NFD Tunnel Authentication

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Presentation transcript:

NFD Tunnel Authentication Junxiao Shi, 2016-06-30

Outline Why is tunnel authentication necessary? Which faces need tunnel authentication? At high level, how does tunnel authentication work? What packets are used by tunnel authentication? How does client and server operate? Are there any deployment issues? How does NFD tunnel authentication compare to IP-based VPN solutions?

Necessity

Overlay Tunnel needs Authentication You don't want to allow anyone in the world to gain connectivity through your router. Analogy in IP world: You don't want to open up your VPN server to everyone.

Authentication is for Tunnels Only Multicast faces do not need authentication: local area network is trusted. Backbone overlay links (eg. between testbed routers) SHOULD have mutual tunnel authentication.

High-level Design

Feature Overview Tunnel opening is explicit: tunnel authentication request and reply. Other packet exchanges are rejected before this sequence is done. Authentication is mutual. Keep-alive is done by repeating the tunnel opening sequence, shortly before previous one expires. Tunnel closing can be explicit: tunnel closure request and reply. Tunnel closing can also be implicit: failure to keep- alive closes the tunnel.

Tunnel Opening (successful) C-S: tunnel authentication request Interest signed by client's key contains a TunnelLifetime chosen by client S-C: tunnel authentication reply Data signed by server's key contains a TunnelLifetime chosen by server Tunnel is open.

Tunnel Opening (server rejects) C-S: tunnel authentication request Interest signed by client's key contains a TunnelLifetime chosen by client Server does not trust the signature in the request, or does not want to establish the tunnel. S-C: tunnel authentication reply Producer-generated NACK signed by server's key contains an error code; no error message to avoid leaking sensitive information

Tunnel Opening (client rejects) C-S: tunnel authentication request Interest signed by client's key contains a TunnelLifetime chosen by client S-C: tunnel authentication reply Data signed by server's key contains a TunnelLifetime chosen by server C-S: tunnel closure request

Tunnel Lifetime Tunnel lifetime is requested by client and granted by server. Tunnel lifetime MUST NOT be less than 2000ms, to ensure correct protocol operations. Server MAY grant a TunnelLifetime that is less than client's request. Client perceives the tunnel to be open for negotiated lifetime since the moment it sends tunnel authentication request. Server perceives the tunnel to be open for negotiated lifetime since the moment it sends tunnel authentication reply.

Keep-Alive and Implicit Closing At some random point between 50% and 75% of tunnel lifetime, client repeats tunnel opening sequence. If a valid tunnel authentication request does not arrive at the end of tunnel lifetime as perceived by the server, the tunnel is implicitly closed. If a valid tunnel authentication reply does not arrive at the end of tunnel lifetime as perceived by the client, the tunnel is implicitly closed.

Explicit Closing C-S: tunnel closure request S-C: tunnel closure reply Interest signed by client's key seize to send other packets; accept incoming packets S-C: tunnel closure reply Data signed by server's key Tunnel is closed. This sequence works on the other direction as well. Each party SHOULD first send other pending packets, wait for a short duration for them to be delivered, then send the tunnel closure request/reply.

Packet Injection Mitigation Tunnel authentication protocol does not mitigate packet injection and MITM attacks. NDNLP may provide mitigation through "packet injection prevention" feature, although this requires a careful security protocol design. Existing TLS/DTLS can be used to provide mitigation.

TLS/DTLS + Tunnel Authentication Client connects to server using TLS/DTLS. Client authenticates server's X509 certificate (one-way authentication), and establishes a secure tunnel. Server disallows all NDN communication from the client except NDN tunnel authentication commands. Client and server authenticate each other through NDN tunnel authentication. Server allows full NDN communication from the client.

Protocol Details

Deployment Issues

Comparison to VPN