Katrin Hoeper khoeper@nist.gov Channel Bindings Katrin Hoeper khoeper@nist.gov.

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Presentation transcript:

Katrin Hoeper khoeper@nist.gov Channel Bindings Katrin Hoeper khoeper@nist.gov

Outline Why do we need channel bindings? What are channel bindings anyway? How can a channel binding draft help?

Potential Attacks Rogue authenticators in pass-through mode may launch “lying NAS attack” Advertize false information to peer e.g. false SSID, services, roaming fees, etc. users might sometimes not care who provides service but always care about correct billing info info’ EAP peer Authenticator Authentication Server (NAS)

Why is EAP prone to such attacks? Limitations Peer unable to validate info’ No pre-shared keys or PKI Not capable to verify authorization Server unaware of what was advertized to peer No consistency check of advertised info’ and stored info Potential solutions must address one limitation No. 1 requires changing infrastructure No. 2 can be addressed by adding channel binding

Channel Bindings Idea: bind information advertized by authenticator to the channel Definition: EAP channel bindings (c.b.) Check consistency of information advertized to peer and known by the server by an authenticator acting as pass-through device during an EAP session match? info info’ EAP peer Authenticator Authentication Server (NAS)

Use Cases Enterprise Networks Service Provider Networks Single administrative domain AS can know & validate all information for all NASes including the identifiers that are advertized to peers Service Provider Networks Multiple administrative domains, bound with roaming relationships, contracts AS can’t know information for all NASes in all domains AS can validate some advertised information based on contractual agreements

Channel bindings should be added to EAP methods because… Peers can’t directly authenticate NASes and check their authorization; EAP c.b. provides simplest solution. Reuse trust relationship between peer ↔ AS Validate against pre-provisioned info on AS EAP c.b. provides a general higher layer-independent solution to the lying NAS problem Prevents attacks on EAP as well as on higher layer protocols that depend on EAP and involve the NAS It is efficient & secure without modifying EAP framework

How does a c.b. draft help? Instead of individual solutions and analyses for each EAP method, a c.b. draft provides A definition of c.b. and the addressed problems One general c.b. technique incl. security analysis applicable to existing and future EAP methods Specifications of type and format of c.b. data A c.b. draft enhances the security of existing methods and accelerates processing current drafts

What should be specified? Define channel binding in EAP context Goals, attacks, trust model … Define channel binding technique What information should be bound to channel identifiers, service info, domains, fee structure, etc How is this information exchanged data format, encapsulation in EAP flow, etc Who performs consistency check and how server and/or peer, comparison method, notification, etc How are messages protected end-to-end integrity protection, specify keys, MACs, etc Optionally means to extend and add new bindings in the future

Existing Work General EAP-related personal drafts Previous documents RFC 5056 “On the Use of Channel Bindings to Secure Channels”, N. Williams EAP-related personal drafts <draft-clancy-emu-aaapay-00> <draft-clancy-emu-chbind-00> Previous documents <draft-hiller-eap-tlv-00>, expired <draft-salowey-eap-protectedtlv-02>, expired <draft-ohba-eap-channel-binding-02>, expired

Questions? Comments? Volunteers?