Geopolitical Implications of the Sino-Japanese East China Sea Dispute for the U.S. Professor Bert Chapman Government Information, Political Science, & Economics Librarian Purdue University Libraries American Society for Competitiveness Conference Mackinder Forum October 22, 2016

East China Sea’s Strategic Importance. Water and airspace affect U. S East China Sea’s Strategic Importance *Water and airspace affect U.S., China, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. Serves as key focal point for U.S. Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons (JAMGC); Originally Asia Pivot. *Maritime geospatial coverage approximately 482,000 square miles. Bordered by Yellow Sea, South China Sea and Taiwan, Japan’s Kyushu and Ryukyu Islands, and Chinese mainland including Shanghai *Senkaku/Diaoyu/Diaoyutai Islands ownership contested by Japan, China, & Taiwan. *Energy Information Administration estimates ECS contains nearly 200 billion barrels of oil and 1-2 trillion cubic feet of natural gas reserves. *U.S. trade with these four countries calculated at $973.6 billion in 2015 representing 35.1% of U.S. international trade with these four countries being among top NINE U.S. trading partners

East China Sea Region

Historical Background China claims ownership of ECS islands from Ming Dynasty (1368-1644) and Qing Dynasty (1644-1911)-Beijing never established permanent civilian or military settlement on these islands or patrolled adjacent waters. *Japan maintains Emperor Meiji approved annexation of them in January 1895 and that year’s Shimonoseki Treaty ratified this. *U.S. administered these islands from 1953 until they were returned to Tokyo in 1972 Okinawa Reversion Treaty. *1968 United Nations report says ECS could hold significant energy deposits attracting acute interest from adjoining countries. *Considerable uncertainty exists over whether United Nations Commission on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) rules can effectively address ECS geography, & international customary law on territorial acquisition. *Chinese and Japanese reluctance to submit their claims to international tribunals due to concern over adverse ruling which could have negative domestic political repercussions.

*June 2008 Japan and China agree to jointly explore for oil and natural gas in Chunxiao/Shirabaka fields adjoining their exclusive economic zones. *Nov. 2013 China establishes an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) in ECS

U.S. does not recognize China’s ADIZ-Increasing Japanese intercepts of Chinese military aircraft 2010-2015. Source: Japanese Ministry of Defense

1st Qtr. FY 2016 (April 1-June 30)-Japan intercepts 199 aircraft (71% Chinese) Source: Japanese Ministry of Defense)

Sino-Japanese ECS Naval Confrontations Source: China Central Television (Aug. 20, 2016) Source: Tomo News US (Nov. 28, 2013)

Wall Street Journal-April 25, 2014 https://youtu.be/-vWxFOTmm0o

In an interview with the Wall Street Journal, Japanese Defense Minister Satoshi Marimoto said “Japan has 6,800 islands, and territory that stretches over 3,300 kilometers [2,000 miles]; it’s necessary to have troops at its southwestern end to beef up our warning and surveillance capability…. We must defend without fail our sovereign rights and our land that includes the Senkaku Islands….We must strengthen our overall defense capability in the southwest.” Wall Street Journal, June 26, 2012

Regional Defense Spending & Trends *According to IISS, China, Japan, & South Korea account for 62% of Asian defense spending with Chinese spending representing 41% of overall regional defense expenditure. *Chinese military objectives are shifting from coastal defense to gaining strategic initiative in military combat, developing and expanding air and naval capabilities to open seas protection, incorporating offensive capabilities into air operations, conducting highly informationized operations with air-space defense forces, and boosting strategic early warning air strike, air and missile defense, information countermeasures, and related combat support capabilities. *Japan’s responses include increasing defense spending for straight years, allowing its forces greater freedom to use force to defend the U.S. even if Japan is not attacked; allowing Japanese Maritime Self- Defense Force (JMSDF) to protect U.S. shipping, intercept hostile ships, and provide logistical support if war erupts. *Tokyo increasing tis destroyers from 47-54; submarines from 16-22; and fighter planes from 260-280.

Rep. Matt Salmon (R-AZ) at January 14, 2014 House Armed Services & Foreign Affairs Committee hearing “Military and commercial access to the navigable waters of the South and East China Seas are critical to the security and economic viability of every country in the region. Strong U.S. allies, including Japan, Taiwan, and Philippines, Vietnam, South Korea, have come under increasing pressure from China to cede or temper these inalienable sovereign rights to the Chinese will. There must be a peaceful pass forward to protect the U.S. regional allies that ensures U.S. national security interests and avoids unnecessary conflict and aggressions.” March 15, 2016 U.S.-China Economic & Security Review Commission report notes China uses psychological, media, and legal warfare to counter U.S.’ Asian presence and influence in a potential military conflict allowing Beijing to control and shape its own security environment.

Essential U. S. Responses Essential U.S. Responses *Properly resource JAMGC (formerly Asia Pivot) to counter Chinese A2AD abilities seeking to deny U.S. access to Western Pacific. *Focus on using airpower to defeat anti-ship weapons, naval power for neutralizing land-based threats against naval and air forces, and cyber operations to defeat Beijing’s space systems. *Incorporate JAMGC concepts into forthcoming military strategic documents e.g. National Security Strategy, National Military Strategy, QDR, and Joint Electronic Library publications *Disrupt China’s C4ISR capabilities by denying them the ability to track and locate U.S. and Essential U.S. Responses *Properly resource JAMGC (formerly Asia Pivot) to counter Chinese Anti-Access Aerial Denial (A2AD) capabilities seeking to deny U.S. access to Western Pacific *Focus on using airpower to defeat anti-ship weapons, naval power for neutralizing land-based threats against naval and air forces, and cyber operations to defeat Beijing’s space systems. *Incorporate JAMGC concepts into forthcoming military strategic documents e.g. National Security Strategy, National Military Strategy, Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), and Joint Electronic Library doctrinal publications. *Develop and deploy conventional ballistic missiles and hypersonic delivery vehicles to draw China away from its defensive envelope while encircling its existing A2AD network. *Disrupt China’s C4ISR capabilities by denying them the ability to track and locate U.S. & allied targets. *Attack Chinese coastal and strategic assets such as PLA Cyber Unit 61398. *Work with allies to enhance ECS air and sea defenses including ballistic missile defenses and strengthen defense against attacks on satellites and fiber optic communications. *Explicitly declare the Senkaku Islands are part of the mutual defense treaty with Japan. *Give the military liberal rules of engagement to defend against Chinese attempts to restrict air and sea passage through the ECS. *Develop agile traditional and social media campaigns to effectively counter Chinese ECS claims and warn about the global consequences of allowing China to dominate ECS and adjoining waters.

*Attack Chinese coastal and strategic assets such as PLA Cyber Unit 61398. *Work with allies to enhance ECS air and sea defenses including ballistic missile defenses and strengthen defense against attacks on satellites and fiber optic communications. *Explicitly declare the Senkaku Islands are part of the mutual defense treaty with Japan. *Give the military liberal rules of engagement to defend against Chinese attempts to restrict air and sea passage through the ECS. *Develop agile traditional and social media campaigns to effectively counter Chinese ECS claims and warn about the adverse global consequences of allowing China to dominate the ECS and adjoining waters.

Accessible in Geopolitics, History, and International Relations, 9 (2)(2017): 15-54; http://docs.lib.purdue.edu/lib_fsdocs/138/ Questions