Meiosis Meeting at MPI-CBG Dresden, 12-13 October 2015 Fertility: are we condemned to decline? Unexpected results from comparing countries Anália Torres Sociologist Institute of Social and Political Sciences (ISCSP) University of Lisboa GermAge Project Advissory Committee www.analiatorres.com Meiosis Meeting at MPI-CBG Dresden, 12-13 October 2015

Analyzing total fertility rate Analyzing total fertility rate* trends, in a sociological perspective, with special focus on European countries. Comparing fertility trends and patterns in Europe (1990-2013). While not reaching replacement generation levels’(2,1), in several European countries there has been a slow but steady growth and some are very close to attain it. Based on results from different EU research projects we will discuss some hypotheses trying to explain different trends and patterns. Data from ESS, European Social Survey (2002, 2008, 2010, 2012), findings from WORKCARE (2006-2009, EC/FP 6) and WORKCARE Synergies (2009-2011, EC/FP7). Work life balance, public policies, attitudes and values comparing countries, with quantitative but also qualitative methods. *Total fertility rate: number of children born per women in fertile age (15-49)

Fertility rate trends in the different regions of the world (1960-2010)

Global decline, explained certainly by different types of reasons in different regions of the world. A slight rising up of the total fertility rates in Europe and in North America. Focusing our analysis on Europe.

In contemporary western societies, having children is a a decision combining intimate desires (the desire of parenting), private dimensions (when? with whom?); and also objective constraints (stability, money, timing and time, family network) and public constrains (institutional support, kindergartens, family friendly policies, biological and legal conditions); But intimate wishes and private matters have public impacts (sustainability of social security systems, ageing populations and all social problems involved) Domain where the intimate, the private and the public combine in a sui generis way, invading also media, public and political agendas and debates.

Findings from European research are clear, however, about the desire of having children: in the majority of the countries the ideal number of children, for both men and women, is higher, and above generational replacement, than, in average, the real number of children they have (Fahey and Spéder, 2004). We found out too that for women, as well as for men, work is an important dimension of social identity; but its more difficult for women and mothers to combine family life with work (Torres et al. 2012). So what happens in between desire and reality?   We can consider several factors: consequences of the extension of education, the postponement of 1st child, biological calendar, less probability of having another child.

But at sociological level some other reasons can be raised But at sociological level some other reasons can be raised. For example, the fact that women, and especially mothers, participate in the labour market has been considered as one of the main reasons for low birth rates. Discussing the possibility of raising the birth rate we have other arguments: part-time jobs (presumably for “women or mothers”); employment security and economic growth; social policies, family and gender equality friendly policies. immigration policies (even if it can be a positive contribution, we know also that the majority of emigrants tend to adopt the fertility patterns of the country where they moved to) The fact that some European countries raised their fertility rates has puzzled the more sceptical. Where did it happen and why? Let us look at some findings.

Working mothers and total Fertility rate (2010) European social survey, 2010

A trend from the 90s on: mothers activity rate can correlate positively with high fertility rates like what happens in Scandinavian and France. So mother’s activity is not the reason for low birth rates. And what about part-time jobs? Countries that have high rates of mothers in part time jobs (UK or the Netherlands) have also high rates of mothers not participating in the labour market and lower fertility rates than France and the Scandinavian. So let us look closer at the trends in the last 23 years in different European countries;

Scandinavian countries fertility rate (1990-2013)

Scandinavian countries: Scandinavian countries have for the last 20 years fertility rates between 1.5 or 1.6 and 2 (close now to generational replacement with Iceland having overcoming it in 1990 and in 2010). Fertility rate in the first 90s went down slightly (with the exception of Sweden, where the fall was more expressive) but it has been rising since then and until 2010; then it started slightly going down . Scandinavian have social policies inspired by a specific philosophy concerning work life balance that may be synthetized briefly: women have the right to work and to be mothers; men have the right to work and to be fathers; and children should be protected by society as a whole (affordable and good quality childcare facilities). Moreover, they evaluate their public policies and introduce “corrections”.

Southern Europe fertilty rate (1990-2013)

Southern Europe: Fertility rate expressive fall, mainly since the 70s, explained by the combination of urbanization, emigration and cultural change. Since the 90s all southern countries have low fertility rates (from 1,2 to 1,5, the lower value of the Scandinavian being the highest of the southern) in spite of lower women’s and mother’s activity rate. Portugal is the exception within the south with higher activity rates and fertility rates until 2002; but since then it is the country where fertility went down and is now one of the lowest. These low values are fed by a big majority of women with only one child but with very low percentage of childless women (in all southern countries). To explain these trends we have to combine structural factors, low wages, high number of working hours for women as well as for men, lack of family and gender equality policies. Sensitivity to the effect of the crisis.

Northern and Central Europe fertilty rate (1990–2013) With the lowest value we can identify Germany Austria and Switzerland (around 1.4, with stable numbers)

Northern and Central Europe: Two sub groups : Germany, Switzerland and Austria (with stable and very low rates similar to those of some southern countries for a long period of time).And the others. Ireland as especial case. France and Germany two completely very different situations. France is very close (2,0) to values for generational replacement and has steady growth. Different authors explain these by a combination of different type of policies (Fagnani, 2012) having clearly positive effects. In Germany it seems that policies adopted – such as long parental leaves, taken mainly or exclusively by mothers - seem to have no positive effects. When comparing Germany with countries with same fertility rates (like the south) we have to consider a different structure composing the same index or rate (in Germany, higher number of childless women and a small group of people with more than one or two). Some authors point out to being much more difficult in Germany to combine life work work life balance being much more difficult in Germany, especially for women, which might also be attributed to cultural reasons (a strong “motherhood ideology” Kunzler, 2001). Austria and Switzerland seem to follow the same pattern. Netherlands, UK and Belgium reveal also a pattern also a growth in fertility rates especially since 2000 and until 2010.

Eastern Europe fertility rate (1990-2013) Dramatic fall after 1989, political, financial economical and policies changes almost with effects almost immediate effects… Slow rise. Different approaches and policies years later among them.

Eastern Europe : Dramatic fall of total fertility rates after 1989 with political, financial economical and policy changes with almost immediate effects. Slow rise years later with different approaches and policies among them.

Final Remarks There are clear different patterns concerning fertility in Europe. They have to be explained by the interaction of different political, economical, historical, and cultural dimensions: Conceptions or cultures that inspire policies concerning work life balance and gender equality. But also structural, social and economical factors. Where there is a good combination between the right for mothers and fathers to have a job and quality childcare facilities, fertility rates are higher. And these type of solutions seem also the ones preferred by mothers and fathers. Policies do have effects when well targeted and combined with the knowledge of their differential effects on different contexts (ex. of Scandinavian and France). We are not condemned to the decline and we could reach in some countries generational replacement. But the impact of economical and social conditions (crisis) on fertility rates could very well be observed in the majority of the countries: curves that were going up until 2010 slightly begin to fall until at least 2013.

Annexes

Mothers and fathers of children under 10 who carried out paid work in the preceeding 7 days (%), 2008 Mothers and fathers’ activity rates are much closer in some countries (Scandinavian, some Northern an Centre and Slovenia) than in others (southern and some eastern countries);

Average hours of work of mothers and fathers with children under 10, 2008 Hours of work, however, have higher gaps in Northern and Centre countries and are very close in Southern and Eastern countries