Apollo Weize Sun, Mar.10th, 2017.

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Presentation transcript:

Apollo Weize Sun, Mar.10th, 2017

Index Stable Matching Token and Opportunistic Tasks YARN & Apollo

Stable Matching A matching is a mapping from the elements of one set to the elements of the other set. A matching is not stable if: There is an element A of the first matched set which prefers some given element B of the second matched set over the element to which A is already matched, and B also prefers A over the element to which B is already matched.

Example of Unstable Matching A: {D, E, F} D: {A, B, C} B: {E, F} E: {B, C} C: {F, D} F: {C, A}

The Traditional Algorithm of SM In 1962, David Gale and Lloyd Shapley proved that, for any equal number of men and women, it is always possible to solve the SMP and make all marriages stable. They presented an algorithm to do so.  In the first round, first a) each unengaged man proposes to the woman he prefers most, and then b) each woman replies "maybe" to her suitor she most prefers and "no" to all other suitors. She is then provisionally "engaged" to the suitor she most prefers so far. In each subsequent round, first a) each unengaged man proposes to the most-preferred woman to whom he has not yet proposed, and then b) each woman replies "maybe" if she is currently not engaged or if she prefers this guy over her current provisional partner. The provisional nature of engagements preserves the right of an already-engaged woman to "trade up". This process is repeated until everyone is engaged.

Greedy Algorithm of Stable Matching Randomly matching firstly, and updates if it is not stable.

Algorithm adopted by Apollo Apollo adopts a variant of greedy stable matching algorithm For each task in a batch, Apollo finds the server with the earliest completion time as a proposal for that task. If conflict occurs when more than one task proposes to the same server, The server picks the task with least completion time. The tasks not picked withdraw their proposals and enter the next iteration.

Token and Opportunistic Tasks Apollo uses Randomized Allocation Mechanism to make sure that the allocation of tokens is fair. Apollo achieves this by setting a maximum opportunistic allowance for a given job proportionally to its token allocation. For example, a job with n tokens can have up to cn opportunistic tasks dispatched for some constant c. When a PN has spare capacity and the regular queue is empty, the PN picks a random task to execute from the opportunistic-task queue, regardless of when it was dispatched. If the chosen task requires more resources than what is available, the randomized selection process continues until there is no more task that can execute. NOT FIFO!

YARN & Apollo The most significant difference between YARN and Apollo is that: Apollo adapts centralized management. Hadoop/YARN used global capacity queue to specify share of each job. Apollo uses grained allocations and opportunistic scheduling.