Stable Marriage Problem

Slides:



Advertisements
Similar presentations
1 Stable Matching A Special Case of Stable Marriage.
Advertisements

Modelling and Solving the Stable Marriage problem using Constraint Programming David Manlove and Gregg OMalley University Of Glasgow Department of Computing.
Stable Matching Problems with Constant Length Preference Lists Rob Irving, David Manlove, Gregg OMalley University Of Glasgow Department of Computing Science.
Blah blah blah. Zoes shark Thanks to the conference artist Phoebe.
Piyush Kumar (Lecture 3: Stable Marriage) Welcome to COT5405.
Chapter 10 IterativeImprovement Copyright © 2007 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved.
1 Overview of Graph Theory Addendum “The Stable Marriage Problem” Instructor: Carlos Pomalaza-Ráez Fall 2003 University of Oulu, Finland.
Matching Theory.
Selecting the the k-th smallest element in a set.
A. Levitin “Introduction to the Design & Analysis of Algorithms,” 3rd ed., Ch. 10 ©2012 Pearson Education, Inc. Upper Saddle River, NJ. All Rights Reserved.
Stabile Marriage Thanks to Mohammad Mahdian Lab for Computer Science, MIT.
Lecture 6 CSE 331 Sep 14. A run of the GS algorithm Mal Wash Simon Inara Zoe Kaylee.
Chapter 26 of CLSR Bipartite Matching By Dr. M. Sakalli, Sources: Levitin and many other CSE, Marmara Univ. May/2009.
Lecture 4 CSE 331 Sep 9, Blog posts for lectures Starts from today See Sep 8 post on the blog.
Lecture 8 CSE 331 Sep 17, HW 1 due today Place Q1 and Q2 in separate piles I will not accept HWs after 1:15pm.
The Stable Marriage Problem
1 Stable Matching Problem Goal. Given n men and n women, find a "suitable" matching. n Participants rate members of opposite sex. n Each man lists women.
L3 #1 The Hospitals / Residents Problem and Some Extensions David Manlove University of Glasgow Department of Computing Science Supported by EPSRC grant.
Stable Matchings a.k.a. the Stable Marriage Problem
Chapter 10 IterativeImprovement. Iterative Improvement Algorithm design technique for solving optimization problems b Start with a feasible solution b.
1 The Stable Marriage Problem Algorithms and Networks 2014/2015 Hans L. Bodlaender Johan M. M. van Rooij.
Specialised Binary Constraint for the Stable Marriage Problem with Ties and incomplete preference lists By Chris Unsworth and Patrick Prosser.
Design & Co-design of Embedded Systems Final Project: “The Match Maker” Second Phase Oral Presentation Safa S. Mahmoodian.
The Stable Marriage Problem
Fair Shares.
Graph Algorithms Maximum Flow - Best algorithms [Adapted from R.Solis-Oba]
Market Design and Analysis Lecture 1 Lecturer: Ning Chen ( 陈宁 )
Chapter 10 IterativeImprovement Copyright © 2007 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved.
Dating Advice from Mathematics
Matching Boys Girls A B C D E
Cybernetica AS & Tartu University
Stable Matching.
Chapter 1 Introduction: Some Representative Problems
Lower bound for the Stable Marriage Problem
Lecture 4 CSE 331 Sep 7, 2016.
Introduction to the Design and Analysis of Algorithms
Chapter 10 Iterative Improvement
The Stable Marriage Problem
Lecture 5 CSE 331 Sep 8, 2017.
Maximum Flow - Best algorithms
Lecture 6 CSE 331 Sep 9, 2013.
CSE 421: Introduction to Algorithms
Lecture 5 CSE 331 Sep 10, 2010.
Lecture 7 CSE 331 Sep 15, 2010.
Lecture 4 CSE 331 Sep 6, 2017.
Lecture 6 CSE 331 Sep 11, 2017.
Lecture 6 CSE 331 Sep 13, 2010.
S. Raskhodnikova; based on slides by K. Wayne
Matching Lirong Xia March 8, Matching Lirong Xia March 8, 2016.
CSE 421: Introduction to Algorithms
1.1 A First Problem: Stable Matching
Discrete Math for CS CMPSC 360 LECTURE 9 Last time: Strong induction
Lecture 5 CSE 331 Sep 6, 2013.
Lecture 5 CSE 331 Sep 7, 2012.
Blah blah blah.
Chapter 1 Introduction: Some Representative Problems
Bipartite Matching By Dr. M
Lecture 10 CSE 331 Sep 21, 2012.
Lecture 6 CSE 331 Sep 12, 2011.
Lecture 9 CSE 331 Sep 15, 2014.
Lecture 5 CSE 331 Sep 5, 2014.
Lecture 6 CSE 331 Sep 12, 2016.
Lecture 7 CSE 331 Sep 10, 2014.
Stable Matchings.
Piyush Kumar (Lecture 3: Stable Marriage)
Lecture 5 CSE 331 Sep 9, 2011.
Lecture 7 CSE 331 Sep 11, 2013.
Lecture 5 CSE 331 Sep 9, 2016.
CSC 421: Algorithm Design & Analysis
Week 10 - Wednesday CS221.
Presentation transcript:

