What Is DMARC Brian Reid Microsoft Office Servers and Services MVP

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Presentation transcript:

What Is DMARC Brian Reid Microsoft Office Servers and Services MVP Exchange Server Microsoft Certified Master brian@nbconsult.co | @BrianReidC7

Business Compromise Email or Whaling Attacks Business email compromise attacks cost global industries over $5.3B last year (and $3B the year before) “SMEs have not historically been the target of cybercrime but in 2015 something drastically changed,” Toni Allen, UK head of client propositions at the British Standards Institute (BSI). According to the latest statistics released by cyber security firm Symantec, 1 in 2493 emails in August 2017 was a phishing attack and the organization size does not impact this Business Compromise Email or Whaling Attacks

Important Terms for DMARC Sender Policy Framework SPF DomainKeys Identified Mail DKIM Domain Message Authentication Reporting & Conformance DMARC

What Do I Need To Consider Why should I care and what can I do about implementing DMARC? And also SPF and DKIM which are underlying technologies And how easy is it to implement?

SPF A DNS record that lists your senders of email outbound to the internet Does not contain a policy on what you want the receiver to do if the email fails SPF Works by validating the IP of the “return-path” address. This is the SMTP envelope “from” address and not the “From:” address you see in the email (as emails have two from addresses!) SPF does not protect against “From:” header address spoofing

Example SPF DNS Records v=spf1 mx ip4:17.15.21.14/32 ip4:17.15.21.18/32 ip4:17.15.20.23/32 include:spf.protection.outlook.com include:spf.mailer.net ~all v=spf1 ip4:1.2.5.5 ip4:8.2.7.4 ip4:7.3.2.2 ip4:5.5.1.8 include:_spf.salesforce.com include:spf.protection.outlook.com -all v=spf1 -all

DKIM Need a server or service that can add the encrypted header outbound and to optionally manage the keys and DNS records for you Email is sent in plain with encrypted hash of the original email body and some headers added as additional header to email Note: Sending server can choose what data to include in encrypted header A DNS record that contains a public key is needed to allow receiving server to decrypt the DKIM-Signature email header on receipt and prove email legitimacy The “selector” value allows you to have multiple public/private keys in use

Example DKIM DNS Records Self managed DNS records, or pointers to other domain so someone else can manage the DNS and keys for you. TXT: Twitter: dkim._domainkey.twitter.com CNAME: selector1._domainkey.microsoft.com > selector1-microsoft-com._domainkey.microsoft.onmicrosoft.com > selector2-microsoft-com._domainkey.microsoft.onmicrosoft.com "v=DKIM1; p=MIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQCrZ6z … 6UvqP3QIDAQAB" "v=DKIM1; k=rsa; p=MIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQ … QIDAQAB; n=1024,1435867505,1"

DKIM Headers In Email DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=microsoft.com; s=selector1; h=From:Date:Subject:Message-ID:Content-Type:MIME-Version; bh=RReWBO26GDxuLUCUnsguWs8KWvyIL+vsEKOpAKkgoU4=; b=nUrVswRdttMonJci+GCY8KqSNr1g5MVxrY/MMbTrlmzD56TXYR2KfGWZgX43D+aF7cCTywJ6Y+DGy9OBYRqkryQBDOv2EjmiUD5B3JLkSANGUogWd+LP3shUi8h4eZmvfECJI+pzJiTWa1UQlG3Lr3f3wUo+SMINnDo/FLgNxac= X-DkimResult-Test: Passed

DMARC Allows you to get reports back on the effectiveness of your SPF and DKIM investments Validates that the “From” header is the same as the domains validated by SPF and SKIM Provides clear instructions to the receiving server on what to do with emails that fail SPF or DKIM Allows you to start simply and just report what your receivers are doing But later allows you to control what receivers should do with your email that fails SPF or DKIM

Example DMARC DNS Records Reporting Only v=DMARC1; p=none; I’d like receiver to quarantine email authentication failures v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; The receiver should reject SPF or DKIM failures v=DMARC1; p=reject;

DMARC Reporting Attributes DMARC Version, which is case sensitive (v) v=DMARC1; p=none; rua=mailto:dmarc@dmarc-aggregator.com; ruf=mailto:dmarc-ruf@dmarc-aggregator.com Daily analytics of passes and fails (rua) Copies of failed emails (ruf)

More DMARC DNS Attributes Treat Subdomains Differently v=DMARC1; p=none; sp=reject; rua=mailto:dmarc@dmarc-aggregator.com; ruf=mailto:dmarc-ruf@dmarc-aggregator.com Receive reports on SPF and/or DKIM failure and not only on both v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; rua=mailto:dmarc@dmarc-aggregator.com; ruf=mailto:dmarc-ruf@dmarc-aggregator.com; fo=1 Defines a percentage of email that DMARC applies to (5% in example) v=DMARC1; p=reject; rua=mailto:dmarc@dmarc-aggregator.com; ruf=mailto:dmarc-ruf@dmarc-aggregator.com; pct=5

DMARC Aggregators Companies that take the analytics and forensic data and allow you to review and determine trends and issues Examples include Agari, Dmarcian, DMARCAnalyzer, Return Path and others

DMARC Aggregator Report Demo

DMARC Aggregator Report Demo

DMARC Aggregator Report Demo

DMARC Aggregator Report Demo

DMARC Aggregator Report Demo

DMARC Aggregator Report Demo

DMARC Aggregator Report Demo

DMARC Aggregator Report Demo

DMARC Aggregator Report Demo

DMARC Aggregator Report Demo

DMARC Aggregator Report Demo

DMARC Aggregator Report Demo

Call To Action Implement SPF and DKIM with DMARC reporting – know about your spoofing attacks Scale up to DMARC quarantine and then reject as reporting results allow – reduce your spoofing attacks Ensure you stay on top of required changes to SPF records, especially when visibility into who sends email from your domain in hard to manage