FCC Safety Strategy for the Conceptual Design Report

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Presentation transcript:

FCC Safety Strategy for the Conceptual Design Report Thomas Otto Departmental Safety Officer, Technology Department, CERN

Contents Scope of Safety in the Conceptual Design Report Hazard Register Implementation of a Hazard Register for the FCC “Standard Best Practice” Safety Design Performance-Based Safety Design Conclusions

FCC Conceptual Design Report The CDR has the purpose of demonstrating the viability of the planned facility in terms of Accelerator technology Detector technology Infrastructure (tunnel, transport, services…) and Safety (incl. environmental protection)

Safety accompanies development CDR Conceptual Safety Study Hazard Register Standard best practice – directives, standards, guidelines Identify cases for risk assessment Proposal of conceptual approaches for risk-control TDR Technical Safety Study Specific Risk Assessments Prescriptive solutions: strictly rule-based Performance-based: tailor-made solutions to meet safety objectives Proposal of detailed technical solutions for risk-control

Hazard Register Hazard is the potential of a substance, activity or process to cause harm (accident or illness) Risk is a combined measure of the likelihood (probability) of harm and the severity of its consequences FCC Hazard Register: Systematic collection of Hazards in the FCC facilities during different phases of its lifetime No assessment of probability or severity

Hazard Register Systematic collection of Hazards, ordered by: Technology S.c. magnets N.c. magnets Cryogenics Vacuum Powering Transport … others Project Phase Construction Service Installation Accelerator installation Commissioning Operation Technical Stop Long Shut-down Dismantling Location in the facility Surface Shaft Long Straight Section Arc Tunnel Caverns … others

Hazard Register based on … Breakdown of the planned facility Technology Item Process Activity / Equipment / Substance Hazard Location Phase Powering Transformer Maintenance Work at height Fall from height

Hazard Register based on … Activation of ground Additional Traffic Noise (Environment) Release of pollutants: air Release of pollutants: solid Release of pollutants: water Release of radioactive liquid Release of radioactive solid Release of radioactivity by air Structured list of potential hazards at workplaces during autonomous operation ≈100 characterised hazards A1 External Hazard to Facility A2 Hazard to the Environment B1 Physical Hazards B2 Radiation, ionising B3 Radiation, non-ionising B4 Noxious Substances B5 Fire Hazards B6 Mechanical Hazards B7 Electrical Hazards C1 Working Environment C2 Physiological Constraints C3 Unexpected events C4 Organisation C5 Psychological Constraints Dangerous surface Fall of object from height Fluid under presure Uncontrolled object in motion Unprotected element in movement

Filling the database Technology Item Process Activity/ Equipment Cryogenics Compressor Supply Line Cryostat Operation Heat xchange Pressure vessel Helium Cold burns ODH Maintenance Welding Welding torch Hot surface Ignition source UV radiation Flammable gas Combustible Material Return Line Technology Item Process Activity/ Equipment Substance Hazard Location Phase

Implementation Numerous technologies, locations, phases, items and processes in particle accelerator project as FCC Spreadsheets quickly overcharged Use of a relational database Scales with complexity of the project Incremental iteration during project lifecycle Overall coherence of data assured Use of queries to highlight risks

Representation in relational database Technology Item Process Act./Equip./Subst. Hazard

Flexibility of Database Approach Capability for specific reports in database approach e.g. extraction of hazard register for selected criteria: What hazards during commissioning in arc tunnel ? Under which circumstances does a fire hazard appear (simultaneous use of flammable substance and ignition source, at the same location) Many processes are universal and hazards need to be identified only once Transport of heavy objects Powering an electrical device Supplying cooling water The same equipment and substances are used over and over again Power tools, brazing and welding kits… Alcohol, acetone…

Exploiting the relations between data Technology Item Process Activity/ Equipment Substance Hazard Compressor Heat xchange Supply Line Operation Pressure vessel Cold burns Helium ODH Cryogenics Cryostat Welding Hot surface Return Line Maintenance Welding torch Ignition source UV radiation Flammable gas Combustible Material Tunnel Shut-Down

