Dr. Darren McKnight Integrity Applications, Inc. Orbital Debris and Breaking Cognitive Biases 4 May 2016 FISO Telecon Presentation Dr. Darren McKnight Integrity Applications, Inc.

Plan of Attack Orbital Debris Cognitive Biases Orbital Debris Introduction Cognitive Biases Identify & Combat Orbital Debris Think “Out of the Box”

Orbital Debris: LEO vs GEO High relative impact velocities (~10km/s) Collisions more likely at extreme latitudes ~18,000 cataloged objects (>10cm) Peaks at 790km and 850km ~500,000 lethal nontrackables (~<5mm) GEO Low relative impact velocities (~500m/s) Collisions more likely during “rush hours” ~1,500 cataloged objects (>1m) Peaks at 75°E and 105°W ~1,000 lethal nontrackables (~<50cm) Over 200 satellite breakups, four collisions of trackable objects, and ~15 impact-induced anomalies – most of these are in LEO

Functional Families of Cognitive Biases Emotional (High Touch) Analytical (High Tech) Inertia Tendency to move in same direction (time, space, and topics) Wishful Thinking (or Anti-WT) Unfounded optimism or pessimism Correlation “See” things that do not exist Signal-to-Noise Ratio (SNR) Cannot see trends due to distractions

Combating Cognitive Biases Inertia Correlation SNR Wishful Thinking PROBLEM Cognitive Biases Analytical Emotional SOLUTION Defenses Keep Fresh Awareness Cognitive Diversity Multiple Reviews Rules/ Checklists RESULT Good Decisions?

In-Flight Anomalies Reported for each NASA Space Shuttle Mission (1981-2010) Anomalies begin to be ignored and deemed as successes rather than indicators of vulnerability, so lulls operators into false sense of security … Challenger Columbia The overall downward trend in reported in-flight anomalies is undoubtedly due, in part, to a decrease in the number of near-misses actually occurring during flights as technology matured. However, it is unlikely that the spikes reflect an increase in true near-miss frequency. Rather clear failures (Challenger, Columbia) trigger an initial burst of attention to searching for near-misses but this vigilance decreases over time so that near-misses are less noticed because of the follow-on successful outcomes. With Exponential Trendlines Added for the Periods before, between, and after the Challenger and Columbia Disasters Spacecraft Anomalies and Failures Workshop, Chantilly, VA, 2015

Space Flight Safety > Environment Sustainability Sustainability1: “development which meets the needs of current generations without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs” Are our current initiatives sufficient to insure sustainability of the space environment in LEO? Could one “massive collision” compromise space flight safety without creating a runaway environment? Deterioration of space flight safety may happen well before the environment becomes visibly unstable or a significant number of breakups occur. Examine event(s) that could push the lethal nontrackable (LNT) collision risk beyond an unacceptable threshold. 0.8%/yr Estimated Peak LNT Collision Risk @860km 1.5%/yr Annual Orbit Failure Rate For All Factors Used by Space Insurance (SI) 1 2 3 LNT Collision Risk (%/yr) 2.5%/yr Threshold For LNT Collision Risk 10y  9.0y +3x of current max +60% above SI limit Summarize the facts of the investigation and motivate people to understand that you do not need a cascading of satellite breakups to have a flight safety situation that is challenging, if not untenable. Selected the 2.5%/yr LNT threat as a quantifiable “line in the sand” that would equate to a reduction to 9yrs of ten year lifetime. 0.8% LNT risk equates to 9.6 years for 10 year lifetime but do not see actual reduction in lifetimes so must consider relative to overall effects… overestimating effects of impacts onto operational spacecraft or using too large of a collision cross-section for disrupting operations? 1Sustainability, 1987 “Our Common Future” by Brundtland Commission of UN.

