ThreeBallot, VAV, and Twin

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Presentation transcript:

ThreeBallot, VAV, and Twin Ballot Box Ballot Mixer Receipt G B + - ThreeBallot, VAV, and Twin Ronald L. Rivest – MIT CSAIL Warren D. Smith - CRV Talk at EVT’07 (Boston) August 6, 2007

Outline End-to-end voting systems ThreeBallot VAV Twin

“End-to-end” voting systems Voter composes and casts ballot as usual, except cast ballot may be encrypted. Cast ballots posted on public bulletin board (PBB). Voter gets “receipt” allowing her to confirm & correct posting of her ballot; receipt is typically copy of cast ballot as it should be posted. Tally is computed by election officials from ballots on PBB (proof of correctness also computed and posted).

End-to-end voting systems VM Result PBB EO Receipt Receipt Voter Cast Ballot Confirm Posting Verify Tally

End-to-end voting systems VM Result PBB EO Receipt Receipt Voter Cast Ballot Confirm Posting Verify Tally “Cast as intended?” “Posted as cast?” “Counted as posted?”

Crypto end-to-end voting systems Cast ballots are encrypted. With encrypted ballots, need to ensure they are “cast as intended” [challenging]. With receipts, need to ensure that they don’t reveal how voter voted [not so hard]. With tally, need to ensure that election result is publicly verifiable [manageable]. Examples: Punchscan, PretAVoter, Scratch&Vote, …

Crypto-free end-to-end systems Is it possible to have an end-to-end voting system without using cryptography?? cryptography ?

Crypto-free end-to-end systems Is it possible to have an end-to-end voting system without using cryptography?? Yes. ThreeBallot. Yes. VAV. Yes. Twin. cryptography ?

ThreeBallot

Voting w/o crypto -- ThreeBallot Each voter casts three plaintext ballots All three cast ballots go on PBB. Voter takes home copy of arbitrarily-chosen one as receipt. Receipt does not indicate how she voted, but serves as integrity check on PBB.

ThreeBallot Each row has 1 or 2 marks. Not 0, not 3. President Alice Bob Charles Vice President David Erica r9>k*@0e!4$% Ballot President Alice Bob Charles Vice President David Erica *t3]a&;nzs^_= Ballot President Alice Bob Charles Vice President David Erica u)/+8c$@.?( Each row has 1 or 2 marks. Not 0, not 3. All three ballots cast and posted on PBB. Voter takes home copy of one as “receipt”.

ThreeBallot Each row has 1 or 2 marks. Not 0, not 3. President Alice Bob Charles Vice President David Erica r9>k*@0e!4$% Ballot President Alice Bob Charles Vice President David Erica *t3]a&;nzs^_= Ballot President Alice Bob Charles Vice President David Erica u)/+8c$@.?( Each row has 1 or 2 marks. Not 0, not 3. All three ballots cast and posted on PBB. Voter takes home copy of one as “receipt”.

Tallying in ThreeBallot Tally as usual: each candidate receives n extra votes (n = number of voters), but election outcome is unchanged. Works for (or can be adapted for) ordinary plurality voting, approval voting, and range voting, but not for IRV or other schemes where voter must rank-order choices. Also doesn’t work for write-in votes.

Casting ballots Votes are cast in a physical ballot box; order of casting is lost, and it is should be impossible to figure out which three ballots originally formed a ballot triple.

Ensuring valid votes Need way to ensure that votes are valid -- voter doesn’t vote zero or three times for anyone. Voter casts ballots through a checker machine that checks validity of ballot triple before allowing them to be cast. Checker Machine Ballot Ballot Box

Making receipts Voter may arbitrarily choose one ballot to be copied as her receipt. No record kept of which was copied. Can integrate copying with checker (Shamos checker). Receipts should be “unforgeable”. Checker Machine Ballot Ballot Box Receipt

Confirming Posting Ballots aren’t posted on PBB until polls are closed. Each ballot should have a unique ID (matching ID on receipt copy), so that ID can be looked up on PBB. Voters should not see (and/or not be able to memorize) ID’s for ballots that were not copied (to prevent vote-selling).

Short Ballot Assumption (SBA) Since ballots are published in plaintext, voters must not be able to identify their ballots by the selection of choices made. Short Ballot Assumption: ballot is short enough so that each possible arrangement of choices likely to have been made by several voters. Can separate ballot into several short ones to ensure SBA. SBA also prevents reconstruction attacks.

Integrity of PBB Since no one knows which ballots posted on PBB have been copied for receipts, any significant tampering with PBB is likely to be detectable.

Coercion-freeness Voter can bring home an arbitrary-looking receipt, independent of her choices. Thus, voter can’t sell vote using her receipt. Adversary (or voter) can’t determine which three ballots were in original triple from PBB and receipt.