Status 1 Hazard list completed Identification of Technologies, Location and Phases completed Interviews with Stakeholders of the Technologies to identify the facility breakdown structure in progress Assignment of Process and Hazards in Progress Reviews with stakeholders planned Production of Particular Hazard Reports for Location / Phase planned

What next ? “Standard Best Practice” are preventive measures rendering a hazard inoffensive Decide if S.B.P. is applicable to the specific circumstances of the hazard (location !) Assess risk in the other cases

Standard Best Practice Technology Item Process Activity/ Equipment Substance Hazard S.B.P. Compressor Heat xchange Supply Line Operation Pressure vessel Cold burns Helium Cryostat ODH Self-rescue mask Cryogenics Welding Hot surface Gloves Return Line Maintenance Welding torch Ignition source Extinguisher UV radiation Protection mask Flammable gas Combustible Material Tunnel Shut-Down

Sources of Standard Best Practice For the conformity of items: EU directives, Int’l standards, Industry guidelines For the use of substances Material Safety Data Sheets For the conduct of activities: Practical guides from prevention organisms Return of experience CERN needs to define accepted sources of Standard Best Practice

Status 2 Hazard list completed Identification of Technologies, Location and Phases completed Interviews with Stakeholders of the Technologies to identify the facility breakdown structure in progress Assignment of Process and Hazards in progress Reviews with stakeholders planned Production of Particular Hazard Reports for Location / Phase planned Identification of Standard Best Practice in progress

Risk Assessment In the case where Standard Best Practice is Thomas Otto, TE DSO Risk Assessment In the case where Standard Best Practice is not available (e.g. innovative, non-standard technologies) not applicable (e.g. in underground environments) too simplistic (e.g. combined hazards of different nature) the risk of a process must be assessed Estimation of the probability / frequency Estimation of the consequences

Safety design Safety design The process is designed with the aim of lowering the risk rating Risk Assessment Process Risk Safety design

Prescriptive Safety Design Example from Fire Safety: “ The length of the escape path in a room with two exits must not be longer than 35 metres. The exits must be situated at the extremities of the room Application in a 8 km long accelerator tunnel ?

Performance-based Safety Design Objective In case of fire, no loss of human life Performance Criterion Nobody exposed to dangerous CO conc. location of ignition source, combustible material, power of heat release Test Fire building structure, occupation frequency, safety devices (alarms) Trial Design Evaluate Does trial design meet performance criteria ? Yes: adopt trial design No: improve trial design

Example of Performance based design: Arc Tunnel Layout Tunnel Diameter Distance of Fire Compartment Walls determine, in case of fire or cryogenic spill: spread of smoke, noxious or cryogenic gases evacuation path Safety of occupants in case of fire Choices for these 2 parameters can be compared in a Performance Based Safety Design Approach

Application Areas of Performance Based Design Fire Cryogenic release Radiation Protection Objective No loss of human life No dose exceeding limit Performance criteria Low temperature Low CO conc. Sufficiently high temperature Sufficient oxygen conc. Low radiation dose rate Test Scenario Fire with specified heat and smoke output Helium release with specified mass flow Beam loss with specified intensity Trial design Building structure with escape paths Shielding walls Evaluation methods Qualitative Experience-based estimation by professional Analytical Zone model Equilibrium model Moyer formula Numerical Computational fluid dynamics Monte-Carlo radiation transport

Status 3 Hazard list completed Identification of Technologies, Location and Phases completed Interviews with Stakeholders of the Technologies to identify the facility breakdown structure in progress Assignment of Process and Hazards in progress Reviews with stakeholders planned Production of Particular Hazard Reports for Location / Phase planned Identification of Standard Best Practice in progress Identification of cases for Performance-based Safety Design in progress Qualitative Evaluation of Trial Designs planned

Conclusion The scope of Safety in the Conceptual Design Report: Hazard Register: overview of hazards in the facility Identification of Standard Best Practice where available Qualitative Performance-Based Design Studies where necessary to define the envelope of the facility, for example tunnel layout Technical risk assessments and performance-based designs are reserved for the Technical Design Report Thanks for assistance and time for discussions go to Johannes Gutleber (ATS); Delphine Letant-Delrieux, Francesca Viggiano (TE); Saverio La Mendola, André Henriques, Markus Widorski (HSE)