By:- Kan Yang, Xiaohua Jia

Slides:



Advertisements
Similar presentations
Secure Naming structure and p2p application interaction IETF - PPSP WG July 2010 Christian Dannewitz, Teemu Rautio and Ove Strandberg.
Advertisements

Trusted Data Sharing over Untrusted Cloud Storage Provider Gansen Zhao, Chunming Rong, Jin Li, Feng Zhang, and Yong Tang Cloud Computing Technology and.
Secure Data Storage in Cloud Computing Submitted by A.Senthil Kumar( ) C.Karthik( ) H.Sheik mohideen( ) S.Lakshmi rajan( )
Henry C. H. Chen and Patrick P. C. Lee
Efficient Information Retrieval for Ranked Queries in Cost-Effective Cloud Environments Presenter: Qin Liu a,b Joint work with Chiu C. Tan b, Jie Wu b,
Using Multi-Encryption to Provide Secure and Controlled Access to XML Documents Tomasz Müldner, Jodrey School of Computer Science, Acadia University, Wolfville,
Digital Signatures and Hash Functions. Digital Signatures.
Lect. 18: Cryptographic Protocols. 2 1.Cryptographic Protocols 2.Special Signatures 3.Secret Sharing and Threshold Cryptography 4.Zero-knowledge Proofs.
CSCE 715 Ankur Jain 11/16/2010. Introduction Design Goals Framework SDT Protocol Achievements of Goals Overhead of SDT Conclusion.
Dept. of Computer Science & Engineering, CUHK1 Trust- and Clustering-Based Authentication Services in Mobile Ad Hoc Networks Edith Ngai and Michael R.
PRIAM: PRivate Information Access Management on Outsourced Storage Service Providers Mark Shaneck Karthikeyan Mahadevan Jeff Yongdae Kim.
CSE 597E Fall 2001 PennState University1 Digital Signature Schemes Presented By: Munaiza Matin.
Alexander Potapov.  Authentication definition  Protocol architectures  Cryptographic properties  Freshness  Types of attack on protocols  Two-way.
Bob can sign a message using a digital signature generation algorithm
Cong Wang1, Qian Wang1, Kui Ren1 and Wenjing Lou2
Construction of efficient PDP scheme for Distributed Cloud Storage. By Manognya Reddy Kondam.
Abstract Provable data possession (PDP) is a probabilistic proof technique for cloud service providers (CSPs) to prove the clients' data integrity without.
Xiaohua Jia Shen Zhen Graduate School Harbin Institute of Technology Data Security for Cloud Storage Systems 1.
(Multimedia University) Ji-Jian Chin Swee-Huay Heng Bok-Min Goi
Guomin Yang et al. IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communication Vol. 6 No. 9 September
A Survey on Secure Cloud Data Storage ZENG, Xi CAI, Peng
DATA DYNAMICS AND PUBLIC VERIFIABILITY CHECKING WITHOUT THIRD PARTY AUDITOR GUIDED BY PROJECT MEMBERS: Ms. V.JAYANTHI M.E Assistant Professor V.KARTHIKEYAN.
02/22/2005 Joint Seminer Satoshi Koga Information Technology & Security Lab. Kyushu Univ. A Distributed Online Certificate Status Protocol with Low Communication.
Cryptography, Authentication and Digital Signatures
Phosphor A Cloud based DRM Scheme with Sim Card th International Asia-Pacific Web Conference Author : Peng Zou, Chaokun Wang, Zhang Liu, Dalei.
Speaker: Meng-Ting Tsai Date:2010/11/16 Toward Publicly Auditable Secure Cloud Data Storage Services Cong Wang and Kui Ren..etc IEEE Communications Society.
Strong Security for Distributed File Systems Group A3 Ka Hou Wong Jahanzeb Faizan Jonathan Sippel.
Yu-Li Lin and Chien-Lung Hsu Department of Information Management, Chang-Gung University Information Science(SCI) Reporter: Tzer-Long Chen.
Secure Communication between Set-top Box and Smart Card in DTV Broadcasting Authors: T. Jiang, Y. Hou and S. Zheng Source: IEEE Transactions on Consumer.
A new provably secure certificateless short signature scheme Authors: K.Y. Choi, J.H. Park, D.H. Lee Source: Comput. Math. Appl. (IF:1.472) Vol. 61, 2011,
Data Integrity Proofs in Cloud Storage Author: Sravan Kumar R and Ashutosh Saxena. Source: The Third International Conference on Communication Systems.
Deck 10 Accounting Information Systems Romney and Steinbart Linda Batch March 2012.
Interleaving and Collusion Attacks on a Dynamic Group Key Agreement Scheme for Low-Power Mobile Devices * Junghyun Nam 1, Juryon Paik 2, Jeeyeon Kim 2,
2011 IEEE TrustCom-11 Sushmita Ruj Amiya Nayak and Ivan Stojmenovic Regular Seminar Tae Hoon Kim.
EE 122: Lecture 24 (Security) Ion Stoica December 4, 2001.
Ari Juels, Burton S. Kaliski Jr 14th ACM conference on Computer and communications security,2007 Cited:793 Presenter: 張哲豪 Date:2014/11/24.
Key Generation Protocol in IBC Author : Dhruti Sharma and Devesh Jinwala 論文報告 2015/12/24 董晏彰 1.
Database Laboratory Regular Seminar TaeHoon Kim Article.
Cryptographic methods. Outline  Preliminary Assumptions Public-key encryption  Oblivious Transfer (OT)  Random share based methods  Homomorphic Encryption.
Cryptographic Hash Function. A hash function H accepts a variable-length block of data as input and produces a fixed-size hash value h = H(M). The principal.
IMAGE AUTHENTICATION TECHNIQUES Based on Automatic video surveillance (AVS) systems Guided by: K ASTURI MISHRA PRESENTED BY: MUKESH KUMAR THAKUR REG NO:
Database and Cloud Security
Shucheng Yu, Cong Wang, Kui Ren,
Searchable Encryption in Cloud
Proxy Blind Signature Scheme
Security Outline Encryption Algorithms Authentication Protocols
Author : Guilin Wang Source : Information Processing Letters
NETWORK SECURITY Cryptography By: Abdulmalik Kohaji.
Cryptographic Hash Function
A Novel Group Key Transfer Protocol
pVault Sharing Architecture
Information and Network Security
Digital Signature Schemes and the Random Oracle Model
Efficient CRT-Based RSA Cryptosystems
Fuzzy Identity Based Encryption
Cryptography Lecture 10.
Lecture 4 - Cryptography
CDK4: Chapter 7 CDK5: Chapter 11 TvS: Chapter 9
Digital Signatures…!.
Date:2011/09/28 報告人:向峻霈 出處: Ren-Chiun Wang  Wen-Shenq Juang 
An Improved Novel Key Management Protocol for RFID Systems
A New Provably Secure Certificateless Signature Scheme
CDK: Chapter 7 TvS: Chapter 9
Topic 13: Message Authentication Code
Security in SDR & cognitive radio
Helen: Maliciously Secure Coopetitive Learning for Linear Models
Cryptography Lecture 9.
Oblivious Transfer.
Secure Diffie-Hellman Algorithm
Presentation transcript:

By:- Kan Yang, Xiaohua Jia AN EFFICIENT AND SECURE DYNAMIC AUDITING PROTOCOL FOR DATA STORAGE IN CLOUD COMPUTING By:- Kan Yang, Xiaohua Jia Presented by:- DEEPAK BEGRAJKA

Preliminaries and definitions CONTENT Introduction Preliminaries and definitions Efficient and privacy preserving auditing protocol Secure dynamic auditing Batch auditing for multi-owner and multi-cloud Performance analysis of auditing protocol Related works Conclusion

What is Cloud Computing? The illusion of infinite computing resources… The elimination of an up-front commitment by cloud users… The ability to pay for use…as needed…”

Where is My Data on Cloud? Data resides on servers that the customer cannot physically access. Vendors may store data anywhere at lowest cost if not restrained by agreement

CLOUD STORAGE Important service of cloud. Allow owner to move data from their local computing system to cloud. Owner start to store data on cloud

New Challenges Data could be lost in cloud. Cloud service provider might be dishonest.

Third Party Auditing Protocol Requirements Confidentiality Dynamic Auditing Batch Auditing

PRELIMINARIES AND DEFINITIONS

SYSTEM MODEL OF DATA STORING AND AUDITING

KEY NOTATIONS

STORAGE AUDITING PROTOCOL VERIFY(C, P, sKh, pKt, Minfo)0/1 PROVE (M, T, Challenge) Proof CHALLENGE (Minfo) Challenge TAG GENERATION (M, sKt, sKh)  (T) KEY GENERATION (λ.) (sKh, sKt, pKt )

