Initial Capabilities Document Review

Objective Purpose: Assess actual JCIDS documents to determine compliance with applicable guidance Build a bridge between old documents and new guidance Address changes from new JCIDS Guidance

Compliance Two parts to compliance Capstone guidance for CBAs / ICDs Format – does the document comply with JCIDS Manual / CDTM Content – does underlying analysis meet the intent of guidance Capstone guidance for CBAs / ICDs CBA is an analytic basis to identify capability gaps / requirements: Validation of an ICD validates; Capability requirements and proposed IOC/FOC meet NMS and CCMD need Prioritized capabilities and do not provide unnecessary redundancy across the Joint Force

Compliance ICDs will typically support an AoA / materiel approach ICD must capture the results of a well-framed CBA or other studies ICD summarizes the results of DOTMLPF-P analysis ICD describes; Military problem being addressed Tasks, Conditions and Standards Capability Requirements and Capability Gaps, Overlaps, Redundancies Risks associated with each capability gap Threat / operational environments DOTMLPF-P analysis Recommended Materiel Approaches ICD is a required input to MDD and guides MSA phase

1. Concept of Operations Summary Executive Summary – one page Describe Joint Concepts, CONOPs, UCP-assigned mission OPLAN / CONPLAN Operational outcomes Integrate into the joint / multinational warfighting force Identify enabling capabilities to achieve operational outcome

1. AAS Concept of Operations Summary Identify the UCP-assigned assigned mission The fundamental purpose of an Armed Aerial Scout is to conduct armed reconnaissance, security operations, and attack missions in support of full spectrum operations. In doing so, it improves the commander's ability to maneuver and concentrate superior combat power against the enemy at the decisive time and place. The following are descriptions of the mission areas this capability contributes to, what operational outcomes it provides and what effects it must produce to achieve those outcomes. Operational outcomes The precise application of combat power and effective synchronization of maneuver and supporting fires require a current and accurate picture of the enemy's current dispositions and activity within a given area of operations. An Armed Aerial Scout plays a critical role in providing this information and provides advantages over other intelligence sources by countering enemy deception efforts, providing improved real-time situational awareness and assessing terrain. Integrate into the joint / multinational warfighting force ???

1. ABSD Concept of Operations Summary Identify the UCP-assigned assigned mission CDRUSSTRATCOM is the lead combatant commander for strategic deterrence planning and is responsible for executing strategic deterrence operations.” Unified Command Plan, 17 Dec 2008, pg 27 The capabilities identified in this Initial Capabilities Document (ICD) directly contribute to the deterrence mission as identified in USSTRATCOM’s Deterrence Operations Joint Operating Concept (DO JOC), tasks established in the Unified Command Plan and requirements ……. Operational outcomes (a) assure friends and allies, (b) dissuade potential adversaries from developing or expanding inventories of (c) deter potential adversaries Integrate into the joint / multinational warfighting force deterrence capabilities complement the joint warfighter’s integrated campaign plan -- preventing the need to escalate to armed conflict.

1. ABSD Concept of Operations Summary Identify enabling capabilities to achieve operational outcome Enabling capabilities required to achieve Assurance, Dissuasion And Deterrence (ADD) include: an understanding of allied and adversary goals, priorities and values an effective Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) providing early warning, assessing programs and threats, adversary behaviors and intentions, targeting, and post attack analysis a secure, survivable Command, Control and Communications the building and cultivation of strategic partners the maintenance of a robust and responsive conventional and nuclear industrial base to sustain capabilities over time and an effective hedge against technical and/or geopolitical uncertainties.

2. Joint Capability Areas (JCAs) Cite the applicable Tier 1 and Tier 2 JCAs Range of military operations Timeframe for IOC based upon input from CCMD / AQ Relevant ISCs, if applicable

2. AAS JCAs Cite the applicable JCAs Range of military operations Battlespace Awareness Force Application Command and Control Net-Centric Range of military operations Conventional Warfare Forcible Entry Unconventional Warfare Show of Force Peace Enforcement Peacekeeping Operations Normal and Routine Military Operations Timeframe timeframe from 2015 through approximately 2024 Relevant DPS’s - ?????

