Prior to the auction, a basement bid of $15,000/unit was secured.

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Presentation transcript:

Prior to the auction, a basement bid of $15,000/unit was secured. Auction Scenarios The following auction scenarios assume an angel group or fund is auctioning off 4 units of Company X. Prior to the auction, a basement bid of $15,000/unit was secured.

Disclaimer The scenarios presented within are theoretical scenarios merely intended to demonstrate the mechanics of the [Company X] auction. These scenarios do not attempt to value [Angel Group’s] holdings in [Company X] today or in the future, nor should they be used to inform any bids on [Angel Group’s] holdings.

Actual Units Purchased Actual Unit Price/Share Auction Example #1 The highest bid to clear all units is $55,000/unit, placed by Investor 4. This is the price at which all winning bidders will purchase units. Investors 1, 2, 3, and 4 each purchase 1.0 units for $55,000/unit. Investors 5 & 6 do not purchase units, as their bids were not high enough. Units Bid Bid Price /Unit Actual Units Purchased Actual Unit Price/Share OTAF I Proceeds Investor 1 1.0 $85,000 $55,000 Investor 2 $75,000 Investor 3 $65,000 Investor 4 Investor 5 $45,000 - Investor 6 Total 4.0 $220,000

Actual Units Purchased Actual Unit Price/Share Auction Example #2 The highest bid to clear all units is $65,000/unit, placed by Investor 3. This is the price at which all winning bidders will purchase units. Investor 1 purchases 1.0 unit, Investor 2 purchases 2.0 units, and Investor 3 purchases 1.0 unit, all for $65,000/unit. Investors 4-6 do not purchase units, as their bids were not high enough. Units Bid Bid Price /Unit Actual Units Purchased Actual Unit Price/Share OTAF I Proceeds Investor 1 1.0 $85,000 $65,000 Investor 2 2.0 $75,000 $130,000 Investor 3 Investor 4 $55,000 - Investor 5 $45,000 Investor 6 Total 4.0 $260,000

Actual Units Purchased Actual Unit Price/Share Auction Example #3 The highest bid to clear all units is $85,000/unit, placed by Investor 1. Investor 1 purchases 4.0 units for $85,000/unit. Investors 2-6 do not purchase units, as their bids were not high enough. Units Bid Bid Price /Unit Actual Units Purchased Actual Unit Price/Share OTAF I Proceeds Investor 1 4.0 $85,000 $340,000 Investor 2 1.0 $75,000 - Investor 3 $65,000 Investor 4 $55,000 Investor 5 $45,000 Investor 6 Total

Actual Units Purchased Actual Unit Price/Share Auction Example #4 The highest bid to clear all units is $65,000, placed by Investor 3. This is the price at which all winning bidders will purchase units. Investors 1 and 2 get their full allotment of units, as they had higher bids than Investor 3. Investor 3 only receives half the units for which she bid. Investors 4-6 do not purchase units, as their bids were not high enough. Units Bid Bid Price /Unit Actual Units Purchased Actual Unit Price/Share OTAF I Proceeds Investor 1 2.0 $85,000 $65,000 $130,000 Investor 2 1.0 $75,000 Investor 3 Investor 4 $55,000 - Investor 5 $45,000 Investor 6 Total 4.0 $260,000

Actual Units Purchased Actual Unit Price/Share Auction Example #5 The highest bid to clear all units is $45,000, placed by Investors 3 and 4. This is the price at which all winning bidders will purchase units. Even though Investor 4 bid the same price per unit as Investor 3, Investor 4 does not purchase any units because Investor 3 was willing to purchase more units than Investor 4. Investors 4-6 do not purchase units, as their bids were not high enough. Units Bid Bid Price /Unit Actual Units Purchased Actual Unit Price/Share OTAF I Proceeds Investor 1 1.0 $55,000 $45,000 Investor 2 Investor 3 2.0 $90,000 Investor 4 - Investor 5 $35,000 Investor 6 $25,000 Total 4.0 $180,000

Actual Units Purchased Actual Unit Price/Share Auction Example #6 The highest bid to clear all units is the basement bid of $15,000. This is the price at which all winning bidders will purchase units. Investor 1 purchases 2.0 units, Investor 2 purchases 1.0 unit, and the basement bid purchases 1.0 unit, all for $15,000/unit. Units Bid Bid Price /Unit Actual Units Purchased Actual Unit Price/Share OTAF I Proceeds Investor 1 2.0 $20,000 $15,000 $30,000 Investor 2 1.0 $19,000 Basement Bid 4.0 Total $60,00