ATTACKS BY SERVER REPLACE ATTACK Server may choose another valid and uncorrupted pair of data block and data tag to replace challenged pair of data block and data tag. FORGE ATTACK Server may forge data tag & data block and deceive the auditor, if same secret tag key of owner is used in different version. REPLAY ATTACK Server may generate proof from the previous proof or other information, without retrieving the actual owner’s data

Efficient and Privacy-Preserving Auditing Protocol

OVERVIEW OF THE SOLUTION The main challenge to design data storage auditing protocol is the data privacy problem For public data, the auditor may obtain data information by recovering data blocks from data proof. For encrypted data, auditor may obtain content keys somehow through any special channels and could be able to decrypt data. To solve data privacy problem, Generate Encrypted proof with the help of challenge stamp by using bilinearity property of bilinear pairing. Auditor verify proof without decrypting.

OVERVIEW OF THE SOLUTION In this method server compute the proof as intermediate value of verification. Auditor use intermediate value to verify proof. (Reduce Computing loads as auditor is moved to server.) To Improve performance of auditing system, author apply Data Fragmentation and Homomorphic Verifiable Tags. Data Fragmentation technique reduces no. of data tags, Hence reduce storage overhead and improve system performance. Using Homomorphic tags, no matter what how many data blocks are challenged server response to sum of data block and product of tags whose size is constant and is one data block.

Algorithm For Auditing Protocol File F (m data components) F= (F1, F2,… Fm) Data component has its physical meaning and updated dynamically. Data Component Fk divided into nk data blocks, Fk = (mk1, mk2,..mknk) Data Fragmentation, Data block  Sectors. For the algorithm we consider no. of sectors to be constant. For data back with different no. of sectors. Smax Max no of sector, Si variable no of sector. For each data block mi (Si< Smax) P  Security Parameters, n  no of data blocks = n = sizeof (M) / s·log p .

Algorithm For Auditing Protocol Encrypted data component M= {mi,j} i∈[1,n], j∈[1,s]. G1, G2 and GT be the multiplicative groups with the same prime order p e : G1 × G2 → GT be the bilinear map g1 and g2 be the generators of G1 and G2 respectively Let h : {0,1}∗ →G1 be a keyed secure hash function that maps the Minfo to a point in G1.

Key Generation Algorithm Input (λ) “Implicit Security Parameter” Choose two random number sKt, sKh ∈ Zp Output pKt  pkt = g2 ^ sKt ∈ G2, secret tag key sKt and secret hash key sKh.

Tag Generation Algorithm Input  M “data component”, sKt “Secret Tag Key”, sKh “Secret Hash Key” Chooses s random values x1, x2, · · · , xs ∈ Zp and computes uj = g1 ^ xj ∈ G1 for all j ∈ [1, s]. For each data block mi(i ∈ [1,n]) calculate data tag  ti = (h(skh,Wi) · s Π j=1 uj^mi j )skt Wi = FID||i, FID identifier of the data, i  block number of mi Output  set of data tags T = {ti} i∈[1,n].

Challenge Algorithm outputs  “challenge” C = ({i, vi} i ∈ Q, R). Input  Minfo “Abstract information of the data” Construct Challenge Set Q, generates a random number vi ∈ Z∗p Compute challenge stamp R = (pkt)^r by randomly choosing a number r ∈Z∗p. outputs  “challenge” C = ({i, vi} i ∈ Q, R).

“Data proof” Dp Prove Algorithm Input  M, Challenge. Output  Tag proof , Data Proof. “Tag Proof” For data proof first compute M Pj j ∈ [1, s] “Data proof” Dp

Verification Algorithm Input  Challenge, Proof, Secret hash key “sKh”, Public tag key “pKt”, and Abstract information of data component. Compute Identifier hash value h(skh,Wi), and computes “Challenge Hash” Verifies the proof from the server by the following verification equation: If above equation holds, Output  1 else it is 0.

Construction of Privacy-Preserving Auditing Protocol Owner Initialization Owner generates the keys and the tags for the data, and store data on server. Confirmation Auditing  Check data correctly store on server or not. Sampling Auditing  Check data integrity, periodically.

Owner Initialization Run TagGen to compute data tags. Owners run KeyGen to generate sKh, sKt, pKt. Run TagGen to compute data tags. Owners send data component M={mi}i∈[1,n] & its corresponding data tags T = {ti}i∈[1,n] to server with set of parameters {uj}j∈[1,s]. Owner send pKt, sKh and Minfo to auditor, including data indentifier FID, total no of block n.

