti-Cartel Enforcement Program Clear Enforcement Policies Commitment to Consistent Enforcement Effective Leniency Programs

Clear Enforcement Policies Define cartel conduct Bring cartel cases that establish bright lines Transparent and predictable enforcement encourages cooperation

Clear Enforcement Policies Explicit and Public Standards and Policies In the U.S. We Strive for Transparency In: Decision to Open an Investigation Decision to File a Case Prosecutorial Priorities Settlement Negotiations Sentencing and Fine Calculation (Proportionality) Our Leniency Program

Preventing Price-Fixing Cartels Most fundamental responsibility of antitrust enforcement officials It is also one of the most difficult, because cartels almost always try to hide their actions

Leniency: Most Important Tool for Uncovering Price-Fixing Cartels Gives full immunity to first qualifying cartel member to confess and cooperate – no penalties or punishment of corporation or its executives Powerful tool for detecting cartels Creates race to report Creates distrust in cartels Creates incentives to defect from cartels Most large U.S. cartel cases involve leniency applications

The Benefits of Leniency for Anti-Cartel Enforcers Detection of Secret Cartels Ends Harm to Consumers Investigations Shortened Enforcer Resources Saved Access to Documents/Witnesses

U.S. Lessons Learned: Implementing an Effective Leniency Program Inclusive rather than exclusive policy Create incentives/avoid disincentives to reporting maintain confidentiality Predictable and transparent policies company needs to be able to predict if it will qualify for leniency and how it will be treated if it applies

An Effective Anti-Cartel Program Detects Cartel Activity and Ends Harms to Businesses and Consumers