Evolution of the family A disappearing entity?

Families and households Households: socioeconomic and physical units consisting of individuals who live together (sharing budget and meals) Families: member of hh related by blood, marriage or adoption A family does not comprise more than one hh but many families can reside in one hh

Some difficulties Kin (blood) ties may be spread over many households are linked together (and sharing budgets and decision-making) Individuals may spend time in different households as they grow up though they belong to one family Birth of new household implies physical separation not just a marriage

Type of households Solitary: single individuals Nuclear: couple + children Extended (stem): two-three generations (example: grandparents, parents, children) Complex: multiple (example: grandparents, two married siblings and spouses and children)

Importance of families Child-caring takes place within hh and families Socialization takes place within hh and families Early child influences are set by family life Demography: (mort/fert/migr) takes place within hh and families Economics: Distribution of output Division of labor Risk Insurance (women, children, elderly) Emotional support

Are families disappearing? What implications for human species? Has the new family an evolutionary advantage?

The ingredients out of which we manufacture households The distribution hh by type is a product of two ingredients: Individual (societal) preferences (demand side) Demographic constraints (supply side) Mortality Marriage - Fertility Migration

The effects of mortality: probability of having both GP’s alive (assumptions: childbearing at 25) Life expectancy = 30 Prob at x =0…. .41 Prob at x =5… .30 Prob at x=10… .21 Prob at x=15… .12 Life expectancy=80 Prob at x =0…. .97 Prob at x =5… .95 Prob at x=10… .91 Prob at x=15… .85

The effects of HIV/AIDS Orphanhood Widowhood Skip-generation households: grandparents and grandchildren with no adult generations Older female headed households

What about effects of marriage or fertility? Late marriage leads to delayed childbearing and less overlap between generations (less time with uncles and aunts) Lower fertility: lower number of siblings and cousins

Hajnal’s typology: two types of families and households Western Europe: Low marriage and late start; relative woman autonomy HH based on conjugal ties; nuclear Circulation of “servants” apprenticeship Primogeniture: young-old contracts Eastern Europe Early and universal marriage; little woman autonomy HH based on blood ties; extended Labor inputs in family farms Land partition: collective protection of elderly

Line of demarcation in European fertility

Influence of family types on industrialization Modernization theory: it is industrialization that produces nuclear families How to prove this beyond a doubt? Hajnal: it is the prevalence of nuclear families that enables industrialization Probably an exaggeration although lack of constraints on labor force and longer time to save could have been important contributors

A second massive transformation: from 1950 to 2000 Relatively early and universal marriage No marital disruption except for mortality Most births within marriage Most child experience within nuclear family Marriage is late and less common Marriage is preceded and replaced by unions High levels of marital disruption High fraction of births outside marriage High fraction of child experience in “non-traditional” families

Consequences Fertility levels drop Household types change: increases in lonely households, headed by females Contracts between generations are transformed Childcaring and socialization are transformed: Emotional development Cognitive development A source of inequalities

Changes in Marriage patterns

Marriage timing

The increase in cohabitation Increases in prevalence due to: Increases in marriages preceded by cohabitation Increases of cohabitation among divorced

The increase in divorce Crude rate of divorce has had oscillations, lately a tendency to decline. Meaning? Proportion eventually ending (by year 30) in divorce is now at 50% Proportion ending in divorce by 5th year has remained stationary since 1985 at 20%. Among first unions there has been an increase in that probability from .30 to .34

More on the increase in divorce Large Black-White differentials Large differentials by education

Unmarried births

Transformation of hh

Experience of children

The second demographic transition

What explains this evolution? Economic explanation: Incentives to marriage have diminished; costs have increased Most important is opportunity costs for women Growth of labor force participation of women Growth in autonomy Welfare payments have decreased attractiveness of marriage Many functions of family have been eroded Insurance for elderly and children Education Economic production Sources of status and success

What explains this evolution? Sociological explanation: Secularization and pursuit of individualism Erosion of dependence on family group for status and emotional support (emergence of social institutions) Feedback mechanism: as trend proceeds, it transforms people’s motives Effects of prevalence of divorce on propensity to divorce Benefits/costs become known Acceptability of phenomenon Effects of prevalence of divorce on propensity to divorce