PLACEHOLDER SLIDE ON SIPR! UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Future “Disruptive” Threat to Mission Command Find & interdict Command Posts Multi echelon use of UAVs; multi level, saturated airspace… decreased sensor-to-shooter time Space-based, Multispectral sensors…EO, radar Ground based multi intel sensors …targeting electronic signatures Long range fires with area and precision munitions Disrupt Mission Command GPS jamming & spoofing, disruption of PNT, denial of electromagnetic spectrum Space-based jamming and ASAT Communications jamming, electronic deception… DRFM jamming Smart and EW munitions PLACEHOLDER SLIDE ON SIPR! Disrupt the Network Massive data injection Insider threat…exploitation, corruption of data…false data insertion Combining Cyber and EW capabilities UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Red Perspective of NIE Network NIE events since 14.2 and CTC rotations have shown some of the same vulnerabilities. Basic-level OPFOR offensive cyber operations (OCO) revealed significant U.S. network vulnerabilities allowing exploitation. Threat representative Electronic Warfare (EW) systems (CICADA Jammer) were effective in disrupting and desynchronizing US Army formations conducting operations. GPS Jamming introduced delays in processing data as well as locational errors, potentially degrading C2. Synchronization of OPFOR activities with EW and OCO in combination with UAS reconnaissance provided a significant advantage for the OPFOR by disrupting US Army situational awareness (SA) while increasing OPFOR SA. Unit OPLANS, OPORDS, operational graphics, spot reports, intel summaries, and commander battle update briefings (BUB) were acquired and passed to the Red Command group. Consequently, after confirming the accuracy of the captured products using various air and ground reconnaissance assets, the OPFOR battalion commander had a near-perfect picture of 1-6 Infantry's defense well before he attacked: