Is Land Tenure “Secure Enough” in Rural Rwanda? MICHAEL BROWN and AILEY KAISER HUGHES March 23, 2017

Why an interest in “secure enough” tenure in Rwanda? Background Why an interest in “secure enough” tenure in Rwanda?

Our Understanding of “Secure Enough” Tenure Security of tenure cannot be measured directly and is largely a result of perception (FAO, 2002). “Secure enough” tenure refers to: “…rights to land and natural resources [that] are not arbitrarily contested by the state, private entities, or others… [where] … people have incentives to invest and reap the benefits of their investments” (USAID, 2016). The formalization of land rights is not always the ultimate objective. “The formalization of land rights is not always the ultimate objective, but rather one component of an approach whereby ‘secure enough’ supports participation in economic development, while mitigating against the loss of land rights and access in an ever-changing global economy and environment” (USAID, 2016).

Why apply a “secure enough” framework? Practical and evidence-driven Can be adapted to vision and theory of change A pathway to formalization that starts with empirical evidence Considers the needs of rural farmers while offering safeguards for their core physical asset – land Framework enables balance between what constitutes “secure enough” tenure for individuals and families as well as the Rwandan government

Issues Affecting “Secure Enough” Tenure The evolution of tenure in Rwanda is influenced by growing population, increasing land scarcity and food shortages. Land issues have been linked to the 1994 Rwandan genocide, in which over one million people were killed, millions more were displaced, and the social and economic fabric of the country was destroyed. Note small parcels as well as gacaca and Abunzis. 25 years after the Genocide, Rwanda is a peaceful, stable country, but land pressures continue.

Issues Affecting “Secure Enough” Tenure The evolution of tenure in Rwanda is influenced by growing population, increasing land scarcity and food shortages. Land issues have been linked to the 1994 Rwandan genocide, in which over one million people were killed, millions more were displaced, and the social and economic fabric of the country was destroyed. Note small parcels as well as gacaca and Abunzis. 25 years after the Genocide, Rwanda is a peaceful, stable country, but land pressures continue.

Key Parameters Impacting “Secure Enough” Tenure in Rwanda Annual demographic growth rate of 2.6 percent – population of Rwanda is expected to increase from approximately 12.2 million people in 2017 to about 14.6 million by 2025 Landholdings tend to be small (less than 0.5 hectare per parcel, by some estimates) Customary practices of inheritance, particularly the gifting of land by parents to children (umunani), result in ongoing land subdivisions

Visionary Policies Vision 2020 outlines Rwanda’s vision for agricultural transformation: “replace subsistence farming by a fully monetized, commercial agricultural sector by 2020” In 1999, the government of Rwanda adopted the Succession Law, which established equal inheritance rights for women and men 2004 National Land Policy 2005 Organic Land Law (OLL) outlined procedures for land tenure and titling, registering land and administering land titles, and guidance for land use and development 2013 Land Law Through the implementation of laws and policy, the Rwandan government seeks to formalize land tenure and professionalize agriculture to help its people earn higher incomes.

Transformative Programs Rwanda seeks to transform rural economy through formalization of tenure and agricultural transformation: LTRP successfully registered 11.3 million parcels of land Crop Intensification Program (CIP) and Land Use Consolidation (LUC) designed to transform agricultural practices to increase agricultural productivity and efficiency. CIP and LUC credited with increasing yields of select crops However, evidence suggests decreased decision-making authority and decreased tenure security in some cases Restrictions on sales, land subdivisions (to facilitate LUC), and the ongoing subdivision of land through umunani The Rwandan government seeks to implement policy that will formalize tenure and professionalize agriculture to increase incomes.

Restrictions on Land Subdivisions Rwanda Vision 2020: “Rwandans can no longer subsist on land and ways and means need to be devised to move the economy into the secondary and tertiary sectors” 2004 National Land Policy: “a farming unit should have at least 0.90 ha (hectare) to be economically viable” 2013 Land Law (Article 30): “It is prohibited to subdivide plots of land reserved for agriculture and animal resources if the result of such subdivision leads to parcels of land of less than a hectare in size for each of them.” This rhetoric is echoed in the Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy II (EDPRS 2) and the Strategy for the Transformation of Rwandan Agriculture.

