1. A defendant’s consent allows a court not otherwise having personal jurisdictional a defendant to exercise in personam jurisdiction because

A. the defendant is entitled, if she wishes, to waive her Fourteenth Amendment right to immunity from judicial jurisdiction in a state with which the defendant has no connection.

B. Pennoyer v. Neff said that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause does not apply in cases where the defendant consents.

C. consent makes the defendant a constructive resident of the state, allowing the state to exercise in personam jurisdiction over her.

D. saving litigation time on the issue of jurisdiction counterbalances the Fourteenth Amendment’s requirement of due process of law.

2. Nonresident- motorist statutes

A. were constitutional until International Shoe was decided, but not after, because they sufficed to establish presence plus service, satisfying Pennoyer v. Neff, but do not ensure that the defendant has minimum contacts with the forum.

B. were unconstitutional until International Shoe, but constitutional thereafter, because Pennoyer’s view of the Fourteenth Amendment prevented a state from demanding a defendant’s consent to service or to appointing an agent for the receipt of service, while International Shoe’s view of the Fourteenth Amendment avoids the question by determining instead that a defendant subject to a forum’s nonresident motorist statute necessarily has minimum contacts with the forum.

C. were unconstitutional both before and after the Court decided International Shoe. They were unconstitutional before Shoe because a defendant receiving service outside the forum under the nonresident motorist statute was not served in the forum within the meaning of Pennoyer v. Neff. They were unconstitutional after Shoe because there was no assurance that such a defendant had minimum contacts with the forum.

D. were constitutional both before and after International Shoe D. were constitutional both before and after International Shoe. They were constitutional before Shoe because service on the designated officer was deemed to be service upon the defendant within the forum. They were constitutional after Shoe because defendants subject to nonresident motorist statutes are subject to jurisdiction because they have performed isolated acts within the forum and the causes of action asserted under nonresident motorist statutes necessarily arise from those isolated acts.

Persephone sues Demeter in a jurisdiction that follows the majority approach concerning jurisdictional challenges. The action is for negligence. Demeter does not believe she was negligent, and in any case believes that the state court in which the action is pending does not have jurisdiction over her. If Demeter’s counsel files a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and the trial court rules against Demeter, she can best preserve all of her options by

A. withdrawing and refusing further involvement in the case, because to anything else would be inconsistent with her claim that the court lacks jurisdiction over her.

B. remaining in the action but refusing to present a defense or to cross-examine witnesses, because to do so would waive her claim of lack of jurisdiction. Her use of the court’s processes would be a submission to jurisdiction. By standing mute she can urge her point on appeal.

C. filing an action in the United States District Court in the same state seeking to enjoin prosecution of the state action because the assertion of jurisdiction violates Demeter’s rights under the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution.

D. remaining in the action and presenting the most vigorous defense possible, preserving the jurisdictional point for argument on appeal in the event that she loses on the merits at trial.