Collision Rate Cannot Predict When Next Event Will Occur PC = VR*SPD*AC*T ~ N (number of objects) VR is relative velocity SPD is spatial density, # objects per cubic kilometer AC is cross-sectional area T is time considered Collision rate (CR) is PC of 1-on-N taken for all objects (i.e., N-on-N) For a cluster: CR ~ N2

The Mean is Meaningless Clusters: Higher PC and Consequence 1 147 SL-8s 210 Mg ~2,800 ~42,000 ~18,000 ~166,000 ~10,000 ~96,000 Fragments from Massive Collision Catalog LNT 1000 900 800 700 Chance Over 10 Yrs 1/2500 1/400 1/20 LNT PC/yr 15m2 1.7% 2.7% 1.5% 2 17 SL-16s 150 Mg ENVISAT 3 46 SL-8s 74 Mg 147 SL-8 between 960-1000km for 210K kg AC= 14m2, XC= 58m2 17 SL-16 between 835-845km for 150K kg AC= 45m2, XC= 180m2 46 SL-8 between 740-800km and ENVISAT for 74K kg AC= 14/50m2, XC= 118m2 XC = [(Ac)0.5 + (Ac)0.5]2 Other clusters by types 20xCosmos P/L(3250kg)=65,000kg 88xIridium(556kg)=49,808kg 33xSL-3s(1440kg)=47,520kg 20xMeteor(2000kg)=40,000kg Could clearly use distribution of large derelict objects but using same type since they had some clustering due to common operational perspectives and its simplified collision cross-sectional calculations. Altitude (km) Cataloged Population Spatial Density Peaks Highest Second Highest

Collision Rate Non-uniform and Larger Than KTG*-Derived Year # of CAs < 5km < 1km Total PC/yr Min. Miss Dist. 2008 179 6 6.3E-4 115m 2009 166 9 9.6E-5 320m 2010 182 7 1.8E-4 220m 2011 164 8 8.1E-3 44m 2012 157 1.4E-3 50m Ave. 170 7.5 150m Cumulative Encounter-Based Collision Probability Statistical Collision Probability *KTG = kinetic theory of gases

Mitigation and Remediation Debris Remediation ǂ ADR Only Removal Avoidance By Self -Only for operational objects By Other -Variety of options -Spacebased -Groundbased Debris Mitigation -Deorbit in 25 yrs via propulsion, orbit selection, drag, etc. -Do not create debris Collision Avoidance (CA) -Daily JSpOC Warnings -All operational payloads -Typical propulsion Active Debris Removal (ADR) -ID-Despin/Grapple-Remove -Need 30-50 missions/collision prevented -Requires large impulse -Execute over decades -Manage reentry risk STRATEGIC - Statistical Lower half is derelict collision prevention which includes ADR and JCA. Include ion this spectrum of remediation responses anything that would prevent derelicts from colliding: Apply something to disintegrate satellite into sizes smaller than would be a risk to operational spacecraft Salvage the derelicts by some other device to convert the mass into energy or repurposed into new satellites that would preclude the launching of some future mass ??? Just-In-Time CA (JCA) -ID-Intercept/Move -Want low false alarms -Enhanced el set accuracy -Hourly/daily response -No reentry risk TACTICAL - Deterministic Eliminate Derelict In Situ -Disintegrate -Consume -Salvage NON-TRADITIONAL

Observations Using averages and considering ADR = remediation constrains thinking and options Clusters of massive derelicts may have both greater PC and consequence May also be more predictable Environment stability analyses do not definitively prove unique efficacy of ADR Uncertainty of environment evolution not addressed Investigating three major issues pushing existing paradigm: Spacecraft Anomalies and Failures Workshop: Characterize negative influence of debris on operational satellites (i.e., degradation of space flight safety) as proxy for debris population Massive Collision Monitoring Activity (MCMA): patterns of life and better PC determination of “clusters” Just-in-Time Collision Avoidance (JCA): prevent collisions of derelicts without grappling, detumbling, or managing reentry But does leave mass in orbit