Crew Resource Management

Slides:



Advertisements
Similar presentations
CABIN CREW HUMAN FACTORS TRAINING IN MALAYSIA AIRLINES
Advertisements

Module N° 4 – ICAO SSP framework
Session No. 4 Implementing the State’s Safety Programme Implementing Service Providers SMS
Robert L. Helmreich, Ph.D. FRAes The University of Texas
ICAO Global TEM & NOSS Symposium EUROCONTROL IANS Luxembourg November 9, 2005 Threat and Error Management Training for Air Traffic Control Officers Greg.
The Importance of Synergy Between Flight Deck and Cabin Crews
Terminal Safety. Objectives Identify main causes Outline terminal safety organization State the safe working practices.
AERONAUTICAL DECISION MAKING
Human Factors for Part 135 Air Operators
SHIFT WORK & Aircraft Pilots Abby, Alison, Maria, and Paula.
Executive Briefing This briefing is designed as a stand alone briefing for Airline Senior Executives / CEOs. Minor text amendments following review at.
CAR/SAM Regional Guidance Material on Air Traffic Services Quality Assurance Programmes NAM/CAR/SAM Quality Assurance Workshop Gustavo De León Regional.
Occupational Road Risk Health and safety issues for vehicles and drivers Mike Lewis MIOSH, RSP.
Downloaded from AERONAUTICAL DECISION MAKING THE FLIGHT INSTRUCTORS’ LESSON PLAN.
Incident Review Meeting Example  The next slides are an example of how to complete the template and identify latent conditions, threats, errors, UAS and.
Office of Aviation Safety Emergency Medical Services (EMS) Aviation Operations Jeff Guzzetti Deputy Director for Regional Operations.
SMS Operation.  Internal safety (SMS) audits are used to ensure that the structure of an SMS is sound.  It is also a formal process to ensure continuous.
Threat and Error Management in Aviation
Downloaded from 9/14/2015 Aeronautical Decision Making - The Theory Behind the Practice 1 AERONAUTICAL DECISION MAKING The Theory Behind The.
Intro to Threat & Error Management
Welcome.
Mr. Bob Hahn Associate Director, School of Aviation Safety Naval Aviation Schools Command NAS Pensacola MISHAP PREVENTION EDUCATION IN NAVAL AVIATION.
Lesson Timeline AHF 2203 – Aviation Human Factors  24 Credit hours per semester Class duration: (4 hrs /week)  Week 1-3: Lecture  Week 4: Mid term.
AHF 2203 PUAN ROSDALILA ROSLAN Human Factor and Flight Physiology.
Hazards Identification and Risk Assessment
The NATS Review of ATM Occurrence Reporting Prepared for ICAO European Region Aviation Safety Seminar/Workshop (Baku, Azerbaijan, 5 -7 April 2006) by Jane.
Mr. Bob Hahn Associate Director, School of Aviation Safety Naval Aviation Schools Command NAS Pensacola MISHAP PREVENTION EDUCATION IN NAVAL AVIATION.
Evolution Cabin Crew Training & Assessment for the Future.
Crew Resources Management
ISM Code 2010: Part A - Implementation Malcolm Maclachlan.
International Civil Aviation Organization ADREP/ECCAIRS End-user course Module N° 7 Analysis and Codification Mexico City November, 2010.
AVIATION HUMAN FACTOR LECTURE 1: INTRODUCTION TO HUMAN FACTOR
OHSAS Occupational health and safety management system.
PST Human Factors Jan Shaw Manchester Royal Infirmary CMFT.
HUMAN FACTORS Module 1, Topic 1. Human factors2 OBJECTIVE At the end of this course, students will be able to explain the meaning and definition of Human.
NOTECHS. Objectives By the end of this workshop you will:  Understand facilitation techniques, and be able to apply them to manage a constructive debrief.

Safety Committee Formation
WELCOME.
Flight Operations.
Implementing SMS in Civil Aviation: the Canadian Perspective
Dr. Dennis Vincenzi Human Factors Issues Dr. Dennis Vincenzi
Safety and Security Management Fundamental Concepts
Drones, RPAS, UAV’s, UAS Unmanned aircraft.
C.F.I.T. © Global Air Training Limited 2010.
Part 1 Being professional
Safety Culture in the Aviation Industry:
ERRORS Module 2, Topic 1 Human factors.
KOREAN AIR FLIGHT 801 CRASH: A CASE STUDY
TOTAL AVIATION SYSTEM.
Education and Careers in the Aviation Industry
Ergonomics.
Safety Management in Europe
Human Factors Training
The air traffic controller’s perspective on runway incursion hazards and mitigation options Session 2 Presentation 1.
The pilot and airline operator’s perspective on runway incursion hazards and mitigation options Session 2 Presentation 2.
EHS beyond Compliance Presenter : Saurabh Srivastava
Crew Resource Management
The air traffic controller’s perspective on runway incursion hazards and mitigation options Session 3 Presentation 3.
The pilot and airline operator’s perspective on runway incursion hazards and mitigation options Session 3 Presentation 1.
Critical components of a Fatigue Management Programme
Human Factors & Patient Safety
Safety / Performance Criteria Agreeing on Assumptions
Runway Excursions.
NAM/CAR/SAM Quality Assurance Workshop Gustavo De León
In the line of fire Disclaimer: this safety moment is designed to prevent similar incidents occurring. All guidance herein is provided in good faith and.
Unit 4 Unmanned Aircraft
Introduction BASICS Education Instructors
Cockpit/Crew Resource Management
THOMAS COOK CRM STANDARDS ASSESSMENT
Presentation transcript:

Crew Resource Management © Global Air Training Limited 2010

Name Introduction Position History/Career Experience of CRM A/C Type & Routes Interests & Activities © Global Air Training Limited 2010

Domestic Arrangements Timings Food & Refreshments Toilets Smoking Policy Fire or Emergency – Exits & Assembly Point Mobile Phones Language Course pack © Global Air Training Limited 2010

Define CRM – What does the term mean to you? The origin of CRM What does CRM stand for? Define CRM – What does the term mean to you? The origin of CRM © Global Air Training Limited 2010

CRM Objective To enhance the communication and management skills of the flight crew members by the effective utilisation of all available resources to achieve a safe and efficient operation TGL 44 © Global Air Training Limited 2010

In the days of early technology, human error was the cause of many safety related incidents © Global Air Training Limited 2010

Human errors continued to repeat even with advanced technology © Global Air Training Limited 2010

Lessons Learnt Research carried out by: NASA Leading Airline Corporations International Civil Aviation Authorities and Accident Investigation Units Universities Worldwide Human performance cited as the causal factor in 3 out of 4 accidents Study & Application of an error avoidance programme called CRM has now become mandatory for both civil and military aircraft operations © Global Air Training Limited 2010

Error Management Strategies Understanding the nature and extent of error or risk Changing the conditions that induce the error Determining the behaviours that prevent or mitigate error Who is at risk? © Global Air Training Limited 2010

Requirements & Blocks to CRM Success Requirements for CRM Success Support from Top & Middle Management CRM Instructors who have the core competencies of good CRM & role model CRM in their words & actions Dedicated Team Blocks to CRM Success Resistance to Change Fear of Failure CRM delivery methodology © Global Air Training Limited 2010

S H E L © Global Air Training Limited 2010

L Liveware Variations in Performance & limitations Physical size & shape Physical needs (sustenance, sleep etc) Input/Output Characteristics Information processing Environmental tolerances (temp, pressure, humidity, enclosed space, stress & boredom) © Global Air Training Limited 2010

H L Liveware – Hardware Ergonomics Displays Instrument interpretation Scanning & detection Work space Controls with proper movement, coding and location © Global Air Training Limited 2010

S L Liveware – Software Non-physical aspects of systems Symbology and computer programmes Procedures (SOP’s, normal, abnormal or emergency drills) Rules and regulations i.e. company and authority Training manuals & document design i.e. content and layout © Global Air Training Limited 2010

Liveware – Environment Disturbed biological rhythms - Sleep disturbance and deprivation / transmeridian travel Pressurised cabin Noise & vibration Weather conditions © Global Air Training Limited 2010

Liveware – Liveware Leadership, co-operation, teamwork, personality interactions Staff/management relationships, corporate culture & climate, company operating pressures L L © Global Air Training Limited 2010

S H E L © Global Air Training Limited 2010

Causal Factors Breakdown of all fatal accidents by causal group (for primary causal factors only) for the ten-year period 1997 to 2006. (From UK CAA CAP776) © Global Air Training Limited 2010

© Global Air Training Limited 2010

Typical approach track Southwest 1455 Typical approach track 18:03 “left to a heading of 190° and to descend to and maintain 6,000 ft” 18:04 “Southwest 1455 maintain 230 or greater until advised please” 18:05 “descend to 5000 ft, following company traffic at 12 miles” 18:08 “cross Van Nuys at or above three thousand, cleared visual approach runway eight” 8 miles 3,800 ft (msl) © Global Air Training Limited 2010

2,275 ft 200 Kt 2,200 ft/min “whoop, whoop, pull up” 3 Miles 1000ft © Global Air Training Limited 2010

2,275 ft 200 Kt 2,200 ft/min “whoop, whoop, pull up” 3 Miles 1000ft © Global Air Training Limited 2010

“2000 gallons unleaded please..” © Global Air Training Limited 2010

© Global Air Training Limited 2010

Crew Captain First Officer 11,000 Hours 9,870 on 737 for SouthWest congenial, mild-mannered, and someone who got along well with everyone. First Officer 5,000 hours 2,500 hours 737 for SouthWest 12 years USAF F-15 above-average, good skills, good judgment © Global Air Training Limited 2010

The Captain failed to “Go-around” What went wrong The Captain failed to “Go-around” The First Officer failed to perform his duties regarding: calling deviations from approach normal criteria check lists © Global Air Training Limited 2010

Why? They were two hours behind schedule pressure to avoid further delay caused by going around. Peer pressure – All other crews on the radio frequency would be aware of their ‘failing’ to make the approach. this was home base the aircraft ahead was also Southwest FO pressure not to challenge his superior Risk shift FO failed under stress to complete simple tasks Both failed under stress to respond to the continuous GPWS warnings © Global Air Training Limited 2010

Lessons The crew were They succumbed to Under stress Skilled Experienced Current They succumbed to Peer Pressure Operational Pressures Under stress Inability to perform simple tasks Judgement was compromised © Global Air Training Limited 2010

Primary Causes of Fatal Accidents Inadequate Communication Deviation from SOP’s Maintenance Error Poor Response to, or no GPWS © Global Air Training Limited 2010