COURSE REVIEW AND CONCLUSION 22 April 2009

TODAY’S AGENDA Remind ourselves about non-military security and non-state actors How do they relate to the task of planning a national security strategy/policy? As the nearest example: comprehensive security for Iceland - recent attempts at prioritization - your own views

NON-MILITARY SECURITY We know what it is (recall security spectrum): just three points: - Our sessions have missed some important angles eg food security, crime/internal order - Priorities and definitions change (eg kreppa) -Strong interaction between milit+non-milit bits - in conflict/armed violence situations - what other examples?

NON-STATE ACTORS We know what they are, but are there any we have not concentrated on enough?? General challenge: to restrain the bad roles and exploit the good. What does this demand in terms of - conceptual frameworks? - distinction and balance between different types of actors? - state, non-state and ‘super’- or ‘trans’- state roles, rules, tools ?

APPLYING THIS TO NATIONAL STRATEGY/POLICY In principle simple: Start with list of non-military security challenges, look for links, prioritize Consider necessary inputs of government and other actors Find right means of regulation, communication , practical cooperation (and resource application)

BUT IT ISN’T SO SIMPLE! You have to get there from where you start (practical and psychological blocks) No state is self-contained and self-sufficient - in handling hard security challenges in handling transnational/global challenges (inc those caused by transational non-state actors) All the more so for a ‘small state’!

HOW TO SECURE THE NECESSARY FOREIGN INPUTS/COOPERATION? Bandwagoning with one state (but limits, for new agenda) Working through one or more institutions Helping create global/regional regulation for indirect control/adjudication ‘Altruistic’ help to others in global system Problems: (i) how to choose? ,(ii) historical/mental blocks here too, (iii) always a price to be paid, (iv) challenge of coordination (inc of non-state inputs and outputs)

MORE ON THE ‘PRICE TO BE PAID’ Always loss of autonomy, ‘process’ costs, and reputational/image effects, but also: - Need to adopt/contribute to other’s security agendas both internal and external Likely pressure for stricter regulation/policies than some domestic threats require Likely distortion of agendas/priorities/ resource use: élites understand, but others..?

NOW COMING TO ICELAND.. Initial findings of Societal Security study Spring 2008: Traditional Icelandic security agenda seen as ‘hard’, narrow, elite-owned, ‘outsourced’ But already changing after Cold War and US withdrawal, and certain to change further Some elements of ‘societal’ security without the name’ Elite support (even before kreppa!) for (i) wider more balanced security agenda, (ii) more coordination at PM’s level, (iii) recognition for non-state inputs (but issue of control) Some fears of political manipulation of the ‘societal security’ (or any new) theme

OK BUT HOW TO MAKE UP THE NEW SECURITY AGENDA? Look at handout for different sets of priorities: (A ) Results of Soc Sec survey (B) Contents of Feb09 ‘risk assessment’ report How do they differ? Any thoughts on why?? Any obvious differences from the ‘big boys’ priorities seen at the top of the page??

(C) ISSUES SELECTED BY OUR CLASSMATES (In essays on the topic of comprehensive security for Iceland) Economic Vulnerability/Instability 8, inc 3 ‘top issue’ Military security 7 inc 3 ‘top issue’ Natural disasters 7 inc 1x1st and 4x2nd place Climate change 4 Social Vulnerability/Instability, Infrastructure failure, Crime/sabotage/human accident, Terrorism, Epidemics, Food/water etc shortage – 3 each Energy shortage 2 Migration and Breakdown of Order - 1 each

OUR EXERCISE We will look at a list of all dimensions put forward in these three sources (+add..?) Vote for most important ones Discuss content of each, need for ‘external’ inputs/outputs and ‘price to be paid’ Discuss governance implications inc what is needed to handle the non-state aspects correctly