COALTITION TASK FORCE GOODWILL

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Presentation transcript:

COALTITION TASK FORCE GOODWILL COL Mark Koh Chief of Staff The purpose of the TE-4 scenario is to support our discussions on crisis action planning procedures, and provide a framework for mission analysis, courses of action development and selection of a course of action to recommend to the Coalition Task Force commander. The scenario involves a crisis between two fictitious countries, requiring a U.N. sanctioned multinational force response. In addition, there are significant humanitarian assistance needs that must be met.

Singapore Joint Staff Warning Order to Commander, Coalition Task Force OPERATION BLUE SINGA 2 Jul 02 The next few slides highlight the warning order issued by the supported strategic commander, in this case the Singapore Joint Staff. The actual warning order is included in the read ahead materials.

Singapore Joint Staff Warning Order Current Situation as of 2 Jul 02 Samagaland and S. Tindoro forces remain on full alert status with increased clashes between certain opposing factions UNMOG to be replaced by UN sanctioned MNF under UNSCR 147 Christchurch, NZ to be initial HQ CTF location SAF to provide Div HQ and Bde size force All Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) forces and resources are at home station Here is the current situation as of 2 July 02. Samagaland and South Tindoro forces remain on full alert status. There are continuing clashes between units of both forces, although senior military leaders from both countries maintain that they have ordered these cross-border clashes to cease. The military observers will redeploy after an appropriate transition from UNMOG to the CTF. New Zealand has agreed to be the initial CTF HQ, to be located at Christchurch. New Zealand does not intend to become a staging base for the onward deployment of multinational forces. All forces of the TCC remain at home station.

Singapore Joint Staff Warning Order Mission Statement Coalition Task Force GOODWILL will commence deployment of a multinational force no earlier than 28 August 02, to conduct peacekeeping operations in North and South Tindoro, in accordance with UNSCR 147, in order to create conditions necessary for a secure and stable environment in North and South Tindoro. This is the mission statement from the Singapore Joint Staff to the Commander, CTF.

Singapore Joint Staff Warning Order MNF End State MNF Mission turned over to Host Nations’ Armed Forces and Civil Authorities Hostile Forces separated Border Regime in place Displaced persons reintegrated MNF HA Missions transitioned to civil authorities The CTF will transition its mission to appropriate host nations armed forces and civil authorities when the following conditions have been met: Hostile forces have been separated and pulled back from the borders, and “stood down” from full alert status. An effective border regime has been reestablished, to include agreed- upon border guard unit size and locations and customs and immigration protocols. The integration of displaced persons back to their homes must be started and fully supportable by the host nations and relief agencies. HA support missions can be safely terminated or transition to host nation military and civil authorities.

Singapore Joint Staff Warning Order Coordinating Instructions Review ROE Commence deployment to South Tindoro no earlier than 28 Aug 02 MPAT planners activated and other augmentees coordinated to arrive at initial CTF HQ in Christchurch, NZ not later than 16 August 02 Deploy for period of up to one year Key coordination instructions for the CTF are: Review the draft ROE which was prepared by Singapore Joint Staff. TCCs have agreed, for planning purposes, to begin deploying no earlier than 28 August. CTF time-phased force deployments must adhere to this date. MPAT and other augmentees must arrive at CTF HQ not later than 16 August 02 and be prepared to integrate into the CTF HQ staff by 18 Aug 02. All TCC forces must be prepared to deploy for up to one year.

Singapore Joint Staff Warning Order Intelligence Guidance Ensure thorough handoff of collection efforts from UNMOG Work closely with local civil administration, in particular police forces, and civil affairs/civil military operations personnel to obtain information on increased level of hostile actions between opposing factions Develop processes to pass actionable intelligence on possible terrorist activities to proper civil authorities While Singapore Joint Staff expects Samagaland and South Tindoro senior commanders to be somewhat transparent on their overall forces disposition and intentions, there is significant danger from lower level units, terrorists, and disgruntled civilian factions. These elements have precipitated actions resulting in death, destruction, and the disruption of humanitarian relief efforts. Hence, the importance of ensuring a thorough handoff of collection efforts and points of contact developed by the UNMOG. CTF must work closely with local civil administration, police, and Samagaland and South Tindoro forces to obtain information on activities that could jeopardize the CTF mission. The CTF will not plan nor execute counter-terrorist actions. However, given its mission and anticipated interaction with various elements of North and South Tindoro society, CTF personnel will be in a position to obtain information that can be reviewed and passed on to host nation civil authorities so they can take appropriate action.

Singapore Joint Staff Warning Order Civil Affairs Guidance Establish liaison and dialogue with local civil administration authorities Establish effective communication and coordination with civil agencies, NGOs, IOs Support Information Operations through media and other channels Plan for protection of NGO/IO personnel and equipment Develop plans to accumulate and transmit information on possible terrorist activities obtained in the course of facilitating HA and return of DPs Facilitating HA relief and the return of DPs are essential tasks for the CTF. The guidance indicated here is important for both civil affairs personnel and all CTF forces engaged in these tasks. Civil Affairs personnel are in an excellent position to gather information on possible terrorist activities and must, in conjunction with C2 personnel, develop appropriate information collection and transmission procedures.

Singapore Joint Staff Warning Order Logistic/Transportation Guidance TCCs to self-deploy/redeploy to Area of Operations (AO) TCCs to be self-sustainable for first six months CTF HQ to plan for logistic contingencies support for UN Agencies and NGOs, as required Forces from Troop Contributing Countries must self deploy and redeploy to the AO. Singapore does not have the resources to provide strategic lift. Similarly, forces must be sustainable for the first six months. The CTF should anticipate that not all NGOs/IOs will have sufficient transportation assets to move their people and supplies when needed, and that these organizations will request assistance. The CTF must plan for these contingencies, balancing the need for assets to be used to move CTF forces and supplies with the CTF task to facilitate HA and reintegration of the DPs.

Singapore Joint Staff Warning Order Command Relationships TCC forces be OPCON to CCTF for duration of operation National command chain will be maintained throughout operation Singapore Joint Staff has worked with TCC national command authorities; all CTF forces will be OPCON to the CTF commander.

Singapore Joint Staff Warning Order Information Operations Guidance Information Operations to be a major component and fully integrated into the CTF mission Incorporate local authorities and media network into the IO campaign Develop media campaign plan Information operations will be critical to the success of the CTF. IO planners must incorporate local authorities and media into the IO campaign. Public Affairs must develop a comprehensive media plan as part of the overall IO campaign

Commander, Coalition Task Force GOODWILL Intent & Guidance 19 Aug 02 Intent is to form a multinational force to help create conditions necessary to establish a secure and stable environment in North and South Tindoro. All of our actions in keeping the hostile forces apart, assisting with HA and return of DPs, must be focused towards this end. This is the intent of the CCTF.