2. ABSD JCAs Cite the applicable JCAs Range of military operations ABSD capabilities reside in FA, supporting the Maneuver and Engagement Tier 1 & 2 JCAs Supporting capability areas include: Battlespace Awareness (BA), Command and Control (C2), Corporate Management (CM), Force Support (FS), Net Centric (NC) and Protection (FP) Range of military operations Deterrence capabilities are applicable across the entire Range of Military Operations (ROMO) Timeframe a 2020 threat environment. Relevant DPSs The ABSD CBA was informed by Defense Planning Scenarios (DPS) 2-4 (Bipolar, Multi-polar and Global Insurgency worlds) . Table 2.1 lists the Steady State Security Posture (SSSP) vignettes

3. Capability Requirements Describe capabilities required in CBA or other study Why are they essential to Sponsor to achieve goals / objectives Relate to Concept, CONOPs, UPC-assigned mission Address compliance with OSD, Joint, National, International, policies and regulations Define capability requirements in JCA lexicon UJTLs / METLs Relevant Range of Military Operations Timeframe Under Consideration Operational attributes, qualitative parameters, metrics Minimum value below which capability will no longer be effective Prioritize capabilities through SWarFs

3. AAS Required Capability Describe capabilities required in CBA the need for an Armed Aerial Scout to enable dominant maneuver for the joint air-ground maneuver force by providing aggressive combined arms reconnaissance. Why are they essential for JFC to achieve objectives The Joint Force Commander (JFC) requires a relatively low cost, armed aerial scout platform that requires minimal training support, is supportable within the planned logistics environment, affordable with the planned level of logistics resources throughout the lifecycle, and is interoperable with organic and joint fires systems and manned/unmanned aviation platforms.

3. AAS Required Capability Capability is required to comply with OSD, Joint, National policies ???????? Identify JCAs to which capability contributes Force Application Command and Control Net-Centric Protect Use JCAs to describe capabilities The Armed Aerial Scout capability gap has been repeatedly identified in previous studies and analysis including: ……. current rotary wing aircraft employed by Army aviation in the armed reconnaissance role have shortcomings in performance, lethality, interoperability and survivability. Prioritize capabilities through SWarFs

3. ABSD Required Capability Describe capabilities required in CBA These required capabilities (listed alphabetically) from the CBA formulated the ICD recommendations. (U) Adaptable (U) Clear/Visible. (U) Credible (U) Effective. (U) Endurable. (U) Global in Coverage. (U) Persistently Present. (U) Responsive. (U) Survivable. (U) Tailorable.

3. ABSD Required Capability Why are they essential for JFC to achieve objectives Capability is required to comply w/ OSD, Jt, National policies above capabilities are essential because they provide credible deterrent tools to the National Command Authority and the Joint Force Commander to achieve military objectives which support Assurance, Dissuasion and Deterrence (ADD). Identify JCAs to which capability contributes directly support both Maneuver and Engagement in the Force Application (FA) Tier 1 JCAs. Use JCAs to describe capabilities The ABSD capabilities do not apply to any Tier 1 & Tier 2 JCAs that have been prioritized by the SWarF process. The STRATCOM SWarF process identified nuclear strike attributes but did not prioritize JCAs Prioritize capabilities through SWarFs These capabilities are rooted in previous USSTRATCOM deterrence analysis and refined in the USSTRATCOM Senior Warfighter Forum (SWarF). A crosswalk of SWarf attributes with ABSD capabilities is found in Appendix I

4. Capability Gaps, Overlaps, Redundancies Describe the missions, tasks, and functions that cannot be performed or are unacceptably limited Describe capability gaps or overlaps in terms of the difference between capability requirements in Sec 3 and performance of current / projected force Proficiency, Sufficiency, capability does not exist or needs to be replaced Identify capability overlaps and / or redundancies Link to CONOPs, UCP mission, etc Prioritize capability gaps based upon operational risk Rules for capabilities Contain operational attributes General enough to not prejudice outcome in favor of a particular means