CONFIRMATION AUDITING Two way communication. Check owners data correctly stored on the server. Auditor Runs Challenge algorithm and send C = ({i,vi}i∈Q,R) to server. Server Runs prove Algorithm & generate P = (TP,DP) send it to Auditor. Auditor Runs Verify algorithm, check correctness of P, extract auditing result.

SAMPLING AUDITING Auditor conduct this algorithm periodically. Similar to Confirmation Auditing. For t challenged data blocks Probability of detection of corrupted data is Pr(t, s) = 1−(1−ρ)^t·s.

SECURE DYNAMIC AUDITING

Data owners dynamically update data. Auditing protocol should be design to support static as well as dynamic update. Dynamic update may make auditing protocol insecure prone to following attacks: Replay attacks Forge attacks.

PROPOSED SOLUTION Replay Attack Prevented by Index Table Forge Attack Prevented by modifying TagGen Algorithm. While generating data tag ti of data block mi, insert all abstract information into ti by setting Wi= FID||i||Bi||Vi||Ti, hence server does not get enough information for forge attack.

INDEX TABLE ITable Record abstract information of data. 4 Components: Index:- current block number of data block mi in data component M. Bi:- original block number of mi. Vi:- current version. Ti:- Time stamp used for generating data tag. ITable created by owner during owner initialization, managed by auditor. Owner send update msg to auditor. After confirmation auditing auditor result to owner.

Three Steps : DYNAMIC AUDITING Data Update Index Update Update Confirmation

DATA UPDATE 3 types of operations: Modify “Vi Vi*, Ti Ti*”. Insert  “Bi Bi*, Vi Vi*, Ti Ti*”. Delete

INDEX UPDATE 3 types: IModify “Vi Vi*, Ti Ti*”. IInsert  “Bi Bi*, Vi Vi*, Ti Ti*”. IDelete

UPDATE CONFORMATION Auditor updates the ITable, conducts confirmation auditing & sends result to owner. Owner can choose to delete the local version of data according to the update confirmation auditing result.

BATCH AUDITING FOR MULTI-OWNER AND MULTI-CLOUD

Large numbers of Owners  Many auditing Request to Auditor. Auditor Combine Auditing Request Conduct Batch Auditing for all Owners. Author apply the encryption method with the Bilinearity property of the bilinear pairing to ensure the data privacy. Hence In the multi-cloud batch auditing protocol does not have any commitment phase. This method does not require any additional trusted organizer.

Algorithm for Batch Auditing for Multi owner and Multi Cloud. O  Set owners, S Set of cloud Servers. Phase 1: Owner Initialization. Each owner apply KeyGen and TagGen algorithm, and send abstract information to the auditor. Three Steps Batch Challenge ({Minfo,kl}k∈O,l∈S) → C. Batch Proof ({Mkl} k ∈ Ochal , {Tkl} k∈ Ochal , Cl,{Rk} k∈ Ochal ) → Pl. Pl = (TPl ,DPl). Batch Verify (C,{Pl},{skh, lk},{pkt, k},{Minfo, kl}) → 0/1. Phase 2: Batch Auditing

PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS OF AUDITING PROTOCOLS

Computation Complexity Performance Analysis Communication Cost Computation Complexity

Communication Cost

Computation Cost of Auditor Computation Cost of Server

Computation Cost of Auditor Wang’s scheme requires data blocks more than Zhu’s 7 proposed scheme, computation time is almost s times. (not comparable).

Computation Cost of Server

Erway et al Extended PDP model  Cost heavy computation burden Related Work Ateniese et al. –Developed Dynamic provable data possession protocol –Based on Cryptographic Hash Function and Hash Function –ProblemsEach update requires recreating all the remaining metadata &cannot perform block insertions anywhere Erway et al Extended PDP model  Cost heavy computation burden Zhu et al –Proposed cooperative provable data possession scheme – support batch auditing for multiple clouds and also extend it to support the dynamic auditing -Not Support Batch Auditing for multiple owners. Also requires additional trusted organizer. Wang’s schemes and Zhu’s schemes incur heavy computation cost of the auditor, which makes the auditing system inefficient.

Conclusion Paper discusses an efficient and inherently secure dynamic auditing protocol. Protocol Protects data privacy against the auditor by combining the cryptography method with the bilinearity property of bilinear paring, rather than using the mask technique. Proposed Multi-cloud batch auditing protocol does not require any additional organizer. Batch auditing protocol can also support the batch auditing for multiple owners. Auditing scheme incurs less communication cost and less computation cost of the auditor by moving the computing loads of auditing from the auditor to the server can be applied to large scale cloud storage systems.

QUESTIONS ???? Thank you