What I Think When I Think About Happiness Dan Weijers CSUS Faculty Panel on Happiness April 20, 2015

Is Matthieu Ricard the Happiest Person in the World? And how could we know?

Brain Scan Test of Happiness

Is Happiness Objective? “Sceptics may still question whether happiness is really an objective feeling that can be properly compared between people.” “To reassure doubters, we can turn to modern brain physiology with its sensational new insights…” –Richard Layard in Happiness (2005, p. 17)

What is Happiness? Flourishing Satisfaction Hedonism Being all you can be (given what you are) Satisfaction Getting what you want in life Hedonism Feeling happy (pleasure and not pain)

What are We Measuring? Significant but low correlations Flourishing: Ryff’s Scales of Psychological Well-Being (0.33**) Life satisfaction: Diener’s Satisfaction With Life Scale (0.30**) Hedonism: Watson et al.’s Positive and Negative Affect Scale (0.21*) We are measuring something related to all three conceptions of happiness, but equal to none of them In the only comprehensive study of correlations between neuroimaging and measurement of subjective well-being, several prominent subjective well-being measures were compared with electroencephalogram data from 84 right-handed adults aged 57–60. Correlating highest with the neuroimaging results were the results for a measure of psychological flourishing—Carol Ryff’s (1989) Scales of Psychological Well-Being. The correlation was highly significant (p < 0.01) and moderate in size (0.33) (Urry et al. 2004, p. 370). Following close behind was Ed Diener and colleagues’ (1985) Satisfaction With Life Scale, which correlated with the neuroimaging results by 0.30 and was also highly significant (p < 0.01) (Urry et al. 2004, p. 370). A smaller (0.21) and slightly less significant (p < 0.05) correlation was also found with the positive affect component of Watson, Clark, and Tellegen’s (1988) Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (Urry et al. 2004, p. 370). It should be noted that, unlike the questions that directly ask about happiness, none of the measures of subjective well-being used in Urry and colleagues’ (2004) study are equivalent to the folk notion of happiness (although the measure of positive affect would come the closest). - First, the neuroimaging results and these measures of subjective well-being are very likely to be tracking phenomena that are related in some positive way. This is shown by the fact that the correlation is positive and highly statistically significant. - Second, the phenomena being tracked are clearly distinct. The high statistical significance of the results should make us confident that the various measures are not measuring exactly the same thing. If the size of the correlations were much higher, at least above 0.60, and the statistical significance remained very high, then we would expect to observe the phenomena measured by the different tests to covariate more closely and, thereby, give the impression of being the same thing. Positive correlations of 0.33 (roughly) mean that we should expect an increase in the results of the neuroimaging measure to be usually accompanied by a relatively smaller increase of the subjective well-being measure. This is the kind of relationship we expect from distinct but positively related variables, not from two different measures of the same phenomenon. 0.60 is the level above which behavioural scientists usually deem results to be ‘highly related’ (Cohen 1988).

Overarching Research Questions What is good for societies? What is good for individuals? The nature of happiness is certainly a contested and very interesting topic… but is happiness the most important thing? What is the connection between happiness and a good life? This explains how my main line of research has developed over the years. These are also questions that I will continue to work on for many years to come. What is happiness?

Interdisciplinary Interests Neuro-science Psychology Philosophy Economics I’m a philosopher with interdisciplinary interests Public Policy

Promoting Interdisciplinary Research on Happiness Hedonism Meaning of life Values International Journal of Wellbeing Writing Editing Advising Organizing United Nations Treasury (NZ) Statistics (NZ) Creating (writing and editing) Connecting (advising and networking) Innovation – for a philosopher I use forward-thinking and innovative methods IJW is online only, interdisciplinary, and open access My policy advice is usually pushing the boundaries (e.g. subjective wellbeing for public policy) International Wellbeing and Policy Conferences

Some Happiness Research Cross-cultural psychology Faith makes injustice less dissatisfying People are somewhat averse to happiness Pondering the meaning of life might bring satisfaction Experimental philosophy The experience machine doesn’t make hedonism false Philosophers are less happy than others Philosophy The meaning of life could depend on science Happiness has meant different things in history Public policy Subjective wellbeing should be a gauge of public policy

Happiness (pleasure and not pain) Defending Hedonism Happiness (pleasure and not pain) What is good for societies? What is good for individuals? Define hedonism I don’t mean pleasure now regardless of consequences No theories of wellbeing are perfect. I defend hedonism because it is seen as much worse than the other main types of theory but I think it’s as good or better. What is happiness?

The Experience Machine “Suppose that there were an experience machine that would give you any experience you desired… Should you plug into this machine for life…?” Nozick, Robert (1974). Anarchy, State, and Utopia, pp. 42–45 Smart, Jack & Williams, Bernard (1973). Utilitarianism for and Against , pp. 18– 21. Bradbury, Ray (1957). The Happiness Machine, Dandelion Wine, Doubleday. Disclaimers: Ignore responsibilities to family etc. Don’t realise it’s not real Still exercise autonomy Machine works perfectly

The Argument Should you get in? Great experiences Low connection with reality High connection with reality Great experiences Two strengths of the argument: Philosophers think that just about everyone agrees that reality is preferable Comparison between great and average experiences (instead of equal experiences) “Now if pleasure were our greatest good, then we would all volunteer to be hooked for life to this machine… But surely very few people would volunteer.” Kymlicka, W. (1990). Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Introduction, p 13. If pleasure = g. good, then we’d plug in We would not plug in Therefore, pleasure ≠ g. good Moderate experiences

The Argument Reversed Should you get out? Moderate experiences High connection with reality Low connection with reality Moderate experiences Bad experiences Two strengths of the argument: Philosophers think that just about everyone agrees that reality is preferable Comparison between great and average experiences (instead of equal experiences) “Now if pleasure were our greatest good, then we would all volunteer to be hooked for life to this machine… But surely very few people would volunteer.” Kymlicka, W. (1990). Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Introduction, p 13. If pleasure = g. good, then we’d plug in We would not plug in Therefore, pleasure ≠ g. good

The Experience Machine We like where we are High connection with reality Low connection with reality Moderate experiences Bad experiences Two strengths of the argument: Philosophers think that just about everyone agrees that reality is preferable Comparison between great and average experiences (instead of equal experiences) “Now if pleasure were our greatest good, then we would all volunteer to be hooked for life to this machine… But surely very few people would volunteer.” Kymlicka, W. (1990). Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Introduction, p 13. If pleasure = g. good, then we’d plug in We would not plug in Therefore, pleasure ≠ g. good

What Does it all Mean? There is much about happiness we still don’t know