Stable Marriage Problem There is a set Y = {m1,…,mn} of n men and a set X = {w1,…,wn} of n women. Each man has a ranking list of the women, and each woman has a ranking list of the men (with no ties in these lists). A marriage matching M is a set of n pairs (mi, wj). A pair (m, w) is said to be a blocking pair for matching M if man m and woman w are not matched in M but prefer each other to their mates in M. A marriage matching M is called stable if there is no blocking pair for it; otherwise, it’s called unstable. The stable marriage problem is to find a stable marriage matching for men’s and women’s given preferences.

Instance of the Stable Marriage Problem An instance of the stable marriage problem can be specified either by two sets of preference lists or by a ranking matrix, as in the example below. men’s preferences women’s preferences 1st 2nd 3rd 1st 2nd 3rd Bob: Lea Ann Sue Ann: Jim Tom Bob Jim: Lea Sue Ann Lea: Tom Bob Jim Tom: Sue Lea Ann Sue: Jim Tom Bob ranking matrix Ann Lea Sue Bob 2,3 1,2 3,3 Jim 3,1 1,3 2,1 Tom 3,2 2,1 1,2 {(Bob, Ann) (Jim, Lea) (Tom, Sue)} is unstable {(Bob, Ann) (Jim, Sue) (Tom, Lea)} is stable

Stable Marriage Algorithm (Gale-Shapley) Step 0 Start with all the men and women being free Step 1 While there are free men, arbitrarily select one of them and do the following: Proposal The selected free man m proposes to w, the next woman on his preference list Response If w is free, she accepts the proposal to be matched with m. If she is not free, she compares m with her current mate. If she prefers m to him, she accepts m’s proposal, making her former mate free; otherwise, she simply rejects m’s proposal, leaving m free Step 2 Return the set of n matched pairs

Example Ann Lea Sue Bob 2,3 1,2 3,3 Jim 3,1 1,3 2,1 Tom 3,2 Bob proposed to Lea Lea accepted Free men: Bob, Jim, Tom Ann Lea Sue Bob 2,3 1,2 3,3 Jim 3,1 1,3 2,1 Tom 3,2 Free men: Jim, Tom Jim proposed to Lea Lea rejected

Example (cont.) Ann Lea Sue Bob 2,3 1,2 3,3 Jim 3,1 1,3 2,1 Tom 3,2 Jim proposed to Sue Sue accepted Free men: Jim, Tom Ann Lea Sue Bob 2,3 1,2 3,3 Jim 3,1 1,3 2,1 Tom 3,2 Free men: Tom Tom proposed to Sue Sue rejected

Example (cont.) Ann Lea Sue Bob 2,3 1,2 3,3 Jim 3,1 1,3 2,1 Tom 3,2 Tom proposed to Lea Lea replaced Bob with Tom Free men: Tom Ann Lea Sue Bob 2,3 1,2 3,3 Jim 3,1 1,3 2,1 Tom 3,2 Free men: Bob Bob proposed to Ann Ann accepted

Analysis of the Gale-Shapley Algorithm The algorithm terminates after no more than n2 iterations with a stable marriage output The stable matching produced by the algorithm is always man-optimal: each man gets the highest rank woman on his list under any stable marriage. One can obtain the woman-optimal matching by making women propose to men A man (woman) optimal matching is unique for a given set of participant preferences The stable marriage problem has practical applications such as matching medical-school graduates with hospitals for residency training