Timeline - ATIS Involvement

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Presentation transcript:

Timeline - ATIS Involvement 4Q2016 STIR / PASSporT Dec 2016 SHAKEN – framework document STIR/SHAKEN Testbed Dec 2016 Display Framework Notes: Estimated timeline for ATIS, SIP FORUM and IETF deliverables.

Timeline - Expanded Caveats: Not to scale Shows dependencies only 4Q2016 STIR / PASSporT Dec 2016 SHAKEN – framework document STIR/SHAKEN Testbed Display Framework STIR implementation SP validation SP deployment Root Certificate Authority Caveats: Not to scale Shows dependencies only Anti-Robocall App Development

Timeline – Post Initial Deployment STIR / PASSporT for SIP GW “Traceback” API available for Anti-Robocall Apps User notification of validated SIP calls Display Framework In Devices Anti-Robocall Apps Global Root Certificate Authority agreed Global CA deployed Traceback for International calls International deployment of STIR User notification of validated International SIP calls Caveats: Not to scale Shows dependencies only One possible deployment scenario; other scenarios could also work.

Definitions STIR: Standard developed by IETF, with input from ATIS member companies, that defines Signature to verify calling number, and specifies how it will be transported in SIP “on the wire”. SHAKEN: Framework document developed by ATIS/SIP Forum IP-NNI task force to provide an implementation profile for service providers implementing STIR. The objective of SHAKEN is to provide guidance to implementers to ensure interoperability. PASSportT: Specifies the format of the “signature” used by service providers to verify calling number. STIR specifies how the signature defined by PASSporT is transported in SIP signaling.

Definitions Display Framework: The protocol specified by STIR/PASSporT can be used by the originating service provider to assert the phone number of the originator of a phone call, and by the terminating service provider to verify the phone number of the calling party. However there is currently no agreement on how this verified number should be presented to the user in a consistent, reliable format. ATIS/SIP Forum IP-NNI task force is developing a set of requirements for displaying this information in a way that builds user confidence in STIR. Implementation will be required by device manufacturers. STIR/SHAKEN Testbed: IETF STIR is being developed by experts, with input from ATIS member companies. However, it is important to verify that the protocol works as intended with real network equipment. ATIS is developing a testbed for this purpose. Note: Service providers will still need to test product implementations.

Definitions Root Certificate Authority: STIR can have more than one “certificate authority”, but it is important that they all trace back to a single authoritative root certificate authority. Only legitimate service providers would be issued certificates, and any service provider determined to be falsely signing calls could have their certificate revoked. This is critical to maintaining the integrity of the Caller ID validation mechanism. The ultimate responsibility and authority for issuing or revoking certificates would be traceable to the single authoritative root certificate authority. Display Framework in Devices: ATIS/SIP Forum IP-NNI Task Force will propose requirements for displaying validated caller ID information to users, but this will need to be implemented in devices before it will be possible to display the information to the user. Prior to this, it may still be possible to validate and act on verified caller ID information within the service provider network.

Definitions STIR Implementation: Once the protocol (STIR) has been finalized and implementation guidelines (SHAKEN) completed, implementation will be required in deployable products. SP validation: the base protocol will be verified in the ATIS testbed, but individual service providers still need to validate specific implementations in the context of their network equipment. SP Deployment: Initial deployment cannot begin until products have been developed and validated in service provider labs. STIR/PASSporT for traceback: deployment of STIR to provide validation of caller ID to the end user has a number of additional dependencies. Starting with an initial scenario limited to traceback of suspicious calls may be an effective strategy to gain immediate value and operational experience with a relatively simple scenario.

Definitions User notification of validated SIP calls: several additional capabilities must be deployed, beyond basic STIR signing and verification, before validated SIP calls can be presented to the end user. These include a protocol to signal the status of the caller ID to the user device (i.e., verification will be done in the network) and a consistent means for the device to display this status to the user. Global Root Certificate Authority: need to extend trust to global service providers for international calls to be reliably signed. This will require a number of steps, beginning with a globally agreed root certificate authority.