4. AAS Capability Gaps, Overlaps, Redundancies Describe the missions, tasks, and functions that cannot be performed or are unacceptably limited They are not sufficiently deployable to permit rapid concentration of aviation combat power to support a brigade combat team within 96 hours after liftoff, a division within 120 hours, and five divisions within 30 days. They do not have sufficient responsiveness in terms of speed and range to support operations across the entire area of operation forecast for the Division area in the future Modular Force………… Proficiency, Sufficiency, capability does not exist or needs to be replaced - ??????? Identify capability overlaps and / or redundancies the capability described in this ICD should provide a solution to the armed aerial scout capability gaps resulting from the limitations of currently employed armed reconnaissance helicopters Link to CONOPs, UCP mission, etc - ???? Prioritize capability gaps based upon operational risk - ???

4. ABSD Capability Gaps, Overlaps, Redundancies Describe the missions, tasks, and functions that cannot be performed or are unacceptably limited Capability Gaps. [Remainder of paragraph REDACTED]. Proficiency, Sufficiency, capability does not exist or needs to be replaced Determination of shortfalls as proficiency or sufficiency The capability shortfalls discussed above exist now Identify capability overlaps and / or redundancies There are no excess deterrence capability overlaps or redundancies in the 2020 timeframe Link to CONOPs, UCP mission, etc required capabilities support the Nuclear Response (NR) CONOPS requirement for Force Application…as follows:

4. ABSD Capability Gaps, Overlaps, Redundancies Prioritize capability gaps based upon operational risk For a prioritized list of shortfalls, linkages to JCAs, metrics and minimum values for each capability, see Table 4.1.

5. Threat and Operational Environment Describe Joint operating environment Summarize current and projected threat capabilities (lethal and non-lethal) Reference DIA validated threat documents Defense Warning Office threat validation Approved Service intelligence products

5. AAS Threat and Operational Environment Describe Joint operating environment An armed aerial scout system will operate in both global and regional conflicts in support of operations ranging from peacetime engagements to conventional, high intensity, conventional or nuclear (general) warfare Summarize current and projected threat capabilities Projected threats include small arms, rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs), MANPADS and other surface-to-air missiles (SAM), anti-aircraft artillery (AAA), integrated air defense systems (IADS); fixed wing (including UAS) and rotary wing aircraft and associated air-to-air weapons, IADS; nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons; and information warfare. Reference DIA validated threat documents Reconnaissance Helicopter / Kiowa Warrior System Threat Assessment Report (STAR) – June 2007, Apache Block III STAR – March 2007, Aerial Surveillance and Reconnaissance Threat Environment Description (TED) Approved Service intelligence products

5. ABSD Threat and Operational Environment Describe Joint operating environment Summarize current and projected threat capabilities Operational Environment. Organizational resources.. Projected threat capabilities. [REDACTED]. Reference DIA validated threat documents Approved Service intelligence products All threat-based scenarios and excursions were derived from OSD’s analytic agenda and the Steady State Security Postures highlighted in Table 2.1. Greater detail on strategic environments and scenarios used can be found in Appendix J.

6. DOTMLPF Analysis Assessment of Non-Materiel Approaches Summarize the results of the analysis Identify any changes that could mitigate any identified deficiency If one or more non-materiel approaches mitigate the gap, include in final recommendation Assessment of Non-Materiel Approaches Summarize changes to DOTMLPF-P that were considered Include consideration of Allies, partners, IA, other DOD components

6. AAS DOTMLPF Analysis Summarize the results of the analysis Identify any changes that could mitigate any identified deficiency Doctrine. Changing current Army aviation doctrine will not eliminate or reduce the Armed Aerial Scout capability gap.   Organization. The described Armed Aerial Scout capability gap cannot be eliminated or minimized by instituting organizational changes.   Training. Training and education alternatives cannot address the aircraft performance limitations that comprise a significant portion of the capability gaps. Leadership & Education. Leadership and education changes …..cannot eliminate the capability gap  Personnel. Changes to personnel will not eliminate the …capability gap. Facilities. Facilities changes do not address the capability gap. If one or more non-materiel approaches mitigate the gap, include in final recommendation

6. ABSD DOTMLPF Analysis Summarize the results of the analysis Identify any changes that could mitigate any identified deficiency If one or more non-materiel approaches mitigate the gap, include in final recommendation Non-materiel solutions did not produce an effective U.S. force component for assurance dissuasion and deterrence thus necessitating the need to seek materiel approaches. See Appendix H for a detailed description of the Non-Materiel Solutions considered.

