Stopping the Reinvasion of the Baltic States Taking the High Ground on Future Warfare Low Density, Nonlinear Fight Sam Gardiner 9 December 2015 Chariots of Fires 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

The Objectives Give the Russians pause Set a framework for analysis Introduce a concept that can be tested in games and exercises Guide force development …but first where are we?

Re-Invasion Concept of Operations Holding Main Axis Since 1994 Holding Maneuver Element D+1 Holding Re-Invasion Concept of Operations

Russian Reorganization 20th Guards Combined Arms Army Reconnaissance Brigade Air Missile Brigade Missile and Artillery Brigades Helicopter Regiment Logistics Brigade (Heavy with AFV’s) Tank and Motor Rifle Brigades Formed 6th Air Defense Army Center of Gravity 1st Guards Tank Army Reconnaissance Brigade Air Missile Brigade Missile and Artillery Helicopter Regiment Logistics Brigade (Heavy with Tanks) Russian Reorganization

Distributed Lethality A New Threat Ring 2000km “CEP 3 meters”

Centers of Strategic Air Defenses Severmorosk St. Petersburg Moscow Kaliningrad

Supports the Lithuanian Wolf Mechanized Brigade

Tactical Fires Deficiency Estonia 155mm 105mm (32) 122mm (42) 155mm (24) 155mm Latvia 100mm Lithuania 155mm 105mm New SP Howitzer 70km Polonez - Belarus 200km 10km 10km

Leverage in Operational Art Simple leverage - Lanchester’s square law of effectiveness... Complex leverage – Maneuver warfare consequences...

The Low Density, Nonlinear Battlefield Airland Battle Future: The Low Density, Nonlinear Battlefield

The Cycle of Future Battle Disperse Mass Fight Re-disperse Reconstitute

Interchangeability When Units Are the Target Used to be: (Triandafillov) Troops Fires Now: Multi-Service and Multi-Nation Fires Cyber and Electronic Warfare Information Operations FOI Workshop 9 December 2015

Essence of Stopping the Reinvasion Attack the Russian plan Focus fires Target units Integrate combat power

Operational Art: Focused Fires General: Time is critical and is against NATO…culminating point. Horizontal escalation is not in U.S. interests. Seek dominance of the air battle only to the extent of being able to concentrate on the ground battle. Focus fires on those aspects of the attack that would bring a Russian success, understanding Russian vulnerabilities (integrated combat power plan). FOI Workshop 9 December 2015

Attacking Units Rather Defeat Mechanism Shock Attacking Units Rather than Weapons Disruption Dislocation Destruction

Unit Damage Consequences Shock - Individuals can’t respond as a unit. (>hour) Disruption – Command is unable to respond. (>day) Dislocation – Response is disoriented and lacks focus. (days) Destruction – Unit is “dead” as a fighting force. (weeks)

Target Selection and Planning Working Concept Target Kill Required for Unit Mission Kill Unit Mission Unit Movement 20% Passage of “Lines” 10% Offensive - Open Terrain 15% Defense - Open Terrain 30% Defense - Urban 60%

Principles of the Unit Target Concept More rapid application of force on the target unit achieves destruction with less application of force. More varied application of force on the target unit achieves destruction with less application Amount of force required to generate a damage level is primarily a function of the mission of the target unit. It’s easier to move to a higher damage level by preceding from a lower.

Dynamic Target Selection and Planning Assembly Area Commander's Net Traffic Control Point ...means being able to identify and target the key elements of movement command and control.

Dynamic Target Selection and Planning Enroute Fuel Facilities ...means being able to identify and target the key elements of enemy logistics.

Dynamic Target Selection and Planning battalion messing area defensive positions being prepared ...means being able to tell when a unit is going to the defense.

Russian Theorists Focus 1985-1987 The Evolution of Soviet Operational Art, 1927-1991 Translated by S. Orenstein The future evolution of land-air battle and the development of the air echelon. The future development of non-linear warfare.

Sixth Generation Warfare Major General Vladimir Slipchenko Moscow 1999 Development of precision strike systems Massing of conventional forces would be an invitation to disaster Demands the need to mass effects Ultimate evolution would be the capability to conduct distant, no-contact operations. Reported in Jacob W. Kipp, “Russian Sixth Generation Warfare and Recent Developments.” Eurasia Daily Monitor, January 25, 2012.

Ahead More than anything, we need to communicate that we can deal with the Russian threat to the Baltic States. Analytic community needs to focus on the details of Baltic defense. We need a better mix of precision munitions. NATO needs to refocus infrastructure funding to dispersal and hardening. Countries of the Alliance need to invest in more standoff fires. We need more aerial tankers. We need a reinvigoration of the study of the operational art. The use of offensive cyber operations. Stronger electronic warfare component. Some of us outside the official structure need to write more about how NATO might use nuclear weapons in the defense of the Baltic States. We need to understand how to limit escalation if there were a conflict in the Baltic States.