Machine Learning for Cloud Security

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Presentation transcript:

Machine Learning for Cloud Security Challenges and Opportunities Andrew Wicker

Cloud Security Security is a top concern when migrating to the cloud Attacks can cause irreparable damage Different industries with targeted attacks Types of Attacks: Data Breaches Leaked Credentials Malicious Insiders API Vulnerabilities Advanced Persistent Threats …

Red Queen’s Race Detecting attacks is nontrivial Tremendous effort to maintain current state of security Even more to detect new attacks Blue Team Red Team

Assume Breach No longer assume we are immune! We can not prevent human error Phishing is still incredibly effective

What can we do to make progress?

Challenge 1: Outliers to Security Events

Outliers to Security Events Finding statistical outliers is easy Finding anomalies requires a bit more domain knowledge Making the leap to security event is challenging

Uninteresting Behavioral Anomalies Simple changes in behavioral patterns are insufficient Typically lead to high false positive rate File access activity: User accesses one team’s files exclusively Suddenly accessing team files from different division within company Risky? Compromise?

Domain Expertise Use domain experts to make the leap “Tribal knowledge” Credential scanning patterns Storage compromise patterns Spam activity patterns Fraudulent account patterns

Threat Intelligence Use threat intelligence data to improve signals Benefits Indicators of Attack Indicators of Compromise Industries targeted IP reputation

Embrace Rules Rules help filter noise from interesting security events Sources: Domain experts TI feeds Easy to understand Difficult to maintain! Be careful relying too much on rules

Incorporating Rules Top-level: Bottom-level: Action OS IP App IsHighRisk AccessFile Windows 10 102.13.19.54 Excel No ModifyFile Windows 8.1 23.12.16.65 Browser AddGroup OS X 74.23.76.12 UploadFile 91.25.46.5 SyncClient AddAdmin 104.43.23.7 Yes If Action is in RiskyActions, then Flag as HighRisk.

Security Domain Knowledge Security Events More Useful Security Domain Knowledge Usefulness of Alerts Less Useful Anomalies Outliers Basic Advanced Sophistication of Signals

Challenge 2: Everything is in Flux

Evolving Landscape Frequent/irregular deployments New services coming online Usage spikes

Evolving Attacks Constantly changing environments leads to constantly changing attacks New services New features for existing services Few known instances of attacks Lack of labelled data

ML Implications Performance fluctuations of training/testing Important for RT/NRT detections Concept Drift Data distributions affected by service changes Monitors Understand the “health” of security signals

Make New Detections, But Keep the Old! Don’t throw out your old detections Old attacks can be reused, esp. if attackers know monitoring is weak Signals are never “finished” Must update to keep up with the evolving attacks

Challenge 3: Model Validation

Model Validation Recap: So, how do we validate our models? Lack of labeled data Few known compromises, if any Changing infrastructure Service usage fluctuations So, how do we validate our models?

What’s Your Precision and Recall? As always, metric selection is critical Precision-Recall curve vs ROC curve How do we define “false positive”? Augment data

Attack Automation Domain experts provide: Inject automated attack data Known patterns Insights into what potential attacks might look like Inject automated attack data Evaluate metrics against this injected data

Attack Automation - Caveat Do not naïvely optimize for automated attacks Precision vs Recall Many events generated by automated attacker may be benign Be careful if labeling all automated attack events as positive label Lean toward precision instead of recall

Feedback Loop Human analysts provide feedback that we can use to improve our models

Challenge 4: Understanding Detections

Understanding Detections Surfacing a security event to an end-user can be useless if there is no explanation Explainability of results should be considered at earliest possible stage of development Best detection signal with no explanation might be dismissed/overlooked

Results without Explanation UserId Time EventId Feature1 Feature2 Feature3 Feature4 … Score 1a4b43 2016-09-01 02:01 a321 0.3 0.12 3.9 20 0.2 73d87a 2016-09-01 03:15 3b32 0.4 0.8 11 0.09 9ca231 2016-09-01 05:10 8de2 0.34 9.2 7 0.9 5e9123 2016-09-01 05:32 91de 2.5 0.85 7.6 2.1 0.7 1e6a7b 2016-09-01 09:12 2b4a 3.1 0.83 3.6 6.2 0.1 33d693 2016-09-01 14:43 3b89 4.1 0.63 4.7 5.1 0.019 7152f3 2016-09-01 19:11 672f 2.7 0.46 1.4 0.03 Good luck!

Helpful Explanations Textual description Supplemental data Variable(s) “High speed of travel to an unlikely location” Supplemental data Rank ordered list of suspicious processes Variable(s) Provide one or more variables that impacted score the most Avoid providing too many variables

Actionable Detections Detections must results in downstream action Good explanation without being actionable is of little value Examples Policy decisions Reset user password

Challenge 5: Burden of Triage

Burden of Triage Someone must triage alerts More signals => More triaging Many cloud services And each must be protected against abuse/compromise

Dashboards! Flood of uncorrelated detections Lack of contextual information

Consolidate Signals

Integrated Risk Reduce burden of triage via integrated risk score Combine relevant signals into a single risk score for account Allows admin to set policies on risk score instead of triaging each signal

Summary Outliers to Security Events Everything is in Flux Model Validation Understanding Detections Burden of Triage