7. Final Recommendations Describe non-materiel approaches Identify DOTmLPF-P recommendations considered as part of materiel solution Identify DOTmLPF-P recommendations considered independent of materiel solution Recommend type of materiel approach Enhance an existing system / Information systems Replace or recapitalize existing system Develop new capability solution Evolutionary development of an existing capability Transformational Approach Mandatory Appendices OV-1 References Acronyms Glossary

Architectures Additional architecture artifacts required in ICD AV-1 OV-1 AV-2 OV-2 CV-1 (Recommended) OV-4 CV-2 OV-5a CV-3 (Recommended) OV-5b (Optional) CV-4 (Recommended) SV-7 or SvcV-7 (Recommended) CV-6

7. AAS Final Recommendations Describe non-materiel approaches Recommend type of materiel approach The DOTMLPF Analysis indicates that a materiel solution is required to eliminate the documented Armed Aerial Scout capability gap. The alternative materiel approaches considered during the Functional Solution Analysis (FSA) include the following six alternatives: New-start Armed Reconnaissance Aircraft. Upgrade an existing Armed Reconnaissance Aircraft  Increased Attack A/C & Organizations. Increased Off-board RSTA Assets.   Unmanned Combat Armed Rotorcraft.   Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Systems Mandatory Appendices OV-1 References Acronyms Others

7. Final Recommendations Describe non-materiel approaches Recommend type of materiel approach Evolutionary development of an existing capability Evolutionary solutions proved most capable in mitigating ABSD shortfalls The analysis of the potential materiel solutions yielded two promising options: A long range penetrating platform was assessed as most promising to mitigate ADD shortfalls A long range penetrating weapon employed by both legacy and future airborne platforms was also assessed to significantly mitigate ADD shortfalls.

ICD Summary Complies w/JCIDS format – does title / document pre-suppose a solution? ICD captures results of well-framed CBA ICD Sections Section1 - CONOPS Summary – emphasis on Joint warfight—not Service stovepipe Enabling capabilities identified Section 2 - Joint Capability Areas (JCAs) Is timeframe appropriate / logical / beyond FYDP Are relevant DPSs identified? Are JCAs appropriate? Section 3 - Required Capability – where you should see that a CBA was conducted Why essential for JFC to achieve objectives; SWarF prioritization Section 4 - Capability Gaps, Overlaps, Redundancies Describe mission, task, functions limited or unable; ID capability overlaps / redundancies; Capabilities contain operational attributes; General enough so not to prejudice outcome Section 5 - Threat and Operational Environment: DIA validated threats Section 6 - DOTMLPF Analysis: Summarize analysis vs how DOTMLPF is affected Section 7 - Final Recommendation: Non-materiel / Materiel approaches IT, Evolutionary, Transformational Mandatory Appendix - OV-1 should reflect operational activities in the CBA

Review If your ICD has the solution in the title ….. If you ICD clearly states “No CBA / analysis was conducted….. If your ICD refers to Lessons Learned and Past Studies……. If your ICD makes no mention of Joint Operations……. If your ICD has a timeframe of last year, this year or next year….. If your ICD makes no reference to any DPS or joint warfighting scenario….. If your ICD makes no reference to risks to operational mission accomplishment…. If your ICD does not have a prioritized list of required capabilities….. If your ICD does not have a list of Capability Gaps against a scenario…. If your ICD lists the solutions required instead of approaches to solutions…. If your ICD makes no reference to any threat environments… If your ICD does not address any analysis on what non-materiel approaches were considered…. And Finally---if the OV-1 in your ICD does not show all 5 Services…..