Lobbying the European Parliament Dr David Marshall d.j.marshall@reading.ac.uk

Outline: 3 strands of research Interest group success in the European Union: When (and why) does business lose? (Dür & Marshall, Bernhagen, 2015) Do Rapporteurs Receive Independent Expert Policy Advice? Indirect Lobbying via the European Parliament’s Committee Secretariat (Marshall, 2012) Explaining Interest Group Interactions with MEPs: Dominant Party Groups, Coalition Formation and Committee Membership (Marshall, 2015)

Interest group success in the European Union: When (and why) does business lose? (Dür & Marshall, Bernhagen, 2015)

Which types of organised interests exert greater influence over policy-making? Who is more successful at shaping contemporary EU policy making, business or citizen groups? Findings: Business is less successful at achieving its policy goals than citizen groups Business is least successful when: (1) policy conflict is high; (2) the European Parliament is relatively powerful Other Findings: Technical knowledge = policy success, but this effect is greater for citizen groups Technical knowledge is subject to the principles of supply and demand Business interests lack an institutional ally Business successful in lobbying for loopholes, and non legislative decision-making

Not without controversy! A recent London School of Economics analysis, by Andreas Dür, David Marshall,, and Patrick Bernhagen, produced some very interesting results. Their findings, based on 70 legislative proposals introduced by the European Commission between 2008 and 2010, found that campaign groups were far more successful at achieving their outcomes in EU legislative decisions. This, of course, contradicts the very vocal critics of business lobbying, who create a culture of fear around business influence in Brussels. The authors of this study interviewed Commission officials and this provided them with data on the issues based around the 70 proposals and also the positions of the interest groups that lobbied on the issues.

Argument Most legislative proposals in the EU concern market regulation, which is frequently opposed by a large majority of business actors Proposals invariably lead to legislation. Therefore, business loses out and at best is able to limit the size of its loss Citizen groups , by contrast, frequently support new regulation. Therefore once a proposal is made these groups can expect considerable gains compared with SQ However, business actors may still be able to defend their interests if policy is agreed within relatively closed elite circles, involving few competing interests and executive officials = low levels of controversy and/or limited role of European Parliament

Research design Legislative proposals sampled: 1 Jan 2008 to 31 Dec 2010 Structured interviews with Commission official responsible for each proposal Interest group sample defined according to legislative activity Measures of success and conflict derived from analysing interview responses

Sampling legislative proposals Population of proposals: 603 (directives n=144; regulations n=459) …after certain eliminations: 538 (directives n=111; regulations n=427) Stratified according to public saliency (with control) Sampled Directives and Regulations separately Final sample = 125 = 64 Directives; 61 Regulations

The data Spatial mapping of actor positions on a policy issue (tyre rolling noise reduction for passenger cars) Council

Measuring success Calculating “success”: Preference attainment: To what extent does the outcome improve on an actor’s utility? Outcome Actor B RP

Measuring success 𝑠 𝑖𝑗 = 𝑥 𝑖𝑗 − 𝑅𝑃 𝑗 −| 𝑥 𝑖𝑗 − 𝑂 𝑗 | 𝑠 𝑖𝑗 = 𝑥 𝑖𝑗 − 𝑅𝑃 𝑗 −| 𝑥 𝑖𝑗 − 𝑂 𝑗 | Calculating “success”: Measure 1 (success): continuous measure ranging from -100 to 100, with a median of 0 where i= actor; j= issue; s= success measure; x= ideal point; RP= reversion point; o = outcome Measure 2 (success ord): ordinal measure, ranging from -1 to 1 1 = if actor won more than 5 points relative to RP -1 = if actor lost more than 5 points relative to RP 0 = neither won nor lost

Analysing business success (coefficient plot) Note: linear regression model with random effects; the markers show the coefficients. The bars indicate the 95% confidence intervals.

Business success and interest group conflict

Business success and legislative procedure

Explaining Interest Group Interactions with MEPs: Dominant Party Groups, Coalition Formation and Committee Membership (Marshall, 2015)

Argument Interest groups’ behaviour is highly conditional on two motivations: lobby powerful MEPs, and lobby friendly MEPs. Friendliness is based on ideology, with power shaped by institutional rules and seat share. These goals can mutually reinforce each other. However, because these two motivations exist, and because political power is not fully predictable, there are also strong incentives for interest groups to lobby non-natural allies.

MEPs’ Contact with interest groups, across parties Source: Hix and Hoyland, 2011

Lobbying of European Party Groups Predicted Effects for Lobbying Non natural Allies and Policy Preferences Source: Marshall, 2015

Do Rapporteurs Receive Independent Expert Policy Advice? Indirect Lobbying via the European Parliament’s Committee Secretariat

Secretariat provide advice Argument Commission proposal Lobbyists provide Information Rapporteur Requests Independent expert advice Secretariat provide advice

Data sources: EP Survey Conducted by Alexander Stubb (2007), in his capacity of rapporteur for the Green Paper on the European Transparency Initiative. 31 secretariat officials 80 MEPs Interviews with Policy Actors, conducted by the author -No photograph! 39 Secretariat Officials 28 MEPs/MEPs’ assistants 94 Lobbyists In

MEPs self-defined sources for verifying lobbyists’ information

Secretariat officials’ sources for verifying lobbyists’ information