Deterrence, Compellence, and Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) Lecture #5 Deterrence, Compellence, and Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD)

Deterrence Definition: using threats to prevent an actor from taking an undesired action Takes the form: “Don’t do X, or else…” X is the undesired behavior “or else” is the threatened punishment

Deterrence Conventional Deterrence: Example: Operation Desert Shield (buildup of U.S. forces in attempt to deter Iraqi invasion of Saudi Arabia)

Deterrence Nuclear Deterrence:: Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) Critical to Cold War era security strategy, still applies today among some nuclear states (e.g., U.S. and Russia) Assumes minimal level of rationality Destabilizing nature of first-strike capabilities Importance of survivable second-strike capabilities Impact of missile defense on MAD

Deterrence Nuclear Deterrence: Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) Critical to Cold War era security strategy, still applies today among some nuclear states (e.g., U.S. and Russia) Assumes minimal level of rationality Destabilizing nature of first-strike capabilities Importance of survivable second-strike capabilities Impact of missile defense on MAD

Deterrence Limits of deterrence: Non-state actors with no defined territory? Actors with apocalyptic goals/insensitivity to cost manipulations? Rigid/inappropriate organizational routines undermining rationality? (Sagan)

Compellence Definition: using threats to change an actor’s behavior Takes the form: “Do X, or else…” X is the desired behavior “or else” is the threatened punishment (could also involve positive inducements: “Do X, and then you’ll receive reward Y…”) NOTE: some use the word compellence to mean action to change behavior (not just threats)—but it is here defined as coercive diplomacy

Compellence Examples: 1991 U.N. Security Council deadline for Iraq to pull out of Kuwait President Bush’s 2003 Iraq ultimatum (Saddam & sons must leave in 48 hours)

Making an Incredible Threat Credible Successful deterrence and compellence both require a credible (believable) threat. The target actor must believe that you have the capability and the willingness to inflict the threatened punishment if they fail to comply. But some threats are inherently not credible Example: “massive retaliation” (nuclear retaliation against USSR for conventional invasion of Western Europe)

Making an Incredible Threat Credible Strategies for making incredible threats credible: Strategically self-imposed constraints “Rocking the boat” Bringing in other actors who do have credibility

Making an Incredible Threat Credible Strategically self-imposed constraints (“tying your hands”) Example: game of chicken: throwing steering wheel out the window Example: political leaders going public with threats/promises and creating audience costs for backing down (e.g., JFK’s public threat of nuclear retaliation against the USSR during the Cuban Missile Crisis)

Making an Incredible Threat Credible “Rocking the boat”: starting a chain of events that might spiral out of control, thereby raising the stakes and frightening the opponent into backing down Example: U.S. naval quarantine of Cuba during Cuban Missile Crisis

Making an Incredible Threat Credible Bringing in other actors who do have credibility (e.g., solution to credible commitment problem discussed in previous lecture)