Usability Not so good! Voting three ballots would be confusing to many! Note: Can mix “OneBallot” (ordinary ballots) with ThreeBallot: OneBallot voters don’t get receipts. But their ballots posted on PBB are protected along with ThreeBallots.

ThreeBallot is end-to-end ThreeBallot provides end-to-end security: Voter is confident her ballot is cast as intended. Voter can check that her ballot is included in collection of ballots being tallied. Voters can check that tampering with collection has not occurred. Anyone can add up ballots on PBB to obtain correct election result.

(Vote // Anti-Vote // Vote) + G - B + VAV B (Vote // Anti-Vote // Vote)

VAV = ThreeBallot Variation Like ThreeBallot: each voter casts three ballots and takes home copy of one as a receipt. But VAV works for any vote-tallying system (e.g. IRV), not just plurality, approval, and range-voting. Key idea: one ballot may cancel another ballot. Of three ballots cast, two of them must cancel each other.

VAV Example Ballots (Blank) President Alice Bob Charles Vice President David Erica President Alice Bob Charles Vice President David Erica President Alice Bob Charles Vice President David Erica _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 4765239014119052 155236349001341 144578232133782

V A V VAV Example Ballots President Alice Bob Charles Vice President David Erica President Alice Bob Charles Vice President David Erica President Alice Bob Charles Vice President David Erica 1 1 3 3 3 1 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 2 4765239014119052 155236349001341 144578232133782 Second (Anti-) ballot cancels first ballot, since they are identical except for A/V notations. As in ThreeBallot, voter can take home copy of any one ballot as her receipt.

Tallying VAV ballots Tallier finds pairs of V/A ballots that cancel, and removes such pairs from further consideration. (The ballots in a pair don’t need to have originated with the same voter.) Remaining ballots are tallied to determine election results. VAV handles any voting system. VAV also provides end-to-end security.

Ballot original twin Ballot Box Mixer Twin Receipt

Key Idea for Twin With ThreeBallot, voter could not use take-home receipt to sell her vote, because it copied only a part of her ballot. With Twin, voter can not use take-home receipt to sell her vote, because it is copy of some other voter’s ballot. Single original may be copied more than once, or not at all. Simple!

“Mixing up” voter receipts Voter places her receipt into the bin, and receives a copy of some previous voter’s receipt from the bin. First 10 voters don’t get take-home receipt. Voter checks PBB with her take-home receipt. At end of day, bin has all original receipts; enables additional check on PBB. Receipt MIXER BIN

“Mixing up” voter receipts Voter places her receipt into the bin, and receives a copy of some previous voter’s receipt from the bin. First 10 voters don’t get take-home receipt. Voter checks PBB with her take-home receipt. At end of day, bin has all original receipts; enables additional check on PBB. Previous Voter’s Receipt Receipt MIXER BIN

“Mixing up” voter receipts Voter places her receipt into the bin, and receives a copy of some previous voter’s receipt from the bin. First 10 voters don’t get take-home receipt. Voter checks PBB with her take-home receipt. At end of day, bin has all original receipts; enables additional check on PBB. Take-home Receipt copy Previous Voter’s Receipt Receipt MIXER BIN

“Mixing up” voter receipts Voter places her receipt into the bin, and receives a copy of some previous voter’s receipt from the bin. First 10 voters don’t get take-home receipt. Voter checks PBB with her take-home receipt. At end of day, bin has all original receipts; enables additional check on PBB. Take-home Receipt Previous Voter’s Receipt Receipt MIXER BIN

“Mixing up” voter receipts Voter places her receipt into the bin, and receives a copy of some previous voter’s receipt from the bin. First 10 voters don’t get take-home receipt. Voter checks PBB with her take-home receipt. At end of day, bin has all original receipts; enables additional check on PBB. Take-home Receipt Receipt MIXER BIN

“Mixing up” voter receipts Voter places her receipt into the bin, and receives a copy of some previous voter’s receipt from the bin. First 10 voters don’t get take-home receipt. Voter checks PBB with her take-home receipt. At end of day, bin has all original receipts; enables additional check on PBB. Take-home Receipt MIXER BIN

Properties of Twin [Exchange] Voter gets a copy of some other voter’s receipt as her take-home receipt. [Anonymity] Voter does not know which other voter she received copy from. [Collusion-Resistance] Adversary has no good way of collecting all copies of some receipt. [Coverage] Constant fraction of all receipts are copied as take-home receipts, with high probability. [End-to-end security] Twin provides end-to-end security. Twin is similar to “Farnel” protocol, except we are applying it to receipts, not ballots, and we distribute copies rather than originals.

Conclusions End-to-end voting systems provide improved assurance of correctness of election outcome. It is possible to implement end-to-end voting systems without using cryptography.

(The End)