Comparative political economics Lecture 2 Paolo Graziano

The Westminster model of democracy Majority principle British parliamentary and governmental institutions Need for alternation that prevents ‘elective dictatorship’ Prerequisite: homogeneous societies UK, Canada… … Australia, New Zealand … … Barbados.

The case of UK I concentration of executive power in one- party and bare-majority cabinets (large minority is excluded from power) – exception with minority cabinets in the ’70s cabinet dominance vis-à-vis Parliament (but possible – although rare - vote of no confidence) two-party system: Conservative and Labour party (but recently increase of the Liberal Democrats) majoritarian (single-member districts and ‘first past the post’) and disproportional (votes vs. seats) electoral system. interest group pluralism

The case of the UK II unitary and centralized government concentration of legislative power in asymmetrical bicameral legislature: House of the Commons and House of the Lords flexible (“unwritten”) Constitution absence of judicial review: Parliament is the sovereign authority (except for EU control…) central bank controlled by the executive (1997: power to set interest rates)

The consensus model of democracy more usable for ‘plural’ societies it contributes to conflict reduction… …guaranteeing strong minorities… …limiting the power of majorities. Switzerland, Belgium … … and the European Union.

The cases of Switzerland/Belgium I executive power-sharing in broad coalition cabinets executive-legislative balance of power (possible government instability) multiparty system (religious, socioeconomic and linguistic cleavages) proportional representation interest group corporatism (agreements reached among few strong political and social actors)

The cases of Switzerland/Belgium II federal and decentralized government strong bicameralism (with the partial exception of Belgium) constitutional rigidity: need of ‘supermajorities’ in order to change judicial review (but not in Switzerland) central bank independence

A supranational case of CD: the EU I executive power-sharing in broad coalition cabinets executive-legislative balance of power multiparty system proportional representation interest group corporatism

A supranational case of CD: the EU II federal and decentralized government strong bicameralism constitutional rigidity judicial review central bank independence