Normative Virtue Ethics

What is a Moral Theory? Gives useful definitions of the elements of moral experience. A definition is ‘useful’ if it provides guidance for practical (moral) reasoning. What is a virtuous or vicious character trait? What is a right or wrong action? What is a morally good or bad state of affairs? Gives guidance for practical (moral) reasoning. Definitions can be used for classification. Provides rules we can reason with. Provides a procedure for resolving any moral dilemma (?) Explains how we achieve and transmit moral knowledge. What is moral knowledge? Is it empirical or a priori? How should we morally educate children?

The Challenge to Virtue Ethics Virtue ethics is not a moral theory because it doesn’t: Give a useful definition of right (and wrong) action. Provide rules for reasoning about right and wrong action. Provide a way of resolving every moral dilemma. Hursthouse argues that virtue ethics does give a useful definition of right (and wrong) action, and does provide rules of reasoning about right and wrong action. She argues that a moral theory need not provide a way of resolving every moral dilemma. In arguing for these points, she gives us a virtue ethics account of moral knowledge.

What is Virtue Ethics? It is a view about morality that emphasizes virtues, or moral character, as opposed to the consequences of actions (consequentialism) or rules of action (deontology). A virtue is an excellent character trait; a vice is a defective character trait. A character trait a well-entrenched disposition to notice, expect, value, feel, desire, choose, act, and react in certain characteristic ways.

Virtue Ethics and Right Action Hursthouse argues that virtue ethics gives the following definition of right action: V1. An action is right if and only if it is what a virtuous agent would characteristically (i.e. acting in character) do in the circumstances.

Virtue Ethics and Right Action Objection 1: this definition is not useful because it doesn’t tell us what counts as a virtuous agent. Hursthouse’s response is that it need not do this on its own. We can add: V1a. A virtuous agent is one who acts virtuously, that is, one who has and exercises the virtues. V2. A virtue is a character trait that…(a human being needs for euidamonia... is useful or agreeable to its possessor or others...) List of virtues derived from V2 (e.g., honesty, charity, kindness). Virtue ethics is in this respect just like consequentialism and deontology, according to Hursthouse.

Virtue Ethics and Right Action Objection 2: (1) Either I am a virtuous agent or I am not. (2) If I am, then I don’t need this definition in order to act rightly. (3) If I’m not, then I can’t use this definition to act rightly, because I cannot know what a virtuous agent would do. So (4) whether I am a virtuous agent or not, this definition is not useful. Hursthouse’s response is that (3) is false. I can know what a virtuous agent would do by consulting a virtuous agent, or by acting in accordance with the list of virtues derived from V2.

Virtue Ethics and Rules to Reason With The Virtue Ethics Account of Right Action V1. An action is right if and only if it is what a virtuous agent would characteristically (i.e. acting in character) do in the circumstances. V1a. A virtuous agent is one who acts virtuously, that is, one who has and exercises the virtues. V2. A virtue is a character trait that…(a human being needs for euidamonia... is useful or agreeable to its possessor or others...) List of virtues (e.g., honesty, kindness, charity). The rules that virtue ethics gives us (“V-Rules”) are derived from V1 and the list of virtues: For example, “do not act uncharitably,” “act honestly,” and so on.

Virtue Ethics and Rules to Reason With Objection 1 to the V-Rules: they aren’t useful because they use difficult evaluative terms (“honesty,” “charity,” etc.) Hursthouse’s response is that most rival moral theories must use rules with evaluative content. E.g., deontology will yield a rule like “Do not kill the innocent,” “Do not kill unjustly,” and so on.

Virtue Ethics and Rules to Reason With Objection 2 to the V-Rules: due to their use of difficult evaluative terms (“honesty,” “charitably,”) these rules could not be used for the purposes of moral education. Hursthouse’s response is that, although we can use simplified rules for children (“do not lie”), if we have an interest in teaching them the moral truth, and the moral truth about what to do is the virtue-ethical account, then we ultimately want children to achieve a more sophisticated level of moral understanding—an understanding that, e.g., to be honest is not the same as never lying. The V-Rules represent the moral truth.

Virtue Ethics and Moral Dilemmas Objection 3 to the V-Rules: The V-Rules can sometimes tell us to do mutually inconsistent things (e.g., act both justly and mercifully). And the V-Rules don’t tell us how to resolve these conflicts. So the V-Rules fail to provide guidance. Hursthouse responds that virtue ethics has resources to resolve some conflicts between V-Rules. Some conflicts are merely apparent, arising from a mis-application of the virtue or vice terms. For example, an apparent conflict between the V-Rule “act kindly” and “act honestly” can sometimes be resolved once we see that in this particular case, concealing the truth is not kind, or that the importance of the truth is more important than hurt feelings.

Virtue Ethics and Moral Dilemmas Furthermore, virtue ethics has a deep explanation for why such apparent moral dilemmas can arise. Determining the morally right action can be difficult because the morally right action is determined by the v-rules, and correctly applying the v-rules in a particular case requires experience—it requires knowing, for example, what sort of truths can be concealed without cost to the person lied to, and what sort of truths ought to told regardless of hurt feelings. Hence, moral knowledge is empirical, unlike mathematical knowledge. Because of this, moral whiz-kids are extremely rare.

Virtue Ethics and Moral Dilemmas Hursthouse acknowledges that some moral dilemmas cannot be readily resolved (i.e., reduced to a single “solution,” an action or choice) by virtue ethics. She thinks it’s possible that some moral dilemmas are irresolvable. If moral theories must provide a solution to any moral dilemma, then virtue ethics is not a moral theory. But Hursthouse denies that a moral theory must provide a solution to every moral dilemma. Instead, she says that a moral theory can and should leave open whether or not there are some irresolvable moral dilemmas. Virtue ethics does leave this question open: it’s possible to be a virtue ethicist and think that, for any situation of choice, there is exactly one morally right choice; or that there are some situations in which there is more than one morally right choice (or none).

Questions Do you find the virtue-ethics account of right action persuasive? Do you agree that moral knowledge depends on experience, at least to a large extent? Do you think there are irresolvable moral dilemmas?

For Thursday Read Jack Smart’s “Extreme and Restricted Utilitarianism.”