Prosunjit Biswas, Ravi Sandhu and Ram Krishnan

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Presentation transcript:

A Comparison of Logical-Formula and Enumerated Authorization Policy ABAC Models Prosunjit Biswas, Ravi Sandhu and Ram Krishnan The University of Texas at San Antonio DBSec 2016 July 18, 2016

ABAC ABAC model components Users (U), subjects (S), objects (O), their attributes (UA, SA, OA) and access rights (R) Authorization policies… R

ABAC Auth Policies Boolean expression Set of authorizing tuples E.g.: auth(u,o,read) ↔ age(u)>18  age(u) <25 ABACα (Jin et al, DBSec 2012), HGABAC (Servos et al, FPS 2014) Set of authorizing tuples E.g.: {(age(u),19), (age(u),20), …(age(u),24)} Policy Machine (JSA 2011), 2-sorted-RBAC (Kuijper et al, SACMAT 2014)

Objective Gain insights into different forms of ABAC auth policy representations Logical Authorization Policy ABAC (LAP-ABAC) Enumerated Authorization Policy ABAC (EAP-ABAC) Quantitative and qualitative comparison Expressive power, ease of administration, etc. ABAC Auth Design Scale LAP-ABAC EAP-ABAC ??

Attribute Domain Assume attributes as functions UA = {age,clr,friends} Range(age) = {1…100}, Range(clr) = {H,L}, and Range(friends) = U Example finite domain attributes Age of user, roles of user, object classification, etc. Example unbounded domain attributes Friends of user, editors of objects, etc. We assume attribute domains to be finite

Contributions and Results Summary Candidate LAP-ABAC and EAP-ABAC models for the purpose of this investigation LAP-ABAC and EAP-ABAC are equally expressive (recall finite domain) Single (e.g. UA = {age}) and multi-attribute (e.g. UA = {age,group,clr}) ABACs are equally expressive However, LAP-ABACs and EAP-ABACs have their pros and cons on qualitative aspects

EAP-ABACm,n

LAP-ABACm,n

Expressive Power Equivalence Framework used: Tripunitara et al, A theory for comparing the expressive power of access control models, JCS 2007.

Auth Specification in LAP-ABAC Multiple ways to set up a policy (Authread allows manager to read TS objects from home or office).

Auth Update in LAP-ABAC Update Authread so that manager can no longer read TS objects from home

Auth Update in EAP-ABAC

Canonicalization of EAP-ABAC Suppose Authwrite = {({mgr},{TS}), ({mgr,Dir},{TS})} This can be reduced to Authwrite = {({mgr},{TS})} EAP-ABAC auth policies can be efficiently canonicalized as per policy semantics

Comparison Easy to setup Rich & flexible Concise Homogeneous Micro policy Easy to update Pros LAP-ABAC EAP-ABAC Difficult to update Monolithic Heterogeneous Large in size Difficult to setup Cons

Conclusion ABAC should be designed with objectives that go beyond expressive power E.g.: Administration of authorization policy Setting up new policies, update existing policies, etc ABAC Auth Design Scale LAP-ABAC EAP-ABAC ??

Q&A Thank you! Consider submitting your work to ACM CODASPY ’16 Submission deadline: Sept 15, 2016 http://www.codaspy.org/ Thank you!