The Indo-Pacific Challenge Matching Commitments and Resources Toshi Yoshihara U.S. Naval War College

Snapshot of Global Commons

2007 Maritime Strategy “Credible combat power will be continuously postured in the Western Pacific and the Arabian Gulf/Indian Ocean to protect our vital interests, assure our friends and allies of our continuing commitment to regional security, and deter and dissuade potential adversaries and peer competitors.”

Atlantic-Pacific Navy Indo-Pacific Navy

2012 Defense Strategic Guidance “U.S. economic and security interests are inextricably linked to developments in the arc extending from the Western Pacific and East Asia into the Indian Ocean region and South Asia, creating a mix of evolving challenges and opportunities. Accordingly, while the U.S. military will continue to contribute to security globally, we will of necessity rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific region.”

Indo-Asia-Pacific “Spanning from the West Coast of the United States to the eastern coast of Africa and containing eight of the world’s ten most populous countries, the Indo-Asia-Pacific region continues to increase in significance for our Nation as well as for our allies and partners. America’s economy and security are inextricably linked to the immense volume of trade that flows across the Indian and Pacific Oceans. The economic importance, security interests, and geography of this vast maritime region dictate a growing reliance on naval forces to protect U.S. interests and maintain an enduring commitment to the stability of the region.”

Enduring U.S. Interests “The United States has enduring economic and security interests in the Asia-Pacific region. And because the region – stretching from the Indian Ocean, through the South and East China Seas, and out to the Pacific Ocean – is primarily water, we place premium on maintaining maritime peace and security.”

Crossover Trends Anti-piracy by East Asian navies in IOR China’s “one belt, one road” India’s “Act East” policy Japan’s Indian Ocean presence Hypothetical: regional war in East Asia leads to horizontal escalation to IOR

SASC Testimony, March 2015

SASC Testimony, March 2015

An Ocean Too Far? Vast distances Chokepoints Anti-access technologies Force structure

U.S. Navy’s Woes Post-Cold War: Shrinking industrial base Skyrocketing per unit costs Ships retiring faster than they are built Post-911: 2008 financial crisis Two wars in the Middle East Postwar drawdown Current budget crunch: sequestration Baseline fleet 2005-2015: 313-308 ships Below 290 ships since 2009 Battle force size (Dec. 31, 2015): 272

Bush Obama

Congressional Budget Office 2012: The Navy “would never achieve a force of 310 to 316 between now [2012] and 2042.” 2013: “Under its 2014 shipbuilding plan, the Navy would not build enough ships at the right times to meet the service’s inventory goal of 306 battle force ships until 2037.”

Congressional Budget Office 2014: “Under that alternative [historical average] plan, the battle force fleet in 2023 would be about the same size as in the Navy’s plan but by 2044 would number 242 ships.” 2015: “Under this [CBO’s estimated] plan, the battle force fleet in 2023 would be about the same size as in the Navy’s plan but by 2045 would number 237 ships, as opposed to the 305 in the Navy’s plan.”

Resource Mismatch? Projected Size Projected Needs Fmr SECNAV John Lehman: 240-250 ships Center for Naval Analysis: 230 ships by 2030 Fmr CNO Greenert 2012 SASC: 230-235 ships after sequester Fmr CNO Greenert 2013 SASC: 2020 fleet: 255-260 ships 95 deployed; 50 ships in Asian waters Pivot nullified Projected Needs QDR Panel: 346 CSBA: 326 Heritage: 309 CNAS: 300 Cato: 241 Sustainable Defense: 230 PDA: 230

CNO Admiral Richardson “Barring an unforeseen change, even as we face new challenges and an increasing pace, the Defense and Navy budgets likely will continue to be under pressure. We will not be able to “buy” our way out of the challenges that we face. The budget environment will force tough choices but must also inspire new thinking.”

Distributed Power and Responsibility Shared vision among like-minded powers: freedom of the seas “From Wheels to Webs”: beyond hub-and-spoke architecture Networks among local states Bilateral, trilateral, quadrilateral, multilateral

“Global Network of Navies” Integrate allied and partner capabilities Enhance allied and partner capabilities Engage allies and partners in regional and international forums

Convening Power of Navies Tailored to needs and capabilities Inductive approach to shared norms Overlapping networks of permanent to ad hoc relationships Resilient maritime system resistant to revisionism