Rwanda LAND Project Research Results Implementation and Outcomes of Article 30 of the 2013 Land Law

Compliance with the Law Rwanda encourages registering a single parcel of land to multiple co-owners (formal co-ownership) rather than subdivisions. Land subdivisions make it difficult for investors who would “use the land more optimally” to invest in Rwandan agriculture, because they would likely have to reach agreements with multiple landowners Formal co-ownership of land is rare Option is not well-known Cost of surveying and registering ownership is too expensive for all but the wealthiest households To comply with the law, a landowner who wishes to subdivide will jointly register the land, which would then be co-owned under a single land title certificate and theoretically managed as a single entity Some see co-ownership positively – more citizens seem to view it negatively Some siblings resist co-ownership, making it hard to reach agreement on land use. Co-ownership complicates the ability to sell one’s land or apply for a loan using the land as collateral.

Non-Compliance with the Law While registration of land rights is widely valued, informal transfers of subdivided parcels are common: Desire to distribute umunani and inheritance among one’s children was the most commonly cited reason for subdivision Informal co-owners still participate in CIP and LUC Sales of land to respond to immediate needs (school fees, medical emergencies, etc.) Informal land transfers not recorded not recorded in Rwanda’s Land Administration Information System (LAIS) Could become harder and harder to identify ownership over parcels; no official boundaries demarcating individual plots Land disputes can arise if records aren’t properly updated and former owners attempt to re- sell the land to another buyer

Impacts on Tenure Security Though well-meaning, Article 30 has negative impacts on tenure security: Curtails owners’ decision-making authority to gift, bequeath or sell land and prevents landowners who purchase or receive subdivided parcels from registering rights Hinders landowners’ ability to take a loan using land as collateral Because rights aren’t registered, decreased ability to respond to challenges to land rights Potential for land disputes as a result of decreased clarity over land rights With informal transactions, buyer does not need to include their spouse as a co-owner, with negative implications for women Complicates divorce proceedings with division of land between spouses Take Away: The policy should be reviewed based on empirical research.

Takeaways and Recommendations

Agricultural Policy and Emerging Threats to Tenure Security Under CIP and LUC, ineffective producers may become landless laborers, be absorbed into alternative sectors or worse still, become indigent Informal subdivisions and transfers associated with implementation of Article 30 of the 2013 Land Law have implications for the sustainability of the LTRP and LAIS. Case load of judicial system overloaded with land disputes However, tenure – even for those holding land informally – is “secure enough” to facilitate investment in land: Perceptions of tenure security remain high Investment in soil conservation – particularly among women – increased following the LTRP – demonstrating perceived security. At least some who hold land informally also participate in LUC, indicating that these farmers continue to invest in their land despite lacking a title certificate Note: A recent World Bank study found that 47% of transfers for newly acquired land have not been registered. Over 2,500 Abunzi local mediation committees convened

Key Take Away Messages Though tenure is currently secure enough to facilitate investment in land, full-fledged implementation of existing policies and law could compromise tenure security in the future. Ensuring secure enough tenure may require less consideration of technical efficiencies and more holistic thought about the social impacts of policies Building secondary and tertiary urban center employment opportunities will be key over the long term Take evidence of inverse relationship between farm size and productivity seriously: small farms showing more productivity than larger farms Build on capabilities of small farmers Reconciling legitimate Rwandan aspirations with the empirical realities of small holders is a big challenge Value risk-coping mechanisms such as internal fragmentation and multi-cropping that improve productivity and provide livelihood security

Recommendations The Rwandan government and donors could: Lead robust research to better understand the farm-size productivity relationship Integrate “secure enough” tenure into its development strategy: Definition could be adjusted over time as development milestones are reached and absorptive capacities of off-farm opportunities grows; start with status quo, then recognition; then progressive formalization of informally subdivided plots Develop criteria to assess secure enough tenure Are perceptions of “secure enough” tenure amongst Rwandans derived from a sufficiently representative sampling? Is smallholder agricultural production being sustained? Is the contribution of off-farm income to rural households continuing to increase? Are smallholder farmers investing in appropriate natural resource management and soil enhancement technologies to assure sustainable productivity? Does the occurrence of local land-related disputes mediated by the Abunzi suggest that tenure is no longer “secure enough,” leading to more arbitrary challenges to small landowner rights (to disproportionate effect on women?) Does research indicate that the cultural imperative of inter vivos gifting (i.e. umunani)/inheritance of land is increasing, stable or decreasing?

Thank you!