S. Kashkarov, Z. Li, V. Molkov

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Presentation transcript:

S. Kashkarov, Z. Li, V. Molkov ICHS 2017 September 11-13, Hamburg, Germany Hazard distance nomograms for a blast wave from a compressed hydrogen tank rupture in a fire S. Kashkarov, Z. Li, V. Molkov

Persistent issue: explosions continue Some reported accident links Hydrogen Safety Panel (USA) is worrying of accidents with CNG cylinders with TPRD: USA: “A garbage truck exploded after catching fire …A total of four houses were damaged in the explosion… ” (http://www.hawkesfire.co.uk/36706) USA: “Car explosion in gas station” (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wPHfiwPSDPM) USA: St. Louis Gas Cylinders Disaster (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EPuTQYHnfoc) China: “Power of Liquid Natural Gas Explosion Accident” (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UI0QWm4TxZU) Pakistan: “CNG cylinders killed more people than US drones” (http://tribune.com.pk/story/362282/transport-safety-cng-cylinders-killed-more-people-than-us-drones-report/) CNG on-board vessels failures (Scheffler et al., 2011)

Harm criteria for people

Harm criteria for people Thresholds defined in the study “No harm” - temporal loss of hearing (∆𝑃>1.35 kPa and 𝐼>1 Pa·s)*; “Injury” – 1% eardrum rupture probability (∆𝑃=16.5 kPa)**; “Fatality” – 1% fatality probability - lung haemorrhage (∆𝑃=100 kPa)**. References: * Baker, W. E., Cox, P. A., Westine, P. S., Kulesz, J. J., and Strehlow, R. A., Explosion hazards and evaluation. Elsevier Scientific Publishing Company, 1983. ** Fugelso, L. E., Weiner, L. M., and Schiffman, T. H., “Explosion effects computation aids,” Gen. Am. Div., Gen. Am. Transportation Co., US, GARD Prog. 1540, 1972. HSE, “Methods of approximation and determination of human vulnerability for offshore major accident hazard assessment.” Supporting document to SPC (SPC/Tech/OSD/30, v. 3), 2010.

Damage criteria for structures Note: * – “No damage” does not fully exclude the damage of building parts. Slight damage may occur, e.g. glass or window frames breakage.

Damage criteria for structures Thresholds defined in the study “Minor damage” - house structures (∆𝑃=4.8 kPa)*; “Partial demolition” - house non-habitable (∆𝑃=6.9 kPa)**; “Total destruction” - almost total destruction (∆𝑃=34.5kPa)**. References: Mannan, S., Lees’ Loss Prevention in the Process Industries, 3rd ed., vol. 1. Elsevier Butterworth- Heinemann, 2005. Clancey, V. J., “Diagnostic features of explosion damage,” presented at the Sixth Int. Mtg of Forensic Sciences, Edinburgh, UK, 1972. HSE, “The Peterborough Explosion. A report of the investigation by the Health and Safety Executive into the explosion of a vehicle carrying explosives at Fengate Industrial Estate, Peterborough on 22 March 1989.,” 1990.

Rupture of a stand-alone tank Blast wave nomograms were built based on the model: Molkov, V. and Kashkarov, S., “Blast wave from a high-pressure gas tank rupture in a fire: stand-alone and under-vehicle hydrogen tanks,” International Journal of Hydrogen Energy, vol. 40, no. 36, 2015, pp. 12581–12603.

Rupture of stand-alone tank Overpressure Nomograms for hydrogen safety engineers

Rupture of stand-alone tank Impulse Nomograms for hydrogen safety engineers

Rupture of stand-alone tank Nomograms for first responders

Rupture of stand-alone tank Nomograms for first responders

Rupture of an onboard tank Blast wave nomograms were built based on the model: Molkov, V. and Kashkarov, S., “Blast wave from a high-pressure gas tank rupture in a fire: stand-alone and under-vehicle hydrogen tanks,” International Journal of Hydrogen Energy, vol. 40, no. 36, 2015, pp. 12581–12603.

Rupture of onboard tank Nomogram for hydrogen safety engineers Overpressure nomogram Onboard application: 60 L and 700 bar onboard tank* *Reference: Yamashita, A., Kondo, M., Goto, S., and Ogami, N., “Development of High-Pressure Hydrogen Storage System for the Toyota ‘Mirai,’” SAE Tech. Pap., 2015.

Rupture of onboard tank Nomogram for hydrogen safety engineers Impulse nomogram

Rupture of onboard tank Nomograms for first responders

Rupture of onboard tank Nomograms for first responders

Harm criteria in different countries Eardrum rupture Fatality Hazard distance deviation 44.5% Hazard distance deviation 60.3% References: USA: NFPA, “NFPA® 2, Hydrogen Technologies Code”, 2011. AIChE, “Guidance for Consequence Analysis of Chemical Releases”, 1999. CCPS, “Guidelines for Evaluating the Characteristics of Vapour Cloud Explosions, Flash Fires and BLEVEs”, 1994. France: Ministère de l’Interieur, “NIO Risque hydrogène”, interieur.gouv.fr, 2013. UK: HSE, “Derivation of fatality of probability function for occupant buildings subject to blast loads,” 1997

Damage criteria in different countries Minor damage to structures Total destruction Hazard distance deviation 4.2% Hazard distance deviation 22.4% References: France: Ministère de l’Interieur, “NIO Risque hydrogène”, interieur.gouv.fr, 2013. UK: Mannan, S., Lees’ Loss Prevention in the Process Industries, 3rd ed., vol. 1. , 2005. Clancey, V. J., “Diagnostic features of explosion damage”, 1972. HSE, “The Peterborough Explosion. A report of the investigation by the Health and Safety Executive into the explosion of a vehicle carrying explosives at Fengate Industrial Estate, Peterborough on 22 March 1989”, 1990.

Concluding remarks The nomograms to assess hazard distances from a blast wave from rupture of stand-alone (stationary) and onboard compressed hydrogen vessels in a fire were developed. The nomograms for first responders are easy to use as they include pre-selected by the authors harm criteria. The nomograms for hydrogen safety engineering give an engineer more flexibility for the more advanced choice of harm/damage thresholds to further apply them for finding a hazard distance. Harm and damage criteria in different countries result in the high dependence (up to 60%) of hazard distances on selected thresholds.

Acknowledgements The authors are grateful to: Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council (UK) for funding the study through The Hydrogen and Fuel Cells Supergen Hub project (http://h2fcsupergen.com/) Fuel Cell and Hydrogen Joint Undertaking for funding through HyResponse project (www.hyresponse.eu).

Thank you for your attention