Safety Performance Review Radu CIOPONEA Performance Review Unit EUROCONTROL

Why is safety performance review useful? The goal of safety performance review is to improve safety The PRC process is composed of performance measurement, consultation and recommendations The PRC is only interested to measure indicators which can provide useful indications to steer performance Performance measurement can give indications on the efficiency of service provision, It also gives indications on the effectiveness and adequacy of regulations.

Safety review State models in best practices The role of CAAs varies across Europe There are different ways of sharing tasks between the CAA, the ANSP and an AAIB (where one exists) Active CAA: investigating and overseeing body; Controlling CAA: regulations and oversight; Regulatory CAA: pure regulatory body. Regulation and oversight are very important for all The real matter is to establish the sharing of safety review between ANSP and CAA/Independent bodies

Safety data flow in best practices Human reporting remains the only reliable reporting. Some States don’t have any Mandatory Occurrence Reporting System for ATCOs to report safety occurrences Automated tools are a good complement to human reporting Severity classification should be determined for all incidents Presently “expert judgment” is used and harmonisation is missing In some States causal factors are only available for serious incidents Very few data available on risk exposure (traffic). Nb. of IFR flights known, but not OAT and VFR flights.

EUROCONTROL and the EU EUROCONTROL has presently 35 Member States The EU has 25 States, soon to be 27; Both organisations want to measure safety; EUROCONTROL has devised a number of Safety Regulatory Requirements, one of which deals with safety reporting and safety review in ATM; The EU has issued a Directive (European law) for the same purpose (applies to the whole of aviation); Together, the EU and EUROCONTROL will need to review ATM safety without duplication or omissions; Most probable compromise: EUROCONTROL will review ATM safety for all its Member States, rather for all ECAC Member States (virtually the whole geographical Europe)

Suggested safety monitoring framework High Level Performance Indicators Incident reports Public information Detection and Reporting ASMT TCAS ATCO Pilots European Common Data base Performance Monitoring, Recommendations Regulated flow Mandatory Regulator confidential Protection for reporting individuals Mandatory reporting EC Dir. 94/56 & 03/42 Monitoring encouraged ICAO annex 13 National Investigation Processes Severity + Risk Exposure (develop) Service provision Voluntary Fast response Confidential Performance Monitoring, Recommendations ANS Co-operative processes

Initial scope for safety review Focus on what ANS can influence (provide added value to safety) rather than considering ATM as a contributing factor ATM can reduce the risk of accidents ATM, Navigation and Surveillance can reduce the risk of CFIT MET can reduce the risk of weather-related accidents PRC Safety performance review will only use validated data Key Indicators are still to be developed Initial KPIs: Airprox RWY incursions A limited number of States with mature systems are involved at this stage; Importantly, the FAA is also involved, which is likely to make the system consistent globally.

Extended scope for safety review Data collection process must be improved; Need to harmonise severity and risk exposure at European level Same standards applied by all (e.g. SRC standards) or Use of legislation / mandatory regulation More KPIs to be developed; Risk model and risk exposure are important elements; Safety targets must be thoroughly developed and validated; No detailed target possible until system is mature; EUROCONTROL strategic target: number of accidents and serious or risk-bearing incidents to remain constant with traffic increase

Possible way ahead for PRC Yearly high-level indicators (European breakdown) – Public Access Safety events in airspace (separation infr. + inadequate separations) weighted on risk exposure data Safety events on the runway (serious RWY incursions. + inadequate separations) weighted on risk exposure data PRC detailed Safety Performance Review – Access restricted to professionals Use of ESARR 2 data More issues (near CFIT + MET related) Analysis on causal factors Meaningful operational breakdown (European level): Controlled / Uncontrolled airspace Complex / simple runway lay out Etc. In a not-so-distant future: State-by-State breakdown and benchmarking

Thank you! Questions? ?